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1A b str a c t
This thesis describes and implements a method to carry out policy analysis within an 
equilibrium framework. This method allows to account for potential effects induced by 
price adjustments. The analysis is based on overlapping generation, life-cycle models 
where heterogeneous agents make endogenous decisions regarding their consumption 
and education as well as labour supply and criminal activity. Some of the agent’s op­
timising decisions (education, crime) are discrete choices. The first part of the thesis 
deals with the issue of including binary decision choices in a life cycle model: the im­
plications of non-convex choice sets in life cycle models with uninsurable idiosyncratic 
risk are studied in detail and some results on the properties of the individual problem’s 
solution axe provided. Next, we apply the proposed framework to analyse two distinct 
policy questions. The first application looks at the equilibrium analysis of tuition poli­
cies on the distribution of education and income. Empirical evidence suggests a link 
between human capital accumulation and wage dispersion. We experiment with college 
tuition subsidies and find that while in partial equilibrium such policies can be very 
effective in increasing education levels and reducing inequality in general equilibrium 
the results are less encouraging. The second application considers whether policies 
targeting a reduction in crime rates through changes in education outcomes can be 
considered an effective and cost-viable alternative to interventions based on harsher 
punishment alone. I find that policies targeting crime reduction through increases in 
high school graduation rates are cost-effective, especially if they are targeted at the 
poor.
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The chapters of this thesis analyse elements of individual life-cycle decisions including 
consumption, work, education, saving and criminal activity within a structural equilib­
rium framework. Rational agents make optimal decisions based on available resources 
and objectives, as in Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957). They also 
react to changes in the economic environment and policy regime. The aggregation of 
individual choices generates distributions of economic outcomes which are computed 
and studied in detail.
As pointed out by Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005), most studies focussing 
on the distribution of economic outcomes such as earnings, consumption and invest­
ment are descriptive in nature. In order to understand distributional effects and do 
policy analysis it is useful to move beyond descriptive statistics and build counterfac- 
tual outcomes. The standard platform of analysis in the policy evaluation field has 
been represented by randomised experiments which naturally or artificially provide a 
comparison between a treatment and a control group (for a discussion see Heckman 
(1992)). Meghir (2006) points out that randomisation and quasi-experimental meth­
ods can offer only limited answers to the questions of policy design and there is ample 
scope to complement them with alternative methods. The limitations of standard 
randomisation methods stem from different aspects of the evaluation problem. For 
example, it may be the case that the implementation of a programme induces changes 
in individual behaviour which bear effects in the long-term and are hardly captured by
11
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short-term comparisons of treatment and control group (see Heckman, Lochner, and 
Cossa (2002), and Jerome, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2006), for examples and 
discussions of this issue). Methods that are able to approximate long-term outcomes 
axe a valuable addition to short-term analysis. A second, serious problem is that a 
policy intervention can have effects on individuals who are not directly targeted. This 
is a violation of the basic identification assumption which allows to distinguish be­
tween treatment and control groups. Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2006) find evidence 
of such violation using experimental data from Mexico. Finally, while small scale 
interventions can have negligible effects on prices, the same is not necessarily true 
of broad programmes characterized by large take-up rates, (see Heckman, Lochner, 
and Taber (1998a, 1998b, 1998c), Alonso-Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde, and Galdon- 
Sanchez (2004), Lee and Wolpin (2006)). If policy interventions simultaneously alter 
the behaviour of many agents they can induce changes in the economic environment, 
for example by determining new levels of aggregate labor supply or capital accumula­
tion. In this way, policies targeting the wider population potentially induce variation 
in market prices which can account for a substantial portion of the final outcome.
The programme evaluation literature often assumes a simple dichotomy between 
treatment and control: agents are usually split into two groups, treated and non 
treated. Being part of a treatment group is often associated to an agent’s optimal 
take-up decision as well as some assignment rule, and it can depend on discrete choices 
like being part of the workforce or studying. Modelling binary choices presents ana­
lytical and computational challenges because of non-convexities in the choice sets.
The first part of this thesis concerns the effect of introducing non-convex choice 
sets in a standard life-cycle maximisation problem, see Townsend and Ueda (2003) 
and Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001). The optimisation problem faced by the 
agents is spelled in detail within a life cycle model with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. 
We discuss the implications of non-convex choice sets and some general properties of 
non concave value functions, with a focus on issues of non-uniqueness and continuity 
of individual optimal policies. We present conditions under which the individual life­
cycle problem can be solved in sequential form and prove existence of an optimal plan.
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Proof is provided that if a functional equation exists, then it achieves the optimum 
value of the sequence plan. Finally, some properties of the optimal binary choice at 
relevant state-space locations are described.
After discussing the peculiarities of models with binary decisions the thesis shifts 
its focus on the implementation of counterfactual analysis for policy evaluation. Two 
different General Equilibrium applications are presented. In the first one a model 
of education, life-cycle labour supply and consumption under uncertainty is specified 
to investigate both short and long term consequences of policies designed to enhance 
investment in Human Capital. The impact of a tuition subsidy, both for the aggregate 
economy and for agents of different ability and wealth, is analysed.
The second application compares the effectiveness of alternative policies targeting 
a reduction in property crime rates. A model with endogenous consumption, saving, 
education and crime decisions is used and different counterfactual scenarios are con­
structed in order to identify the effectiveness and cost of different interventions. The 
reaction to the policy of different types of agents is also studied.
Methods which allow to build counterfactual outcomes (that is, outcomes not di­
rectly observed in data) provide a way to move beyond aggregate measurements of 
policy effects and to establish whether and to what extent different people in an initial 
distribution are affected by some policy. Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro(2004, 2005) 
stress that, unless available panel data are good enough to build alternative outcomes 
in the presence of policy reforms, only counterfactual methods can provide answers 
on how different people “benefit or lose, how much they lose, how they would vote in 
advance of the reform and how they would vote after it is implemented, once the ex 
ante uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of the reform is resolved”.
In both applications the aggregate and distributional effects of the different pro­
grammes are presented. It becomes apparent that aggregate measures provide only 
a rough approximation of the effects of a programme for most individuals. The pol­
icy effects are extremely strong for some groups and almost non-existent for others. 
Moreover, the short-term, off-equilibrium effects are very different from the long-term, 
equilibrium effects.
Chapter 2
On N on-C onvexities in a 
Life-Cycle M odel
2.1 Introduction
Studies on topics such as education, retirement, unemployment and portfolio decisions 
often include binary decision variables on which budget sets depend. For example, 
Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) study an infinite horizon search-theoretic model 
of equilibrium unemployment in which the employment decision is a binary variable. 
They find that the outer envelope of the value of being employed or searching is 
not concave due to the depression where these two conditional values intersect over 
the assets’ domain. This kind of “butterfly” value functions are a common event in 
the presence of binary choices. This chapter discusses the issue of non-convexities 
implied by the presence of binary choice variables in a dynamic programming context. 
Concavity of value functions is a highly desirable thing as it guarantees differentiability, 
sufficiency of the first order conditions for a maximum and applicability of the Envelope 
Theorem. Gomes, Greenwood, and Rebelo (2001) concavize the value function by 
including a normally distributed shock that “fills up” the convex hull generated by 
the “butterfly” crossing. This method is often effective in models with continuous 
future shocks but no general result guarantees the effectiveness of this method under
14
2 On Non-Convexities in a Life-Cycle M odel 15
all circumstances1.
We focus on a finite life cycle model. We prove our results for a model with 
binary, repeated education choices. After solving the problem in sequential form and 
proving the existence of an optimal plan achieving a sequential maximum, we show 
that the maximum can be obtained by a functional equation and that such functional 
equation does exist. We study the functional equation in both its conditional and 
unconditional forms and show that the individual optimal policy (the pair of education 
and asset saving decisions) is piece-wise continuous and, even without an explicit tie- 
break assumption, can be considered for practical purposes as being single-valued. 
Using an argument proposed by Pavoni (2006), we notice that the points where the 
discontinuities occur are the same points at which the policies are not single-valued, 
but such points axe never chosen.
2.2 Literature
Within the infinite horizon models’ family, Townsend and Ueda (2003) study a dynamic 
model with financial deepening, intended in the sense of a binary portfolio choice 
carrying a one-off fixed cost of entry. They present proofs of existence of an optimal 
program and its equivalence with the value function approach. 2 Our work is in the 
spirit of that of Townsend and Ueda (2003), and whenever possible uses notation and 
procedures similar to theirs. However, some of the properties of the finite lifetime 
problem are different and new results are provided for this case.
In the analysis of optimal unemployment benefit contracts Pavoni (2006) discusses 
the case of a non concave value function emerging from the envelope of two conditional 
value functions. He studies the ‘switching points’ (utility levels at which the upper
1A simple argument can show that not all continuous shocks are able to make the unconditioned 
value concave: consider a shock process which can be fully described by its finite mean and variance 
and which is able to concavize the envelope of two conditional value functions. If we let the variance 
of such shock become progressively smaller, there might be a positive variance below which the shock 
process will not vary enough to smooth the unconditional envelope. In other words, shifts in the 
conditional values induced by small enough shocks can be unable to generate a smoothing of the 
unconditional envelope.
2Townsend and Ueda (2003) also show that an optimal portfolio choice can convexify a non-convex 
participation technology.
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envelope function switches between two different conditional functions) and finds that, 
for the class of concave and continuously differentiable functions, each switching point 
possesses a very nice characteristic: the ‘kink’ at the switching point is an ‘inward’ 
one. It can be shown that this implies that the optimal choice of the continuation 
utility can never be at a switching point. We will also make use of this argument.
2.3 A  m odel of education choices
In this chapter we derive the optimal consumption and schooling choices for an indi­
vidual of given ability who supplies labor in a competitive market. A unique good is 
produced in the economy, and it can be either consumed or saved as an asset to carry 
over to the future. Different kinds of education command different returns. Wage 
differences among persons are generated by differences in education (between group 
inequality) and by differences in ability and labor efficiency (within group inequality).
We use the index j  £ T =  { l ,  2 , j }  to indicate agents’age. Agents have 
an age-related probability to die measured by (1 — Sj), with (1 — Sj) < (1 — Sj+1), 
(1 -  s0) =  0 and ( l  -  s j j  =  1.
2 .3 .1  D e m o g r a p h ic s  an d  p referen ces
Each agent’s fife starts at age 1 and lasts at most j  periods, after which death is 
certain.3 Agents axe faced with educational choices at the beginning of their lives and
base such choices on returns and costs of education and on their initial asset holding,
ability and idiosyncratic shocks. Over the life cycle they choose the labor supply path 
that maximizes their expected lifetime utility.
Let e denote the individual educational attainment, e £ S  =  {e i,e 2,es}, with 
e =  e\ the lowest and e =  e% the highest. Also, denote individual ability by 9 £ 
[^ min> 9max ] =  © and let { z } j =1 be a sequence of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks, 
Zj £ Z; finally, use a,j £ A  to denote individual asset holdings at age j .
A ssum ption  1 0 ,  S , Z and A are compact sets. A is a convex set.
3Accidental bequests can be left at the end of life.
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Define the log of individual labor efficiency as
e j ( 0 , e , z )  =  0 +  £ j ( e )  +  z j  (2.1)
where £j (e) is an age-dependent trend in efficiency specific to each education group 
e 6  3 . The market wage for education level e is denoted as we and individual labor 
supply as n € [0,1]. Leisure, Z =  (1 — n), is a choice variable when employed; however 
we assume that the amount of leisure is not a choice variable for students but an 
increasing function of ability, which is defined as f s  =  f s  (6) G [0 , 1].
Agents pay proportional taxes rne and rjt on, respectively, labor and asset income. 
Labor factor prices we, e g Q , and capital factor price r are exogenous and constant.
Individual consumption at age j  is denoted as Cj € 3ft+; direct cost of schooling as 
D e, government subsidies towards education as Tre, intertemporal discount factor as 
P >  0 and individual bequests received by an household at age j  as qj.
The period utility u (c, I) varies with consumption c and leisure / =  (1 — n), and is 
defined as u : 3ft+ x [0,1] — ► 5?. We make the following assumptions on u (c, I):
A ssum ption  2 u(-) is (at least) twice continuously differentiable on its domain,
strictly increasing and strictly concave in both its arguments and satisfies the Inada
conditions, limc >o uc =  oo, limc >00 uc =  0 and lim/ >o ui =  00> so that consumption
is never zero, savings never equal available resources, and agents always consume a 
minimum amount of leisure.
It follows that the domain and range of u (•) are 9R++ x (0,1] and 3ft, respectively.
2 .3 .2  C o n str a in ts
Several constraints restrict the behaviour of agents.
A ssum ption  3 aj >  amin for every j  and ay+1 >  0.
The first inequality is a standard borrowing constraint imposing a lower bound on 
asset holding. In what follows we consider the case of omin =  0.
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The second inequality is a terminal condition for agents reaching age j : they can 
consume all their assets before kicking the bucket but are barred from dying in debt. 
We also assume a law of motion for the transitory idiosyncratic shock 2 .
A ssum ption  4 Let Z  be a compact (Boret) set in 3ft, and let 7t be a transition function 
on the measurable space (Z ,F  {Z)), denoted as TTZj+llzj =  n { zj +1 I zj } ; with z\ =  z\. 
The function 7r (•) has the Feller property and is monotone4.
Sequential problem: given some initial conditions x\, an age 1 agent’s utility over 
sequences of consumption and leisure, c =  |c i ,  -vCjj and I — 1S denoted
as U (x \ , c, I) and can be written as the expected discounted sum of period utilities
U (xi,c,  I) =  EzeZ ^ 2  ( I I Si I P3~lu  (CJ ^
j = 1 \ t = i  J
Such utihty is allowed to take values over the set identified by the following restrictions 
Cj +  aj+ 1 =  [1 +  r (1 -  Tfc)] aj +  we expeJ nj( 1 -  rne) (1 -  dj) -  (D e -  T re) dj (2.3) 
where d^  is a binary variable which is 1 if the agent is in education and 0 otherwise.
2.4 T he agen t’s problem
At the beginning of life individuals decide whether to engage in education or go to 
work.
A ssum ption  5 Agents who terminate education and start working cannot go back to 
education at a later age.
The above assumption can be removed allowing for agents to go back to education:
of course things become more complicated as agents which experience bad labor shocks
4The Feller property holds if and only if the expectation operator using the transition function 
TTzj+x\Zj =  7r{zj+i | Zj}  on (Z, F  (Z)) maps the space of continuous bounded functions on Z  into itself. 
Monotonicity means that for every nondecreasing function /  : Z — > R  the expectation of /  is also 
nondecreasing.
2 On Non-Convexities in a Life-Cycle M odel 19
are more likely to go back to school. However, it could be proven that there is no 
incentive to go back to education beyond a certain age.
The education choice made by each agent depends on the relative returns to dif­
ferent education levels in the economy, the pecuniary costs of schooling De and gov­
ernment education subsidy Tr e, the innate type 9, the current idiosyncratic shock 2 , 
and the current asset holdings a.
A ssum ption  6 (Education Progress) To pass from education level e\ to education 
level e2 an agent has to stay in school from age 1 to age j  (2). Similarly, to pass from 
e2 to e3 an agent has to stay in school from age j  (2) +  1 to age j  (3). No schooling is 
possible after age j  (3).
Involuntary unemployment is not possible in this model.
A ssum ption  7 All agents who decide to work can find employment at the existing 
market wages.
Given some skill prices we, direct costs of schooling D e and government education 
subsidy T*r^ , the binary function dj . X x 0  x ^  x Z  x
describes an agent’s educational choice as a mapping from the space of age, ability, 
education, idiosyncratic shocks and assets into the age j  employment set {0, 1} •, where 
1 stands for full-time education status and 0 stands for full-time worker5.
We define educational attainment as a function e : f l j ^ { 0 ,1} — > 3?, and we 
denote it as
m
e =  ei i f  ^  dj <  j  (2)
j =i
j(3)
e =  e2 i f  j {2)  < ]T d j  < j  (3)
j=i
m
e =  e3 i f  j  (3) =  ^  dj
3=1
5Denote x =  (6, e,_z, a) £  F (X ), where F (X ) =  F (0 )  x F  (3?) x F (Z)  x F  (A) is the a  algebra on 
X  =  ( 0  x  9  x  Z x A ), then d-, =  dj (x ).
2 On Non-Convexities in a Life-Cycle M odel 20
Such educational sorting mechanism hinges on the assumption that progress from 
one educational level to the next may require more than just one study spell.
R em ark 1 Incomplete study spells do not change the educational status (e )^ of an 
agent.
R em ark 2 Conditional on the choice of entering the labor market, the labor supply 
policy of an agent is nj =  nj (0 , e , z , a  | dj  =  0). Using the intra-temporal margin 
condition it is possible to express the individual labor supply as a function of optimal 
consumption and real wage6.
Without conditioning on the current education decision, the optimal policy of an 
agent can be represented as a vector pj =  (dj, aj+i), where aj+\ is the optimal saving 
policy and dj the binary education decision. The policy space P  is
Pj =  (d j,aj + i) e  P  =  {0 , 1} x U+
Life-long profiles for asset holding are uniquely determined by ability, education, 
past asset holdings and individual shocks. Given Xj =  (0,ej ,Zj ,aj ) and dj, we can 
write aj+\ — aj+1 (xj) for j  =  1,..., j .  We assume that initial asset levels axe finite and 
positive, 0 < a\ <  oo, and since aj+\ cannot exceed available resources we have that 
for all j 7
Oj+1 < Raj +  wnj (1 — dj) — (De — Tre) dj (2.4)
The age j  policies that axe feasible when dj_i =  1 axe
Pj G T (x j f l j -1) =  {0,1} x [0, Raj  +  wnj  (1 -  dj) -  (D e -  Tr e) dj] (2.5)
The set of feasible policies T is nonempty and compact valued. When dj_i =  1, T
is a correspondence defined a s T : © x ^ x Z x A  — > (0 ,1} x 3ft+ . In this case
T is generally non convex valued because of the binaxy choice dj (xj). However, T
6The analytical details of the labour/leisure inter-temporal choice are provided in the Appendix.
rHere R  =  [1 +  r  (1 — Tfc)] and w =  we exp£j (1 — rns). Incidentally, we assume w  is finite and 
positive.
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is convex conditional on the implicitly determined dj (xj), that is T ( x j , d j - i  =  1) =
1 x [0, Raj — (D e — T re)] if dj (Xj) =  1 and T (xj,dj_i =  1) =  0 x [0,Ra,j +  wrij] if
dj (xj) =  0 , which are both convex sets.
When dj_i =  0, T is convex-valued: in fact, by assumption 5, the set of feasible 
policies can be reduced to:
Pj G T (x j , d j - \  =  0) =  0 x [0, Raj  +  wrij]
and r  is a convex-valued correspondence defined a s r : 0 x 9 x Z x i  — > 0 x 3ft+ .
The resource constraint implies that, given a value for pj =  (dj,aj+i) and Pj~\  =  
(d j_i,aj), consumption at j  can be written as8
cj (PjiPj-1) =  Raj  +  ™nj  (1 ~  dj) -  (De -  Tr e) dj -  aj +i (2.6)
Using (2.6) we obtain the indirect instantaneous utility
v (p j,£ j,p j_ i) =  u(cj  (dj,dj_i,aj+i,arj)) (2.7)
A ssum ption  8  v : P  x A x P  — ► as defined in {2.7), is a measurable function9.
The indirect utility function U, given initial conditions x\ and policy sequence
p =  {p i, ...,Pj}> is defined as the age 1 discounted sum of indirect instantaneous 
utilities
U (x i ,p) =  EzeZ ^ 2  ( I I Si ) PJ~l w(P3’x3iP3-1) (2-8)
j=i \i= i J
where U : — > 3?, where P J is the j  — product of the set of policies P.
The household problem can then be stated as
U* (x i) =  sup U {x\,p)  (2.9)
p€B(x  i)
8We are using the short notation w =  we (1 — r n e )  exp^'.
9Measurable on the F (P)  x F  (A) x F (P ) cr-algebra. Recall that Xj G A  =  T  x 0  x 3  x  Z x  A
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where B  (xi) identifies the set of feasible policy sequences
B (xi) =  {pj e  T {xj ,pj -1)} (2.10)
2 .4 .1  O p tim a lity
In this section we claim that an optimal plan exists and discuss 
representation of this problem . The relevant proofs are presented
Lem m a 1 The set B{ x \ )  is compact in the j  — product topology.
If the supremum in (2.9) is feasible, then it is also a maximum and the associated 
policy plan p* is the optimal plan.
However, before stating that the supremum operator can be replaced with a max­
imum, we restrict the individual’s utility U (x\ ,c, l )  defined in equation (3.1) to be 
bounded from above.
P rop osition  1 U (x\,c,  I) < oo.
Now we can state the existence of an optimal plan.
P rop osition  2 There exists an optimal plan p* such that U (x\,p*) as defined in 
equation (2.8) is equal to the supremum U* (x\) as defined in equation (2.9).
We use value functions to characterise the optimal path10. Next we show that a 
functional equation is an equivalent and unique approach to the household’s sequence 
problem (2.9).
Lem m a 2 U* (xi) is continuous inx\ ,  measurable inx\  and monotonically increasing
with changes of 9, z \ and a \ .
10In this section we use an hyphen ”/” to identify next period unknown values and often omit the  
age/tim e subscripts for notational simplicity.
the value function 
in the Appendix.
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The functional equation is then
J ( x j , p j - 1) =  sup v
Pjer(xj,pj-i)
(2 .11)
for given initial condition ah-
As, from Lemma 2, U* (ah) is continuous and measurable in ah, J  can be chosen 
from the functional space of continuous and measurable functions, denoted as p.
If there exists a function J  £ p  that satisfies (2.11) then J  (ah) coincides with 
U* (x\) in (2.9). We first note that the demographics of this model imply that 
J (xj ,pj) =  0 for all j  > j .  Then, following Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), 
page 247, and Townsend and Ueda (2001), with slight modifications, we can prove 
that
P roposition  3 The value of the functional J  G p  defined in (2.11) achieves the value 
of the sequence problem U* (ah) defined in (2.9).
C orollary 1 Given x \, the value of J  (ah) is unique and equivalent to U* (ah) .11
We also want to prove that not only the functional equation and the sequence prob­
lem return the same solution value, but that the associated optimal policies coincide.
P rop osition  4 The optimal policies associated to the function equation J  (ah) coin­
cide with the optimal policies of the sequence problem U* (ah).
Having shown the equivalence of the sequence solution and of the functional equa­
tion, we are left to show that a value function exists.
P roposition  5 A value function J * (xj ,pj_ i) satisfying the functional equation (2.11)
11The value of U* (x i) is the supremum of U (xi ,p)  in (2.8) over the set of policies P , and the 
supremum of any function is unique. By proposition (3) J  (x i) achieves U* (x i) , and therefore J  (x i)  
is also unique and equivalent to U* (x i).
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exists. Moreover, the correspondence G : A — > $?+, defined by
G 1 ) =  { Pj  £ r  ( X j , p j - i )  : J* ( x j , P j - 1 ) =  (2.12)
( Pj , Xj )  +  f/zj+llzjr  (xj+i , Pj )  dzj+ 1 }=  V
is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemi-continuous.
Proposition 5 states that the correspondence of optimal policy functions G (x j , P j - i )  
is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemi-continuous. This result turns out to be 
extremely helpful.
2 .4 .2  V a lu e  fu n c tio n s
In this section we study the shape and properties of the value function J* ( x j , p j - 1). 
We call J* ( x j , p j - 1) the unconditional value function because it is defined over all the 
possible (current) education choices.
In order to fully characterize the unconditional value function it is helpful to study 
the two conditional value functions which are obtained by assigning a value to the 
(current) binary choice dj] the conditional versions of J* ( x j , p j - 1) are the value of 
employment when dj =  0 , and the value of education when dj — 1.
We denote the conditional value function as J { x j , p j - \  | condition), with the con­
dition being the value of dj12.
The unconditional functional equation J* (x j , p j - 1) is the upper envelope of the 
conditional values of employment and education. We discuss the properties of such 
envelope and characterize the optimal policies.
Without loss of generality, we reduce the complexity of the value functions as­
sociated to different kinds of employment by making the choice of employment-type 
irreversible (this is equivalent to assume that the costs of reverting to different, feasible 
‘careers’ are sufficiently high).
A ssum ption  9 Working agents can find a job in the spot-market corresponding to 
their own education level or a lower one; this initial choice is irreversible.
12Such notation allows to summarize education status for the last 2 periods (d j_ i and dj).
2 On Non-Convexities in a Life-Cycle M odel 25
We start our discussion by examining the conditional value of employment, that 
we call Wj.
Lem m a 3 Given assumption 5, the conditional value of employment Wj ( 9 , e , z , a ) ex­
ists, is unique and is defined as
J  ( x j , p j - 1 | dj =  0) =  Wj(6,  e, z ,a)  =  (2.13)
=  max u (c, 1 — n) +  Sjfi / 7iyu Wj +1 (0, e, z', a') dz'
a',n J z
Rem ark 3 By Assumptions 6 and 9, Wj (•) is defined for any age j  E [l,J] if e — e\,
only for j  E [j (2) +  1, J\ if e =  e2 and only for j  E [j (3) +  1, J) if e =  e3.
In the class of employment value functions special attention must be devoted to 
the value function of newly employed agents. By assumption 9 this conditional value 
is
J  { x j , p j - 1 =  (1 ,aj)  | dj =  0) =  max {Wj(0 ,e,z,  a )}* lei (2.14)
where e* is the agent’s own education level. It is evident that the conditional value of 
first-time employed equals the highest employment value among those available, and 
is therefore subject to (2.13).
It is possible to prove that the conditional value function of employment is monoto­
nous, concave and smooth, and the optimal policy is single valued and continuous.
P roposition  6 The conditional value function of any employment, Wj (•), has the 
following properties
1. it is monotonically increasing in (6, Zj,aj), concave and differentiable on 0  x Z  x 
A;
2. the associated optimal policy pj =  (aj+i,dj =  0) G T {xj ,pj - \ )  is single-valued, 
and dj and aJ+\ are continuous functions in {6,Zj,aj).
The next step is to examine the conditional value of education, that we call Vj.
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Lem m a 4 The conditional value Vj(9,e, z ,a ) for education participants at age j  £ 
{ 1, j  (3) — 1} exists, is unique and is defined as
J ( x j , p j -1  | dj =  1) =  Vj(0,e, z ,a) =  max u ( c , f e (9)) +  (2.15)a'
+Sjfi J  xz>\z m a x {v j+ i( 6 ,e ',z ' ,a ') ,{W j+i (0 , e , z f,a') Ye=ei}  dz'
where e* is the education level of the agent. Both Vj and Wj are subject to (2.3).
Moreover, the conditional value for education participants at age j  (3), denoted as
Vj(ty(0,e,z,a),  exists, is unique and is defined as
J  (xj ,pj -1  | dj =  1) =  Vj(ty(Q, e, z, a) =
=  max u (c, f e (9)) +  sjfi /  xz,\z max {W j+ 1 (9, e, z ', a') } e* dz'
J z  e
where Wj+i is the only integrand because further education is not an option at age 
j >  j (3 ) .
Obviously Vj can be defined only for a specific subset of ages.
R em ark 4 By assumption 6 , Vj (•) is defined only for j  £ [ l , j  (3)].
Some interesting properties are associated to the value function of education.
P roposition  7 The conditional value function of education, Vj (•), has the following 
properties:
1 . it is monotonically increasing in (9,Zj ,aj );
2 . the associated optimal policy pj =  (aj+i,dj =  1) is upper hemi-continuous in 
(0 , Zj, aj);
3. it has both right and left derivative with respect to aj. Moreover it is the case
dVj(x) ^  dVj(x)
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4- the state space locations where are never chosen. We refer to
them as ‘switch ’ points because at such locations a kink in Vj occurs, indicating 
a switch in the binary variable;
5 . the associated optimal asset policy aj+i is single-valued everywhere but at the 
‘switch ’ points .
The fact that >  ^ 7  ^ implies that the education value is not generally
concave, but only piece-wise concave. This is potentially troubling because it raises 
issues of non-uniqueness of the optimal policies and non-sufficiency of first order condi­
tions, making the applicability of the Envelope Theorem problematic. However, since 
the kink in the upper envelope at the switch points is inward, it is never voluntarily cho­
sen by an optimizing agent because, by continuity, there is a discrete payoff (marginal 
utility jump) by choosing another point arbitrarily close to the switch point. More­
over, given continuity of the assets domain, the probability of ending up in one of those 
switch points due to pure model randomness is arbitrarily close to zero. Therefore, 
having a tie-break condition is not necessary13.
R em ark 5 The locations where switches in conditional values occur (switch points) 
correspond to inward kinks of Vj and are never chosen by optimising agents.
The reason why the inward kink points are not chosen is that a marginal change in 
asset saving can guarantee a positive jump in marginal utility, which makes the kink 
point a suboptimal choice. We conclude that the optimal asset policy is unique at all 
relevant points and is piece-wise continuous between switch points.
These results characterize the unconditional choice problem of an agent who is still 
in education at age j  < j  (3) as
max { V j , Wj }
laj+i 1
13A tie-break condition might still be necessary if the initial wealth endowments were non- 
continuously distributed.
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We call this the unconditional problem because we are not restricting the value of dj. 
A natural corollary follows.
C orollary 2 The optimal unconditional policy pj =  (aJ+i, dj) is single-valued every­
where but at the ‘switch’ points ofVj. The only discontinuities of pj — (flj+i, dj) occur 
at the ‘switch ’ points.
The discontinuities in the asset policies occur at the switch points because of the 
jumps in marginal utility at such locations. Nonetheless, the optimal policy duplet 
Pj =  (a,j+i ,dj )  is continuous between successive switch points.
2.5 Som e properties o f th e optim al binary choice
In this section we discuss some features of the model and characterize a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a reservation policy for educational choice with respect 
to asset holding and ability. We start by arguing that for current asset holding aj close 
enough to the lower bound amin it is the case that Wj ( 9 , e , z , a )  >  Vj(9,  e, z,  a); this 
simply means that very poor people never go into education, regardless of their ability 
or idiosyncratic shock.
Rem ark 6  There exists an e >  0 such that for amin < a < e the following inequality 
Wj(6,  e, z, a) > Vj{6, e, 2, a) holds for any triplet (9 , e, z).
The previous remark follows from the definitions of the conditional value functions 
in (2.13-2.15), with the corresponding budget constraints, and the Inada conditions for 
utility.
A natural question is whether there exists an amount of asset holding that induces 
agents to choose education. We now provide a sufficient condition for the existence of 
at least one asset level at which education is chosen.
P roposition  8 Let Assumption 2 hold, and f e (•) be some (student leisure) function 
strictly increasing in ability 9, 0 < f e (9) <  1 . Take a level of education and current
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shock, (e, z), and let e be the defined as
Raj — a*+l +  wn*
£ ~  Raj -  a*+1 -  (D  -  Tr) 1
where (D-Tr) ra^° °f consumptions when in education and employ­
ment for some given level of present asset holding aj and where a^ +^1,n*^ maximize 
the value of being employed. Given prices, tax rates and direct costs of education, 
and given some c* maximising worker’s utility, if there is a 9 for which the following 
equality holds 14
•  = u ( c * , n
and if is within the student’s budget set, then (9 , a) are such that Vj(9 , ej, Zj,aj2) >  
Wj { 9 , e j , Z j , a f ) .
The above proposition provides a sufficient condition for education to be chosen 
over employment. It is important to notice that the above condition gives some insight 
on the relationship between current asset holding and educational choice: as the current 
asset holding aj goes to , the e as defined above goes to infinity, implying that
the equality u f e (9)j =u{c*, l*)  cannot hold even for very high values of f e (9)-, 
similarly, as aj becomes very large, e tends to zero and at the same time an income 
effect makes I* closer to one (agents supply little labor when they exit education) so 
that the equality described above can hold only for very high values of f e (9). In 
other words, people who are either very rich or very poor are less likely to remain in 
education for different reasons: very poor agents need to work in order to consume 
at the beginning of their lives, whereas very rich people choose to leave education 
because they can afford to consume large amounts of leisure when they are formally 
out of education.
R em ark 7 R is possible to show that for current asset holding aj which are either
14u ( - , f e (6)) is the instantaneous utility when studying and u(c*, l*)  is the instantaneous utility 
when working, with the couple (c*,/*) maximizing the RHS of the equality. Of course the budget 
constraints are different for the LHS and the RHS.
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sufficiently low or sufficiently high, the value of employment Wj lies above the value of 
education Vj .
It follows that if there exist a combination of (6 , a) such that the value of education 
is at least as big as the value of employment, then two cases are possible: (i) there is a 
finite subset of asset levels for which an agent always chooses education over employ­
ment, or (ii) the upper envelope of the two conditional value functions corresponds to 
the conditional value of employment at all levels of current assets.
Finally we provide a parametric equivalent of the condition spelled out in Proposi­
tion 8 for one kind of preferences that we will use in other chapters, specifically CRRA 
in leisure and consumption.
C orollary 3 Let the utility function be of the CRRA kind described in (2.16-2.17) in 
the appendix with a given parameter u and let f e (6 ) be some (student leisure) function 
which is strictly increasing in ability 6 , 0 <  f e (6 ) < 1. Let w be a finite vector
of market-clearing wages in the economy, (rne,Tfc) be the current tax rates on labour 
income and asset returns, and D e and T re be, respectively, the direct monetary cost of 
and subsidy to education. Take any duplet (ej ,Zj ), some current asset holding dj and 
optimal asset saving when employed aj+i (xj). Define the ratio (1 +  e) as follows15
Rdj -  a*+i +  w _ 1 |
Rdj -  a*+1 -  (D e -  T re) 6
for an a* maximising the value of employment which is also within the student’s budget
V
set. If there exists a 0 such that f e (9) — (1 +  e )1-" I*, then there exists (at least one) 
current asset level aj for which Vj{6 R,ej ,Zj ,aj*) > Wj{9R,ej,  Zj, a f )  holds.
We incidentally notice that for 0 < v <  1 we have that f e (6 ) must be larger than 
the optimal leisure P .16.
15Here w  =  we exp£C (1 — rne) and R  =  (1 — r^) (1 +  r).
16Some useful analytical results for the CRRA utility are discussed in the Appendix 2 and will be 
used in the following chapters
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we examine how the inclusion of non-convexities in the choice set due to 
binary decision variables might affect the solution of an otherwise standard life-cycle 
model of consumption with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. Simple conditions necessary 
for the existence of a functional equation representation of the solution are presented. 
We investigate how the standard properties of optimal policies change because of the 
binary decision, and characterize the behaviour of the binary decision in some critical 
state-space locations.
We find that under very standard assumptions a solution of the problem exists and 
can be described through functional equations. We also find that the optimal policies 
are always upper hemicontinuous but not single-valued at all points of the state-space. 
It follows that continuity of the optimal policies is lost through the inclusion of binary 
choices.
However, we argue that for the purposes of numerical implementation the optimal 
policies can be treated as if they were single valued, because the state-space locations 
where they are not single-valued are never chosen and, in presence of a continuous 
shock process, have a probability of occurring arbitrarily close to zero.
Of course, the lack of continuity of the optimal policies represents a very undesirable 
feature for numerical work, which cannot rely on simple local methods to identify 
optimal behaviour.
We also provide some results describing the interaction between discrete choices 
and heterogeneity. In particular, we show how the inclusion of different types of het­
erogeneity makes for more interesting and realistic dynamic binary choices.
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2.7 A ppendix  to  chapter 2
2.7.1 First order conditions and budget sets: education and labour 
supply decisions w ith  C RRA utility
The period utility function for an agent in full time education is
c*7e (0) i-i/
(l-A)
u ( c ) =  1 X  - J (2.16)
where f e (6 ) is a monotonically increasing function of the innate ability parameter 0 . 
The period utility for an employed agent is instead
c1' (1 — n) l -u ^
u(c, l )  =  u ( c , l - n )  = --------- — \ ----------  (2'17)
The analytical forms of uc (c, I) and un (c, /) for this period utilitity of an employed 
agent are
uc (c,l) =  (<? (1 -  n)1- ‘,y X i/c" -1 (1 -  n )1-" (2.18)
u, (c,i) =  ( i -  v)<n ~v
s o  t h a t  (!)■
From the intra-temporal margin we know that (1^-) |  =  we exp£e (1 — rn) and
solving this equality for n — 1 — I we get the optimal supply of labor as a function of
consumption
n =  max { 1 -  ( -— -  J - - , o l  (2-19)
\  V v J we exp*e ( l - T neY J v '
If we plug equation (2.19) into the period budget constraint of a working agent, (2.3), 
we can cancel out labor supply and obtain a ’consumption only ’ budget constraint
cj +  a,j+i =  [1 +  r (1 -  rjb)] dj +  we exp€j (1 -  r n e )  (1  -  - —  -------------    J
V v we expeJ (1 — T n e ) )
= >  V (Cj +  dj+1) =  V [1 +  r (1 -  Tfc)] dj +  uwe expCj (1 -  rne) -  (1 -  v) Cj
= >  Cj +  vdj+i =  v [1 +  r (1 — Tfc)] dj +  vwe exp6-7' (1 — rne) (2 .20)
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Finally, by using the intra-temporal margin, we can express the period utility as a 
function of consumption only
Furthermore we can derive an analytical solution for the labor supply function rij =  
rij (0, e, 2, a), given w e. For notational simplicity we write eq.(2.20) as cj =  v Rdj  +  
vw — uaj+1, where R  =  [1 +  r (1 — r*.)] and w =  we exp€J (1 — rne). Then the optimal 
labor supply function is given by
This expression is useful to analyze the life-long pattern of labor supply and is nothing
v  is the fraction of labor supply directly related to providing utility through con­
sumption, whereas (1 — v) is the leisure-related component of labor supply, depending 
on income and substitution effects.
Notice that Q;+1^ 'R^ Z- < 1, if the budget constraint holds. If ai+l>_Rai — 1 it follows
This simple relationship can go quite far in explaining the labor supply profile of 
an agent with finite life as agents accumulate assets at the beginning of their life (that 
is, when aj+1 > Raj)  we can expect relatively high labor supply, whereas at later 
stages in life, when agents deplete their asset stock, labor supply decreases and, if 
w =  w e e x p eJ (1 — rne) is small enough, it can get arbitrarily close to zero.
(2.21)
1 — A 1 — A
max < 1
max < v  +  {l  — v)
(2 .22)
else than a weighted average of 1 and , with weights equal to v  and (1 — v).
that rij =  1; if aj+i =  Raj then nj =  v. Finally, when ai+1^ Ra) < we have that 
rij — 0.
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2.7.2 Proofs o f lem m as and propositions
P roof o f Lem m a 1. At each j , aj+1 is bounded as shown in equation (2.4). Say 
that hj+i <  oo is the upper bound of a,j+i, then we can define the set
j
B (xi) =  H  [0 , aj+i] 
j =1
The feasible set B  (x\) is the finite product of compact sets and it follows that B  (xi) is 
compact in the j  product topology. This result is also known as Tychonoff theorem17. 
■
P roof o f  P roposition  1.
We can find the upper-bound of U {x\ , c, I) subject to the resource constraint (2.3). 
From ( 2.6) we know that consumption has an upper bound at any j ,  Cj <  cj <  oo. Us­
ing the intra-temporal margin we can express U (x\ , c, I) as a function of consumption 
only U (x\, c) and given u (Cj) < oo we can write
3 3
U (xi ,c) =  E ^  (sjP3~l ) u { c j ) < E Y 2  (sjP3~1) u (cj) <  oo 
j = i j= i
■
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2 . Given initial conditions x\  G A, if the feasible set 
B  (xi) is compact, and the indirect utility U (xi,p)  is upper hemi-continuous on B (xi), 
then, by the Weierstrass Theorem, an optimal plan exists. B  (xi) is compact by Lemma 
1.
To prove the upper hemi-continuity requirement, we first show that c(p) is con­
tinuous in p, and that U {x\,c, l )  is upper hemi-continuous in c. Then, it follows that 
U {x\,p)  is upper hemi-continuous on p  G B  (ah)18.
In order to show continuity of c{p) : B  (xi) —> 3?+ in p G B  (x i), we need to show 
that all its elements Cj (pj ) are continuous in pj.  In equation (2.6) Cj is defined as a
17See Becker and Boyd (1997), page 41.
18This result is from Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), page 58.
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function of pj =  (dj (xj) , aj+i (xj))  where Xj =  (6,ej ,Zj ,a, j ). The function Cj (p j ) is 
continuous in (dj, flj+i) if and only if (d* ,a}+1) (dj ,aj+1) implies Cj (pj) -> c, (Pj).
Note that a convergent sequence in {0,1} must be zeros before converging to zero, and 
ones before converging to one using this result it is easy to check that, given some 
d^  —> dj, Cj as defined in equation (2 .6) satisfies the above condition as a*+1 —> Uj+i- 
So Cj is continuous in p j .
Finally, we have to show that U (xi, c, /) : 3ft+ x [0,1] —^ 5R is upper hemi-continuous 
on c 6  5?+.19 Conditional on the period shock zj,  take some c 6  3ft3 and a sequence 
c1 6  3ft3 such that cl —> c. Then
j
lim sup U (x i,c) =  lim sup }  SjP^~1u(c) (zj)) ir{zj | z j - \ }
i —>oo i —»oo
3=1
Note that, from equation (2.6) the consumption sequence cl has an upper bound at 
every j  that we denote as Cj <  oo,
c} <  Cj Vj
Then the instantaneous utility sequence has also a finite upper bound 
sj(3^~lu (cj) < Sj/33_ 1u(cj) < oo Vj
By the Inada condition u( c j ) > — oo; then
j
-O O C ^ 2  SjP3~ l U (Cj (Zj)) 7T{Zj  I Z j - 1} < OO 
3=1
19We do not concern ourselves with leisure I because the intra-temporal condition for leisure allows 
to reduce the instantaneous utility to a function of Cj alone.
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and we can write the following inequality20
J 1
lim supY I s j p - ' u  ( d  (zj)) tt{ zj | z j - i j  < V  lim supsj (3J~1u (c) (zj)) tt{zj  \ z j - i }
t —>oo — '  i —>oo
j =1 3 = 1
Finally we use the upper hemi-continuity of the instantaneous utility u (•) in c to write 
lim sup Sj f t~lu (dj (Zj)) < Sj f t~l u{cj  (Zj))
i —*-oo
for every j ,21 so that
3 1
Um su p sj/^ -1 « (dj (z j )) 7r{^- | ^-_i} <  Y ^ sj P J~ l u (cj ( z j ) ) * { zj  I zj - 1} 
j = 11^ °° j= i
and hence
hm sup U ( x \ , d )  <  U (ah,c)
i —*oo
which is a sufficient condition for the upper hemi-continuity of U (x i, c) on c e  5R+. ■
P ro o f o f Lem m a 2. Since U (ah, p) is upper hemi-continuous in (x \ , p ), and since 
T is a continuous mapping, then U* (ah) is non-empty-valued, upper hemi-continuous in 
(xi) and compact-valued by Berge’s maximum theorem. See also Townsend and Ueda
20To prove the inequality just take a sequence of J-periods plans conditional on Zj, gm =  
sup { / m, / m+1, ••••}, so that gm >  f n for n > m .  Then, given some initial condition z i, i 9 T n i z3 I 
Z j - 1} >  Yl j =i f j n{z3 I zj - i}- h  follows that
J  J
y ^ T h r fz j  | z j - 1} >  lim sup Y  f i n f a  \ Z j - 1}
n —>ooj =1 3=1
Finally, note that
J  J
E lim sup f ? n { z j  \ Zj -1} >  V ] g ^ { zi  I zi - 1}n —*oo 13 = 1  3 = 1
by definition of lim sup, which delivers the result
J  j
E lim su p /jh r{z j  \ Z j - i }  >  Um sup Y / " n{z j  | Zj_i}n —>oo n —>oo3 =  1 3 = 1
21 In this case we are using the fact that u (•) is by assumption continuous in its arguments and we 
are applying proposition 2, page 47 of Becker and Boyd (1997), claiming that a function /  is u.h.c. if 
and only if /  (x*) >  lim su pj^ ^  /  (x l ) whenever Xi —> x*.
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(2003) and Berge (1997), page 116. Upper hemi-continuity and compact-valuedness 
of the correspondence U* (x\) imply that for any x\  —> x\  there exists a convergent 
subsequence of { U* (a^)} whose limit, as i —► oo, is in U* (S |). Since the supre- 
mum of any function is unique, U* (xi) is single-valued, and therefore the sequential 
chaxacterisation above implies continuity of U* (ah).
Given that the supremum of measurable functions is also measurable22, then U* (ah) 
is measurable by assumption 8 .
As for monotonicity, assuming U* (x\ =  6 ,e\ ,  zi, ai) is achieved by an optimal 
sequence p*, this optimal sequence is also feasible for any other x\ — (6 , e i , z i ,  ai) 
such that either 0  >  6  or z\ > z\ or ai >  d\, or any combination of the three. ■
P roo f o f P roposition  3. By definition in (2.11)
J { x i) =  sup v (p i,x i,p 0) +  (sip)  /  t t (z2 | zi) J { x 2 , p i )dz 2
Pier(ii,p0) Jz
in this expression we can replace J  (x2,pi) with its definition and use the definition of 
v in (2.7) to obtain
=  sup v (pi,Xi,po)  +  
Pier(xi,p0)
+  {si/3) /  7t{z2 I Zi) sup v(P2 ,X2 ,Pi) +  (S2P) 7T(z3 \ z 2 ) J { x 3 , p1) d z 3
Jz  P2er(x2,pi) Jz
then, following Townsend and Ueda (2003), we can write
dz2
sup v (p i,x i,p o ) +
pier(xi)po),P2er(x2,pi)
+  (si/?) /  'k(z2 \ z i )  v ( p 2 , x 2 ,pi) +  (s2/3) /  t t {z3 | z2 ) J { x 3 , p i )dz 3 
Jz  I Jz
dz2
See Stinchcombe and White (1992).
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which in turn gives
sup v(pi,aJi,po) +  (si/3) I tt{z2 \ Z i ) v ( p 2 , x 2 , p i ) d z 2 +
+  (S\S2P2) /  TT (z2 | Zi) TT (z3 I Z2) J  {x3 ,pi) dz3dz2
By applying this substitution j  times, we get
J ( x i) =  sup _ Ez ^ 2  P3 l y (Pj’x3 ’P j - 1)
{Pjer(xj,pj-i)}3j=1 j =1
which coincides with the sequence problem in (2.9). ■
Proof of Proposition 4. See Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), theorem 
9.4, page 251. For a discussion of how the necessary assumptions are satisfied, see 
Townsend and Ueda (2003). ■
Proof of Proposition 5. See Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), theorem 9.6, 
page 263. Assumptions 9.4-9.7 are satisfied, as Z  is compact by assumption 1 and 
its transition function tt (•) has the Feller property, by assumption 5, T is non-empty, 
compact-valued and continuous, the utility is bounded. ■
Proof of Lemma 3. For the existence and the uniqueness of the conditional value 
function see Proof of Proposition 5. All necessary assumptions axe trivially satisfied. 
As for the definition of the employment value, it follows from Assumptions 9,6,4 and 
5. ■
Proof of Proposition 6. Monotonicity of Wj( 6 , e, z,a)  follows from the same 
arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2. Concavity of Wj{6 , e , z ,a)  can be proved 
by backward induction by assumption 3 and the demographic fact that =
1, Wj( 6 ,e, z,a)  =  u (c (0 ,e ,z ,a )  ,n(0,  e ,2,a)), which is strictly concave in both its 
arguments by assumption 2. By assumption 4, if Wj(0,  e, z, a) is strictly concave, then
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such is f z Trz'\z Wj(d,e, z ' ,a/ )  dz'
W j ,  (0, e, z, a) =  max u (c, 1 -  n) +  Sj(3 /  irz n z  W j (0,e, z', a') dz' 
a', n J z
is also concave, as it is the sum of two concave functions. We can repeat this argument 
going backwards up to the first age when Wj can be defined. Differentiability of 
Wj(9, e, z ,a)  follows from concavity, see Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989), Theorem 
4.11, page 85. The conditions for the theorem are satisfied by Assumptions 2 and 
1 and Propositions 5 and 1. Furthermore, the necessary Assumption 4.8 in Stokey, 
Lucas, and Prescott (1989), page 80, is satisfied by the fact that, by assumption 5, 
when dj =  0 the set of feasible policies is reduced to
Pj G r  ( x j , d j - \ )  =  0 x [0, Raj  +  yjrij]
and T is convex in the sense of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). In order to prove 
that pj G r (x j ,d j_ i)  is single-valued and that dj and aj+i axe continuous, we first 
resort to Proposition 5 (Berge’s Maximum Theorem) to claim that the optimal poli­
cies correspondence (2 .12) is non-empty, compact-valued and upper hemi-continuous. 
Then, we notice that by Assumption 5 the value of dj is going to be zero thereafter; 
finally, using the strict concavity of u (•) from Assumption 2 , and noticing that when 
dj =  0 the feasible set r (r j ,d j_ i)  =  Ox [0 , Raj +  wrij] is convex-valued, we argue 
that the optimal asset policy aj+\ (x) is indeed unique. Since the optimal policies cor­
respondence (2 .12) is upper hemi-continuous, dj is a sequence of zeros and the asset 
policy is single valued, we conclude that dj and aj+\ are also continuous functions (see 
also the proof of Lemma 2 for a discussion of this point). ■
Proof of Lem m a 4. Same as Proof of Lemma 3. ■
Proof of Proposition 7. Monotonicity of Vj(0,e, z,a)  follows from the same 
arguments used in the proof of Lemma 2.
In order to prove that the optimal policy pj — (<2j+ i, dj =  1) is upper hemi- 
continuous in {Q,Zj,aj) we use Proposition 5 (Berge’s Maximum Theorem) to claim
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that the optimal policies correspondence (2 .12) is non-empty, compact-valued and 
upper hemi-continuous.
dV' (x)  dV-(x)The existence of left and right derivatives and the property >  dd-'+l _ can
be proved as follows. First, resort to the definition of education value
Vj(6 , e, z, a) — max u (cj, f e (0)) +
Oj + l
4" sjP  J  ^Zj+i\zj m&X eJ + zj+ \i aj+l)> {y^j+ 1 €j+li zj +1) aj+ l) }ej+i=ei } dZj+i
The first component u (cj, f e ( 6 )) can be differentiated with respect to aj. The second 
component is the upper envelope of future realizations of V)+1 and W j+1 . We know 
that Wj+ 1 is concave in aj and therefore differentiable. Moreover, Vj+ 1 is the upper 
envelope of future values of education and/or work. The upper envelope of concave 
and piece-wise concave functions is itself piece-wise concave. Then, given some (0 , e, z),
Vj can be described as a succession of montonous and concave functions over i asset 
intervals such that
•  for any aj <E (aj0 , ^ 0 ) ’ both and _ exist, and ;
•  for aj =  afj \  exists ;
•  for aj =  cl^  , exists ;
,  and dv^ x) >  dvAx)
aild + \aj=$> -  Oaj ‘
Then the boundary points of each interval (^Oj\a^^j are those where the ends 
of two consecutive concave functions meet. At such points it must be the case that 
dVd ^  > . As a proof, suppose that there exists some boundary point off*j + uaj — J
d V ( x )  d V ( x )where -g —  < , then it would not be optimal to switch conditional value at
afj \  and therefore a ^  would not be a boundary point which contraddicts the initial 
statement.
Finally, it is possible to prove that aj is single-valued everywhere but at the switch 
points using Proposition 5 (Berge’s Maximum Theorem) to claim
that the optimal policies correspondence (2 .12) is non-empty, compact-valued and
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upper hemi-continuous. Then, we notice that the value of dj is constant over a given 
concave interval, so that the feasible set T (;rj, dj_i) is convex-valued, and uniqueness 
of the optimal asset policy dj+\ follows. ■
Proof of Proposition 8. First consider the ratio of the consumptions when in ed­
ucation and employment for some given level of present asset holding a j , (o-Tr) >
and then define e as
Raj -  d*+l -I- wn*
6  ~  Rdj -  d*j+ 1  — (D — Tr) 1
where a*+1 denote the optimal asset saving when employed and n* the optimal labor 
supply. Given some (e, z), if there exists a 9 such that u (9)^ — u(c*,l*) for
an e defined as above and within the student’s budget set, with (c*, / *) maximizing 
Wj, then the current asset holding dj that can achieve such e is such that Vj >  Wj. 
This last inequality follows because, keeping present utility constant, the optimal policy 
d*+1 and the associated employment value for next period is one of the available options 
when in education, which means that the value of education is at least as big as the 
value of employment. ■
Chapter 3
Education Decisions, Equilibrium  
Policies and Wage Dispersion
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the effects of alternative policies on the distribution of edu­
cation in both partial and general equilibrium. Empirical evidence suggests a link 
between human capital accumulation and wages dispersion (see for example Mincer 
(1991, 1994)), so that policies affecting education outcomes will also have an impact on 
inequality, productivity and welfare. We use a life-cycle model of labor earnings with 
endogenous labour supply and education choice, allowing for agents’ heterogeneity in 
several dimensions.
Individual choices are analyzed in the context of a general equilibrium model 
with separate, education-specific spot markets for jobs. The unit price of (efficiency- 
weighted) labour differs by education group and equals marginal product.
We are interested in the equilibrium, long-term effects of policy interventions tar­
geting the wider population rather than limited groups, with relative labour prices 
endogenously adjusting to changes in the aggregate supply of educated people1.
1 Admittedly, given that labor is bought and sold on spot markets,the demand for labor is always 
equal to the supply. Alternatively, Acemoglu (2002) studies a model in which the demand for skills 
changes more than proportionally as a response to the increase in the supply of skilled workers.
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We examine traditional policies, such as tuition transfers and subsidies2, but our 
structure could be used to evaluate a number of alternative forms of policy intervention. 
The policy experiments are carried out through numerical simulations, with some of the 
model’s parameters directly estimated from PSID and CPS data and others calibrated 
to match specific long-term features of the US economy. By simulating and comparing 
equilibrium outcomes we aim to explore the quantitative aspects of the relationship 
among education participation, endogenous selection, wages inequality and education 
policy.
When we experiment with college tuition subsidies it becomes apparent that while 
in partial equilibrium such policies can be very effective in increasing education levels 
and reducing inequality in general equilibrium the results axe much less encouraging: 
the main effect of a subsidy there is to increase the supply of human capital as one would 
expect. However, it is the more able but liquidity constrained individuals who take up 
extra education, while the education levels of the less able can actually decrease (they 
are crowded out). Thus the subsidy acts on the composition of those in education. 
In many respects this is in line with results found by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 
(1998b). The inclusion of risky returns on labor earnings and the fact that labor supply 
is endogenous lend additional credibility to the result.
3.1.1 Literature review
Research linking human capital investment to life cycle earnings dates back to original 
work by Mincer (1958), Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967). The first studies ignored 
the important issue of self selection into education, as described by Rosen (1977) 
and Willis and Rosen (1979). Permanent and transitory individual characteristics are 
now acknowledged as important determinants of education choices and have become 
a standard feature of HC models. Empirical evidence supporting the plausibility of a 
link between human capital accumulation and economic inequality has been provided, 
among others, by Mincer (1991).
2Standard education policy is just one of the possible types of human capital policy. For example, 
changes in proportional income taxation affect the life-cycle returns on HC and the opportunity costs 
of education, altering HC investment decisions.
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In work relating education policies and individual preferences Fernandez and Roger- 
son (1995) originally point out that heterogeneity among individuals, whether in terms 
of income, ability or locality, can generate conflicting preferences as to the kind of poli­
cies that are most desirable3.
Studies on the evaluation of policy interventions in equilibrium are more recent. 
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b, 1998c) have led the way in advocating an ap­
proach to policy evaluation which does not overlook equilibrium effects induced by the 
policy4. In fact, statements regarding the effects of policy interventions which ignore 
price changes induced by such interventions axe misleading. Fernandez and Roger- 
son (1998) provide an interesting application of G.E. modelling to the evaluation of 
education-finance reform in the US. Later work by Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro 
(2004, 2005) reinforces the view that models that are able to construct equilibrium 
counterfactuals are essential to understanding the wider consequences of policy inter­
ventions.
In the empirical literature on education policy, early work by Keane and Wolpin 
(1997) focuses on the partial equilibrium effect of a tuition subsidy on young males’ 
college participation. A valuable generalization of their approach within a dynamic 
GE framework is due to Lee (2001). Also Abraham (2001) examines wage inequality 
and education policy in a GE model of skill biased technological change. All these 
studies restrict labor supply to be fixed, although earlier theoretical research has un­
covered interesting aspects of the joint determination of fife cycle labor supply and HC 
investment, among others Blinder and Weiss (1976).
Our model incorporates two twists with respect to earlier work: first, optimal 
individual labor supplies are an essential part of the lifetime earnings mechanism; 
second, agents’ heterogeneity has different dimensions, including a permanent (ability) 
component and a persistent efficiency shock 5. Each agent in our model represents a 
single individual household, consistently with the empirical analysis we produce.
Recent empirical evidence in Hyslop (2001) indicates that labor supply explains
3Femandez and Rogerson (1995) consider ex-ante identical individuals who differ only in income
4Heckman, Lochner, and Taber estimate and simulate a dynamic general equilibrium model of 
education accumulation, assets accumulation and labor earnings with skill-biased technological change.
5 Mortality risk is also explicitly included in the model.
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little of the rising eaxnings inequality for married men, but over 20% of the rise in 
(both permanent and transitory) family inequality during the period of rising wage 
inequality in the early 1980’s 6. Moreover, the response in hours of work to changes 
in net wage is small for prime age male earners. However, as pointed out by Eaton 
and Rosen (1980) in their seminal work on taxation and HC accumulation, even if 
taxes have only a limited impact upon the quantity of hours worked it is possible that 
they have an important effect on their quality, intended as the type of human capital. 
This happens because tax changes can alter the incentives for education. Moreover, 
even if individual labor supplies do not deviate much from some average levels, it is 
the case that average levels may differ between education groups. For given market 
prices, work effort represents the intensity of human capital utilization and individuals 
can self-select into education groups according to their preference for leisure 7. Labor 
supply, therefore, represents an effective channel of adjustment to labor price signals 
and an important determinant of the relative variation in skill prices8.
The other crucial twist in our model is the introduction of individual uncertainty 
over the returns to HC in the form of idiosyncratic multiplicative shocks to labor 
efficiency. As Levhari and Weiss (1974) originally emphasized, uncertainty is of ex­
ceptional importance in human capital investment decisions as the risk associated to 
such decisions is usually not insurable nor diversifiable. Problems of moral hazard 
can be extremely severe when insuring labor risk because idiosyncratic shocks and 
individual ability can be partially or completely unobservable to third parties. Given 
these problems the market is not likely to provide insurance. Using a multiplicative 
form of earnings risk9 Eaton and Rosen (1980) show how earnings taxation has an am­
biguous effect on investment in human capital because it impinges on two important 
parameters of the decision problem: for one, taxation reduces the riskiness of returns
6Hyslop (2001) also shows that labor supply explains roughly half of the modest rise in female 
inequality.
7 This selection in our model happens through permanent unobserved characteristics.
8 Consider, for example, taxes on labor earnings which reduce the return to HC investment but 
also the opportunity cost of being in education represented by foregone earnings. When differences 
in lifetime labor supply between education groups are present, the two effects are weighted by the 
relative intensity of HC utilization in the appropriate education group.
9They multiply education specific earnings by a random variable.
3 Education Decisions, Equilibrium Policies and Wage Dispersion 46
to human capital investment;10 in addition, taxation induces an income effect that can 
influence the agents’ willingness to bear risk. Thus, ignoring the riskiness of education 
decisions can partly sway the results in the analysis of the effects of earnings taxation 
and education policies.
3.2 M odel
This section describes the model we use for the analysis of education policy. In many 
respects this model is similar to the one described in chapter 2. The main difference lies 
in the introduction of an explicit production technology which delivers the marginal 
productivity of various inputs.
We model three levels of education obtained through formal schooling and corre­
sponding to three types of human capital which enter the production technology.11 
Education and employment are mutually exclusive in each period. Foregone earnings 
and tuition charges are the direct costs of schooling, and an additional utility cost is 
associated to schooling through reductions in leisure.12
Agents can accumulate assets and we assume that the distribution of assets among 
newborns is the same as the distribution of accidental bequests in the economy.13 The 
structure of our model allows to introduce different levels of correlation between ability 
and initial assets holdings.14
In general, the model allows us to look at endogenous equilibrium levels of aggregate 
human capital, with associated wages, as a function of agents’ optimizing schooling
10As the proportional tax rate increases, agents earn less from high realization of the shock but also 
lose less from the bad ones. Therefore the overall risk is decreased.
11 We distinguish among people with less than high school degrees (LTHS), high school graduates 
(HSG) and college graduates (CG). The distinction between LTHS and HSG is based on different 
earning and labor supply characteristics. Schooling is the only way to accumulate human capital (no 
children nurturing or on-the-job training). The possible effects of OJT are accounted for through 
an age-efficiency profile which is estimated for each education group and is maintained to be policy- 
invariant.
12These utility costs are calibrated to match enrolment rates for different ability groups
13Gale and Scholz (1994) show that inter vivos transfer for education represent only a part of total 
bequest. We ignore this issue in this paper and redistribute assets only among the youngest. The 
initial distribution of wealth replicates the distribution prevailing among those who die in each period, 
as this has a realistic accidental bequest interpretation.
14This can be thought of as a shortcut to incorporate the effect of parental background on ability 
formation, as extensively documented in the literature, see Heckman and Carneiro (2003) for a review).
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choices and demographic factors. This provides a mapping from a set of initial condi­
tions (that is, initial agents’ distribution over states such as permanent and persistent 
idiosyncratic shocks and assets) into distributions over educational and economic at­
tainments: this mapping turns out to be ideal to study the economic implications of 
alternative policy interventions.
3.2.1 Overview
We consider an economy where a unique good is produced, and it can be either con­
sumed or used as physical capital. We specify an overlapping generations general 
equilibrium model for this economy that focuses on education and labour supply. 
Consumers maximise an intertemporal utility function over their finite life-cycle, with 
respect to education, labour supply and consumption/savings. Agents can accumulate 
assets representing ownership shares on physical capital. They have a maximum life­
time and they plan to consume their entire assets. However they may die before that 
leaving accidental bequests. The maximum possible lifetime is 99 years. Individuals 
can work up to age 65, and after that age they retire. They can also decide not to 
work before age 65 (by not supplying any labour). Retirement is financed by the ac­
cumulated assets. The population consists of 99 overlapping generations, each with an 
ex-ante identical distribution of heterogeneity.
Young and old households are not linked in any direct way. Bequests are pooled 
together and redistributed to all newly born individuals according to the steady state 
equilibrium wealth distribution. This reflects both inter-vivos transfers for education 
and actual bequests. Since we assume that assets must always be non-zero (liquidity 
constraints), these transfers are the only source of funding for education, other than 
possible government transfers. Education can only take plane at the beginning of the 
life-cycle and the individual can attain one of three education levels, corresponding to 
less than high school, high school, and college. The costs of education consist of the 
opportunity cost, tuition fees net of any government subsidy and the psychic/utility 
costs of education. In addition individuals are endowed with different abilities which 
lead to different efficiency units of human capital and thus earnings. Thus wage dif­
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ferences among people are the consequence of differences in education (between group 
inequality) and differences in labor efficiency (within group inequality). People are 
perfect substitutes within schooling groups, regardless of their individual efficiency.
There is no aggregate uncertainty in the model. Once out of school the individual 
has to decide on the proportion of his/her time to devote to work and on consumption. 
All these decisions take place in an incomplete markets environment. The individual 
cannot borrow against human capital and faces uninsurable idiosyncratic wage shocks.
There is an aggregate production function with four inputs: the three levels of 
human capital, measured in total efficiency units supplied and physical capital. We 
solve the model as a closed economy with the interest rate determined endogenously.
The model is partly estimated and partly calibrated. First we estimate a wage 
process and extract relative prices for our three human capital measures. This allows 
us to compute the total supply of efficiency units of human capital in each of the three 
groups. From the estimation of the wage process we also estimate the stochastic process 
of wages, net of measurement errors which we take to be the process of uncertainty 
facing the individual.15 The stochastic process of wages is taken to be education 
specific.
Next we estimate the aggregate production function which is taken initially to be 
Cobb-Douglas. However, we also carry out sensitivity analysis based on a number of 
different production function structures. Moreover, since there seems to have been a 
change in the production structure mainly due to skill biased technological change we 
use as our basis for the Cobb-Douglas specification the average shares over the period.
To obtain the parameters characterising preferences we use risk aversion coefficients 
taken from the literature and then we set the preference for labour supply to match 
the proportion of people working in the economy. Given these parameters we then 
calibrate the utility costs of education to match the proportions in each education 
group during 1978-82. The individual discount rate is calibrated to match the ratio of 
physical capital over total output.
15This may overestimate the degree of uncertainty; see Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2005).
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3.2.2 Individual preferences
We use the index j  to denote age. Agents have a probability to survive in each period, 
denoted as Sj, which is decreasing in age. Annuity markets axe absent we use a random 
bequest mechanism to redistribute left over assets based on the prevailing equilibrium 
assets’ distribution.16
Agents face educational choices based on returns and costs, which depend on age, 
asset holdings, permanent characteristics and labor shocks. Over the life cycle they 
choose the labor supply and consumption path maximizing expected lifetime utility.17
The period utility u{c, l)  is concave in consumption c and leisure / =  (1 — n); it 
satisfies standard regularity conditions and in particular the Inada conditions. The 
education level is denoted by e, it takes three values, with e =  e\ the lowest and 
e =  ez the highest. Permanent (unobserved) individual characteristics are denoted by 
6  and distributed over the domain [0min, #max]- We also assume that the distribution 
of ability 9 is independent of time. We denote by {<z}7=1 the sequence of uninsurable 
idiosyncratic shocks. Their law of motion is summarized by a stationary transition 
function ir denoted as ^zj+1]zj =  7r{ zj +i | zj}.
While in school individual utility is given by u(cj , f (9) ) ,  where the function f(9)  
reflects the psychic costs of schooling which may be thought of as leisure costs but may 
include other aspects of effort and like or dislike of the education process - hence we 
do not bound f to lie in the unit interval. These costs will depend on ability with the 
idea that more able individuals will suffer lower costs.
Given some initial values x\  for the state variables, household/individual utility 
over sequences of consumption and leisure, c =  | c i , ...,c j |  and I =  j / i , ..., / j j ,  as of 
age 1 is denoted U (x\ , c , l ) and can be written as the expected discounted sum of
16Negative borrowing limits open up the possibility that people dying prematurely can be in debt. 
Yaari (1965) considers this case explicitly and proves that, with functioning credit markets not making 
systematic losses, the budget constraint must be such that individual can never go short on assets. 
We prefer to ignore this issue and let interest rates adjust appropriately.
17See discussion in chapter 2 for technical details regarding the agent’s problem.
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period utilities
jedu
^ 2  s jP3~ 1 [di u (cj J ( e)) +  (1 -  dj)u (Cj,lj)\ +  (3.1)
] T  S 3 ^~l u{Cj,lj)
j = 3edu
where dj  is a binary variable which is 1 if the agent is in education and 0 otherwise, 
jedu denotes the last age of education, Sj =  I^"Ii=i s*) denotes the probability of 
surviving to age j  and (3 is the intertemporal discount factor. For the first j edu ages 
the individual may decide to be in education which is why there are two alternative 
forms for the utility function depending on the action taken. We restrict all education 
choices to take place in the beginning of life.18 Note that once in education f(9)  is 
fixed and only depends on ability 9. The period budget constraint is given by
Cj +  dj+i =  [1 +  r  (1 -  rfc)] dj +  wee€jnj ( l  — rne) (1 — dj) +  (3.2)
-  (De — Tr e) dj
where aj denotes individual asset holdings19 at age j  and r is the risk-free interest 
rate. For the purposes of policy analysis we distinguish between the taxation of capital 
income and the taxation of labour income rne ,20
The D e is the direct cost of schooling and Tre summarizes government subsidies 
towards education e. The term e^ denotes individual labour efficiency, with 6j  defined 
as
€j (9, e, z) =  9 +  £j (e) +  Zj (3.3)
where £j (e) is an education-specific age profile.
18This restriction reduces the computational burden significantly
19Individual asset holdings satisfy: aj >  amin for every j  and a j+1 >  0. The first inequality is a 
borrowing constraint, whereas the second is a transversality condition for agents reaching age j.
20Heckman (1976) first noted the importance of this distinction when considering investments in 
Human Capital. Changing the cost of intertemporal substitution will affect investment decisions.
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3.2.3 Solving the individual problem
The individual’s problem may be solved recursively by backwards induction. Denote by 
xj  the value of the state variables at age j  and by Wj(xj)  the optimum value function 
at age j .  The state vector includes the current value of the shock z, which is assumed 
to arrive at the beginning of the period, as well as permanent characteristics, past 
values that are relevant for predicting future outcomes and, of course, current assets 
and education levels. Following the age of life when no more education choices can 
be made the individual chooses consumption and labour supply to solve the simpler 
problem
Wj(zj) =  max u (cj, 1 -  rij) +  Sj(3 /  n \ Wj + 1  (xj+1) dzj + 1  (3.4)
{Ci.nj} Jz
subject to the budget constraint (3.2) with dj =  0 and subject to the constraint 
a,j+\ > amin where amin is some exogenous minimum level of assets.21
Previously, during the early ages of life, the individual’s problem is complicated by 
the fact that she/he needs to decide on whether to obtain education. When education 
is still an option22 the problem solved is
w j { xj) =  s max {dJu(ci ,/(0 ))  +  ( l - d j )u (cj,/:,)} +  (3.5){Cj )7lj ,dj j
+  Sj(3 /  7TZj+llz.WJ+i (xj + i )dz j +i 
J z
subject to the budget constraint, the asset constraint mentioned above and subject to 
the constraint that n =  0 if dj =  1, i.e. we do not allow for work and education at the 
same time.
3.2.4 Aggregate variables
We study equilibrium allocations and assume a stationary population. The aggregate 
states of the economy are physical capital K  and efficiency-weighted aggregate labour
21 We set amin =  0 in the numerical experiments
22See chapter 2 for a description of the timing of education decisions in this model.
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supplies (referred to as human capital aggregates) H\,  H 2 , and # 3.
We define the measure space ( X , F  (X)  ,xpj), where X  is the individual state 
space.
For each set Q C F (X),  let ipj represent the normalised measure of age j  agents 
whose individual states lie in Q as a proportion of all age j  agents. Calling (j the 
fraction of age j  agents in the economy we define
F = F i Q J )  = Cjipj(Q)
which is a measure of agents belonging to age group j  with individual state vector 
(9,e,z ,a)  e  Q .24
The aggregate states determine the relative prices in the economy. In steady state 
there will be no change in the relative wages between the three different types of human 
capital. However, the feature of the model that allows for such relative price variation 
is key because as the policy alters the supply of each education group, relative prices 
will change and this will lead to different steady state levels of supply for Hi,  H2 , and 
H3 . The total stock of human capital of type e is the sum of the efficiency weighted 
individual labor supplies of type e which axe defined by
hj (0, e, z, a) =  eej 6^,e,z r^ij (9, e, z, a) (3.6)
The total stock of human capital of type e is denoted as He is defined as
H e = Y l  0  /  h3 (z) # 7  (x) = 5^ 0  /  (0, e, z) Tlj (x) d'lpj (X)
i  Jx  j Jx
where x/jj (x) — xpj (9, e, z, a).
The demographics are stable, so that age j  agents make up a constant fraction (j 
of the population at any point in time. The Q values are normalized to sum up to 1
23 X  =  0 x 9 x Z x l  and F  (X ) =  F (©) x F (3 ) x F  (Z ) x F (A ) is its sigma-algebra.
24 fi is a measure on (r, F  (A )), where F (A) is the Borel a-algebra on A =  T x X  =  T x Q x Q x Z x i ,  
defined as F (A ) =  F (A) x F  (©) x F (O') x F (Z ) x F  (^4). Ergo, for any given Q  e  F (A),  fi (Q ) 
indicates the mass of agents whose individual state vectors lie in Q.
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and are such that £j+i =  SjCj-
3 .2 .5  M ark et s tr u c tu r e
Our setup is an incomplete markets one where idiosyncratic risk cannot be insured, 
other than by self-insurance through precautionary savings. However we also impose 
liquidity constraints, which will be biting for the more able young people, unless they 
have inherited wealth. There is no aggregate uncertainty. The unique physical good 
is used as numeraire. All unemployment in the model is voluntary.
With missing annuity markets the assets left behind by agents who die at age j  are 
distributed to the youngest age group according to the density law prevailing among 
age j  agents.25
Given differential mortality and life-cycle assets savings the cross-sectional distri­
bution of bequests changes with age. The newborns’ asset density is assumed to be 
equal to the aggregate distribution of bequests26
where ipj (a) denotes the age j  marginal assets density27




25This bequest mechanism has the desirable feature of making the age 1 assets density depend on 
the older ages assets densities generated in equilibrium.
26The only restriction imposed on the distribution of assets at age 1 is that no agent should be 
born in debt. This is achieved by properly rescaling the lower tail and the average of the bequests’ 
distribution
27This is defined as
V b ' + i  ( a )  =  /  ipj+i(0,e,z ,a)  dddedz
Jx
28In this chapter we will provide results for the case in which newborns have independent draws in 
ability and assets. However, if one knew the correlation between permanent characteristics and initial 
wealth, it would be possible to introduce dependence between the ability and asset draws.
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E (qi) =  [_ipi (a)aida  (3.8)
Ja
qj - 0 for j  -  2, . . .J  
and the amount of wealth that is bequitted in each period is29
C i  I  V h  (a) aida =  Y ]  ( j U  “  sj )  I a j + i ^ j + i  (a) da
A j = i  dA
3.2.6 Technology
Firms maximize profits using a CRS technology and set wages competitively. The 
aggregate technology employs physical and human capital and is denoted as F(H, K ) 
with H  =  {H \ ,H 2 ,Hz}.  The relationship between human capital factors (H ) and 
physical capital is expressed as a Cobb-Douglas :
F (H ,K )  =  A H l ~aK a (3.9)
A is a TFP coefficient and the isoelastic, general definition of the HC input is
H =  {AiH*  +  A 2H p2 +  AzH p}~p (3.10)
with h =  1 given the CRS assumption.30 This specification allows for the elasticity of 
substitution to differ between unskilled labour H\  and the other two inputs.
In this specification {A\, A2 , A3 ) are share parameters, while p pins down the Allen 
elasticity of substitution among different weigthed labour inputs. In the CES case the 
Allen elasticity of substitution between any two inputs is 31 When p is equal to
29In reality, only a part of intra-family wealth transfers axe intra-vivos. For a discussion of related 
issues see Gale and Scholz (1994).
30For strict quasi-concavity of the production function p has to lie within (—00,1).
31The Allen partial elasticity of substitution is also known as the Allen/Uzawa elasticity and is the 
most widely used. However, Blackorby and Russell (1989) show that there is no intution about what 
this measures. Blackorby and Russell advocate the use of the so-called Morishima elasticity. Another 
alternative for multisector models would be the so-called direct elasticity of substitution proposed by 
McFadden (1963). In what follows we just use the Allen elasticity as a simple approximation.
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zero the technology is Cobb-Douglas, whereas values of p greater than zero indicate 
more substitutability than in the Cobb-Douglas case.
An alternative specification could be32
that the elasticity of substitution between H2 and H3 is the same as the that between 
H$ and H\.  Therefore, if P2 > Pi we have that H$ is more complementary with H\  
than with H2 . Also, the grouping allows separate parts of the above technology to be 
Cobb-Douglas, when either P2 or p\ tend to zero.
In practice we have not been able to obtain meaningful estimates of the more 
general, unconstrained production functions and we present estimates for a Cobb- 
Douglas specification with p\ — P2 =  0. However we do use the isoelastic general 
specification as a basis for sensitivity analysis in the simulations. In chapter 4 we 
present an alternative method which seems able to estimate one type of unrestricted 
technology with more precision.
The equilibrium conditions require that marginal products equal pre-tax prices so 
that we =  for any education level e, and r +  S =  where 5 is the depreciation 
rate for capital.
3.2.7 Government
Government has revenues from proportional taxation of labor and asset income at 
respectively rne and rate, and uses part of these revenues to subsidize education via 
a transfer Tre. We call G the residual non-education general government expenditure 
and assume that G is lost in non-productive activities. The government’s behaviour 
is fully described by the budget constraint, which requires that expenditures equal
32This specification has been attributed to Sato (1967) by Hamermesh (1993).
33See Caselli and Coleman (2006) for a discussion.
which allows for the elasticity of substitution to differ between unskilled labour Hi  
and the other two inputs.33 This specification also has a symmetry property imposing
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revenues obtained from taxation34. The government has a balanced budget in each 
period.
3.3 Equilibrium
We use a notion of equilibrium in which the state variables’ distribution remains 
unchanged over time. This notion of equilibrium is known as stationary recursive 
competitive equilibrium, see Lucas (1980). In the Appendix to chapter 3 there is a 
brief description of the steps required to define a stationary measure 'tfjj, such that 
I1 (x i j )  =  Cji j^ (x ) is stationary, as a function of the markov process ir{zj+i  \ Zj} and 
of the decision rules dj  (x) and aJ+i (x), where x £ X  is a vector of state variables.
Let (X , F ( X ) , ipj) be an age-specific measure space with state space X  and F (X)  
be a cr-algebra on X.
Given some state vector x E X  , a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for 
this economy is a set of decision rules dj  (x), aJ+\ (x), Cj (x), rij (x), value functions 
Wj(x)  and V)(x), price functions we, r, densities •••> V’y) and • • • > Cy) > and a
law of motion Q , such that:
1. dj (x), dj+i  (x), Cj (x) and rij (x) are optimal decision rules and solve the house­
hold’s problem;
2. Wj(6 ,e, z ,a)  and Vj{x) are the associated value functions;
3. Firms employ inputs so that
we =  FHe for  e € %  
r +  5 =  Fk  ;
34The government budget constraint is
rrkcij dipj (a)
We assume that the government has a balanced budget in each period.
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4. tpj (x) is a stationary measure, that is ifrj (F ) =  Q (F, V'j), where Q (•, •) is the 
law of motion of xj)j (•) and is generated by the optimal decisions dj  (x), aj+i (x), 
cj (x) ;35
5. The good, asset and labour markets clear.36
The goods market clearing equation is derived by integrating the individual budget 
constraint.
3.4 E stim ation
With the exception of the parameters for intertemporal substitution the remaining 
ones are obtained by a combination of estimation and calibration using data from the 
US.
We thus estimate the wage process, the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity 
and the aggregate production function. We then calibrate the costs of education func­
tion f(Q) to fit the distribution of education by ability in the four year period from 
1978 to 1982. Our sources of data are the CPS, the PSID and NIPA.
3.4.1 E stim ating wage equations: skill prices and age profiles
An important characteristic of the model is that the three types of human capital 
represent different inputs to the production function, not necessarily perfectly substi­
tutable and may have relative prices that vary over time in response to changes in 
either supply or demand for skills. So as to be able to simulate our model, we need 
to extract from the data the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity affecting wages 
and education choices as well as the stochastic process of the shocks.
We start by specifying an education specific wage equation for individual i wages 
in period j , weit
In W en  = W et + Qe ^ e i t  (^dl)
35Given Q,  also fi (x, j )  =  Qipj (x) is a stationary measure.
36Equilibrium definitions in the asset and good markets must include cross border asset holding 
F X  if the interest rate r is constant. The Appendix to chapter 3 contains a derivation of the market 
clearing equations.
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where wet represents the log of the aggregate price of human capital for education group 
e and where ge (ageeu) is the education specific profile of wages. The unobservable 
component ueu is specified to be
Ueit — %eit ~t~ fTln (3.12)
where represents unobserved fixed effects, zeu is the (persistent) shock to wages 
and mu is measurement error, assumed iid. Self-selection implies that fixed effects 
are correlated with both education decisions and observed wage rates. However, a 
within groups transformation eliminates the source of self-selection and identifies the 
changes in the returns to education over time as well as the way wages grow with age 
by education group. Thus we estimate by OLS
(In weit -  In wei) =  (In wet -  In wl) +  g (ageeit -  ageei) +  (ueit -  uei) (3.13)
where the upper-bar denotes an (individual) time average and where g is a polynomial 
of order two for the lowest education group and of order 4 for the two higher education 
groups. The term (In wet — In w )^ is modelled as time dummies. The residuals from 
this equation can be used to identify the persistence of wage shocks, and we discuss 
this below.
3.4.2 W age data and results
For the estimation of wage equations we use longitudinal data from the PSID. The 
sample is based on annual interviews between 1968 and 1997 and on bi-annual inter­
views from 1999 onwards. We do not use individuals associated with the Census low 
income sample, the Latino sample or the New Immigrant sample and focus instead 
on the SRC core sample, which did not suffer any systematic additions or reductions 
between 1968 and 2001 and was originally representative of the US population.
The main earnings’ variable in the PSID refers to the head of the household37 and is
37In the PSID the head of the household is a male whenever there is a cohabiting male/female 
couple. Women are considered heads of household only when living on their own. We do not address 
the related sample issues explicitly, but any gender effects are likely to be captured in the ability
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described as total labor income of the head.38 We use this measure, deflated into 1992 
dollars by the CPI-U for all urban consumers. By selecting only heads of household 
we ignore other potential earners in a family unit and restrict our attention to people 
with relatively strong attachment to the labor force. We include both men and women 
as well as whites and non-whites.
Information on the highest grade completed is used to allocate individuals to three 
education groups: high school drop-outs (LTHS), high school graduates (HSG) and 
college graduates (CG). A detailed description of our sample selection is reported in the 
appendix: in brief, we select heads of household aged 25-60 who axe not self-employed 
and have positive labor income for at least 8 (possibly non continuous) years.
The age polynomials from the wage equation are presented in table (3.1).
Table 3.1: Age polynomials
D ependent variable: log hourly earnings














Figure (4.2) plots the age profiles implied by the polynomial estimates for different 
education groups.
By fitting the within group specification of the wage (log of hourly earnings) equa­
tion we also obtain ln(u)ef), estimates of the growth of log-price of labor by education
estimates.
38This includes the labor part of both farm and business income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commis­
sions, professional practice and others. Labor earnings data are retrospective, as the questions refer 
to previous year’s earnings, which means that 1968 data refer to 1967 earnings.
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Figure 3.1: Age profiles of labor efficiency by education group
Year effects -  Iths Year effects -  hag
Year effects -  eg
Year effects -  various groups
Figure 3.2: Log of marginal labor productivity, by education group
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and year, which are plotted in figure (3.2). The time effects have a natural interpreta­
tion as time varying prices of skills associated to different education groups. The fact 
that the relative prices vary this much is a key justification for treating the different 
education levels as different types of human capital.
3.4.3 Perm anent characteristics and their distribution
For the purposes of simulation we require the unconditional distribution of permanent 
characteristics (ability) as reflected by the fixed effect 0*. We thus use the estimate
ln wit -  In w t - g  (ageit)
W )
0;
where T  (i) is the total number of observation available on agent i. If we assume 
that the unconditional distribution of ability has not changed over the time period 
covered by our sample, we can use the estimated fixed-effects as an estimate of the 
{ 0 i }  distribution over the working population.
T 2.5 .5 1.5 2.
ability
- r r f f [ ca __
- 1 .5  -1  - .5
Unweighted density of perm anent heterogeneity, 1968-1993 dateUnweighted density of perm anent heterogeneity, 1968-2001 date
Figure 3.3: Log density of fixed effects for 1967-1993 and for 1967-2000
In figure (3.3) we report the empirical frequencies of 0 obtained by aggregating 
both cross-sectionally and longitudinally.
The estimation variance of 0i will inflate the overall variance of unobserved het­
erogeneity. To mitigate this problem we have traded off some representativeness by 
taking individuals who are observed for at least eight periods.
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3.4.4 Analysis of labour efficiency shocks
We now use the residuals from the wage equation to estimate our assumed stochastic 
process for wages. First note that we can treat as observable the following:
ueit =  InWeit -  ge (ageeit) -  ln wet -  Oi (3.14)
We assume that ueit can be decomposed into two components
Ueit =  Zeit 4“  m eit
where zeit is an autocorrelated error process and m eit is classical measurement er­
ror, iid (0,<jgm), and where {zei} t is a autocorrelated process with education specific 
parameters
%eit =  Pe^eit—1 &eit
in which £eu ~  iid (0 , 0 %). We can achieve identification of the autoregressive para­
meters in one of several ways. With an external estimate of the measurement error 
variance we can use the following expressions to estimate a 2 and p :
  C O V (zeit, Zeit—l)   COV (ueit,Ueit—l)
P ~  VAR (zeit) _  V A R(ueit) - V A R ( m it) }
o2
VAR (ueit) =  — £e 2 +  o^  
1 ~ Pi
where we can substitute the covariances of u with sample analogues. However it is 
also possible to use the variance of u and its first two auto-covariances to identify the 
variance of the measurement error as well. Thus we have that
  CO V (ueit, Ueit—2 )
Pe CO V { U e i t ,  U e i t - 1 )
and the rest follows immediately. In practice we replace the error terms u with the
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residuals for the wage regression as defined in (3.14).
R esu lts for the wage process
We present estimates of the autoregressive coefficients obtained using external esti­
mates of measurement error by French (2000), who provides a lower and a upper bound 
estimate for measurement error (respectively 0.0172 and 0.0323). Our results are based 
on an average of the two. The (bootstrapped) standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 3.2: Autoregressive coefficient p. Bootstrapped S.E. in parenthesis
Group 1 Group 2 G roup 3 P ooled
0.651 0.557 0.608 0.584
(0.130) (0.042) (0.058) (0.034)
These findings are apparently in contrast with some of the recent literature, among 
others Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) and Meghir and Pistaferri (2004). How­
ever, using the upper estimate of measurement error we get parameters much closer 
to one. Of course, with near unit-root persistence of wage shocks the identification 
of fixed effects would suffer from severe initial conditions problems (for a discussion 
of incidental parameters problem see Heckman (1981)). In chapter 4 we take a more 
orthodox stance and use an exogenous distribution of ability based on 1972 PSID test 
scores while assuming unit-root behaviour of labor efficiency shocks.
Table(3.3) presents the point estimates of cr|.
Table 3.3: Variance of Ar(l) perturbation (of). S.E. in parenthesis
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 P ooled
0.024 0.054 0.099 0.063
(0.011) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006)
3.4.5 U sing CPS to obtain data for th e aggregate production func­
tion.
Estimation of the aggregate production function requires the total wage bills for each 
of the education groups, and in the general CES case it also requires some measure of
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human capital in each of these groups. We use the March supplement of the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) to obtain these. The CPS is a monthly survey of about 
50,000 households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics.39 The wage bills are straightforward to obtain. We just add up the earnings 
of each of the three education groups and then scale up the figures to match the entire 
US economy.
When we need to estimate a CES production function the issue is more involved 
because we also need to estimate the quantity of human capital in each year. To 
achieve this we need an aggregate price series for each of the education groups; our 
estimates from the PSID provide the growth of prices over time and we can normalise 
one of the initial prices to one. Now note that we have one degree of freedom. We 
can set the initial relative price of high school and of college graduate labour and we 
can then choose the utility costs of education to match the proportions going into each 
of the educational categories. In other words with unobserved costs the data can be 
rationalised either with high returns and high costs or low returns and low costs. The 
particular normalisation we choose will not affect the simulation of the policy changes.
The adult universe (i.e., population of marriageable age) is comprised of persons 
15 years old and over for March supplement data and for CPS labor force data. Each 
household and person has a weight that we use in producing population-level statis­
tics. The weight reflects the probability sampling process and estimation procedures 
designed to account for nonresponse and undercover age.
We use the CPI for all urban consumer (with base year 1992) to deflate the CPS 
earnings data and drop all observations that have missing or zero earnings.40 Since the 
earning data are top-coded for confidentiality issues, we have extrapolated the average 
of the top-coded values by using a tail approximations based on a Pareto distribution.41
39The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. Statistics on the employment status of 
the population and related data are compiled by the Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS) using data from 
the Current Population Survey (CPS).
40Eliminating all zero-earnings observations rules out the possibility to incorporate employment risk, 
which is possibly an important source of risk.
41 This procedure is based on a general approach to inference about the tail of a distribution originally 
developed by Hill (1975). This approach has been proposed as an effective way to approximate the 
mean of top-coded CPS earning data by West (1985); Polivka (2000) provides evidence that this 
method closely approximates the average of the top-coded tails by validating the fitted data through
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Figure (3.4) reports the number of people working in each year by education group, 
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Workers in Millions -  1=lths 2=hsg 3=cg
Figure 3.4: Employed workers in millions, by education
It is clear that some strong and persistent trends towards higher levels of education 
have characterized the sample period.
Figure (3.5) plots both the total wage bills in billions of dollars whereas figure (3.6) 
plots averages. Since CPS earning data until 1996 are top coded we report both the 
censored mean and a mean adjusted by using a method suggested by the BLS (West 
(1985)) which is based on the original Hill estimator to approximate exponential tails. 
The difference between the two averages is larger for the most educated people who 
tend to be more affected by top-coding. We include also self-employed people in the 
computation of these aggregates; however, their exclusion has almost no effect on the 
value of the wage bills and human capital aggregate, as they never represent more than 
5% of the working population in a given education group (and most of the time much 
less than that).
undisclosed and confidential non top-coded data available only at the BLS.
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Figure 3.5: Total earned labour income, by education, in billions of 1992 dollars.
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Figure 3.6: Average earned labour income, by education, in 1992 dollars.
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Figure 3.7: Efficiency weighted labor supply (HC) in billions of 1992 dollars, by edu­
cation
Finally, dividing the wage bills by the exponentiated value of the time effects esti­
mated through the wage equations using PSID data we finally obtain point estimates 
of the value of efficiency weighted total labor supply (human capital aggregates) by 
education and year. These are plotted in figure (3.7).
Notice that the evolution of human capital over time is non-monotonic, unlike the 
wage bills for the two highest education groups. This is due to the large increase in 
the level of estimated marginal product of these two factors in the early 1990s, which 
has grown proportionally more than the total remuneration of these factors.
3.4.6 Aggregate production function
In estimating technology parameters, we start from the relatively easier case of Cobb- 
Douglas technology. Let aggregate output Y  be produced through the following tech­
nology
Y =  ( h £ h £ ~ A)BH {i ~ A){l~B)y ~ a K a
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Using NIPA data we find the share of capital a  to be between 0.3 and 0.35, de­
pending on whether we correct for housing stocks.
Share parameters A  and B  can be easily expressed as a function of the aggregate 
wage bills. We can then compute the output shares of College labour, High School 
labour and Dropouts labour, which are respectively A , (1 — A)B  and (1 — A )(l — B )) 
in terms of technology parameters.
Applying this procedure separately for each year we can pinpoint the evolution of 







Figure 3.8: Labor shares in human capital input of technology, computed using Cobb- 
Douglas specification (with bounds equal to + /-  2 standard errors). Period: 1968-2000. 
Larger bounds after 1996 are due to changes in top-coding of income in the CPS.
Figure (3.8) reports the value of the share parameters (with bounds equal to 2 
standard errors) associated to each human capital variety. In figure (3.8) the upward 
sloping line represents the College output share, whereas the downward sloping one 
represents the Dropouts output share. The flat line on top refers to the output share 
for High School graduates.
The time average of such shares is A =  0.33, (1 — A) B  =  0.54 and (1 — A) (1 — B) — 
0.14. The evolution of the college graduates labor share over time more than doubles 
(from 0.2 to 0.4) whereas the share of less-than-high-school labor falls dramatically 
from over 0.3 to roughly 0.06. These findings, together with the strong changes in the
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education composition of the labour force, confirm what we already noticed in terms 
of marginal productivity of labour using PSID data: major shifts in technology have 
taken place between the late 1960s and the end of the century.
We follow up our initial findings by performing some additional inference on the 
technology parameters. In order to do this we first approximate the total human 
capital factor H  =  F { H \ ,H 2, # 3} by combining NIPA and CPS data on wage bills and 
physical capital42 and then use a 2-step GMM method which controls for endogeneity 
and serial correlation of TFP to estimate the parameters. We use lagged shares as 
instruments. .
The results of the GMM estimation of our favourite specification for the log- 
linearized C-D technology are reported in the following tables (standard errors in 
parenthesis) for two alternative moment weighting matrix choices (the identity matrix 
and the optimal matrix). In the Appendix to chapter 3 we report results for all other 
specification.
Table 3.4: Long-term (1967-1997) labour output shares. S.E. in parenthesis





We also find that the linear trend included to control for TFP deterministic varia­
tion is estimated to be 0.035 and strongly significant. Given the log specification, this 
is equivalent to an average annual TFP growth rate of roughly 3.5% between 1967 and 
1997, a value that lies on the higher end of current estimates for the period.
The point estimates for A and B  give labor shares very similar to the long-term 
averages we estimate using the initial Cobb-Douglas computation. The labor shares 
roughly sum up to one, even though we do not impose this restriction in the estimation 
procedure.
42D e ta i l s  o f  t h e  m o d e l  a n d  e s t i m a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  c a n  b e  f o u n d  in  t h e  A p p e n d i x  t o  c h a p t e r  3 .
3 Education Decisions, Equilibrium Policies and Wage Dispersion 70
3.5 Sim ulations
Estimation above has yielded the stochastic process for wages, the distribution of 
ability, the life-cycle growth of wages and finally the aggregate production function. 
In the next step we set the preference parameters and we choose the utility cost of 
education to match as close as possible the proportions completing each of the three 
levels of education.
3.5.1 Preferences parameters
Wealth and consumption data are probably not of sufficient quality to estimate a joint 
model of labour supply, consumption and education choice, particularly because we 
will have to observe all forms of wealth reliably, together with consumption. Thus we 
decided to rely on earlier Euler equation estimates for the preference parameters, as 
well as matching aggregate labour supply levels. Thus we specify the utility function 
to be of the CRRA type, i.e.
Op-i'l (!-*)
|d , -= 0 )  =  4 ^ r l
\cv- f e (9)1~,/1 
u ( Cj 1 ^  =  1 ) = ^  J
The parameters v and A of the period utility jointly pin down the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of consumption (ISE) as well as the level of labour
supply over the lifecycle. Se set the ISE to 0.75 as in Blundell, Browning, and Meghir 
(1994) and Attanasio and Weber (1993). Given this, a value of v =  0.33 and hence 
A =  2.00 matches the labour supply data very well.
3.5.2 Demographic and cost param eters
Individuals are assumed to be born at the real age of 16, and they can live a maximum 
of j  =  84 years, after which, at the real age of 99, death is certain (retirement occurs 
after age 60). The sequence of conditional survival probabilities {s}y!li is based on 
mortality tables for the US and we do not differentiate mortality rates by sex or race.
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The direct cost of education De is set to be equal to 0.3 times the average earnings 
in the economy, which corresponds to an estimate of average (in-state) tuition costs 
for public and private colleges in the US.43
Tuition subsidies (Tre) as a share of average earnings have changed over the last 
30 years. A long term average stands at roughly 1/2 of the tuition costs.
3.5.3 Some simple tu ition experim ents
The numerical experiments we report in the rest of this section are compared to a 
simple benchmark economy in which the discount factor /3 is set to match a physical 
capital over output ratio of 3.0. The resulting discount factor is very close to one, 
with the first 3 decimals all being equal to 9. The depreciation rate is set to 0.07, 
which we compute from NIPA data. No negative assets are allowed in the benchmark 
economy. The deterministic leisure function f e (0) is discretised and then calibrated 
to approximately match enrolment rates within different ability bins.44
The initial wealth distribution is endogenously determined in this simulations: the 
accidental bequests are distributed to the new-borns following the steady state asset 
density. Thus some people are born with zero assets and others with different, positive 
amounts, which implies that some will be facing a tight liquidity constraint for college 
education. In the simulations we are not correlating initial assets and permanent 
characteristics, although we plan to do it in the future.
The tuition subsidy experiment is implemented by giving people, ceteris paribus, a 
transfer (same for all) equal to a percentage of the direct cost of schooling. The extra 
costs are covered by extra proportional labour income taxation.
The top panel of table (3.5) shows the results for the benchmark economy. The 
bottom panel shows what happens in partial equilibrium, when prices for human capital 
do not adjust. However, taxes must change to fund the tuition subsidy and of course 
the underlying wealth distribution does change as well as the work behaviour. The 
middle panel shows the general equilibrium results where human capital returns and 
interest rate are allowed to change.
43S o u r c e :  E d u c a t i o n  d ig e s t ,  N C E S ,  N a t i o n a l  C e n t e r  fo r  E d u c a t i o n  S t a t i s t i c s .
44I f  w e  k e e p  t h e  u t i l i t y  c o s ts  f ix e d  e n r o lm e n t  s h a r e s  a r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  c h o ic e  o f  a g g r e g a t e  t e c h n o lo g y
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In partial equilibrium this universal subsidy leads to a substantial increase in college 
graduates from 20% to 25%. When breaking this down by ability we see that the 
increase is high for all ability groups, relative to their original position. In addition, 
this seems to have come for almost “free” since the tax on labour only needs to increase 
marginally. This is because the policy attracts a number of high ability and previously 
liquidity constrained individuals into higher education.45 They earn high levels of 
income which more than compensate the cost of educating them. In fact there is a 
substantial increase in the college level human capital aggregate from 5.41 to 6.5. This 
is precisely the logic underlying a number of educational subsidy programmes around 
the world. Thus in partial equilibrium, the policy pays for itself.
In General Equilibrium though the situation is quite different, at least as far as 
the aggregate shares are concerned. Following the policy there is a very small decline 
in aggregate college attendance. This is due to the decline in the marginal product of 
college level human capital. However, the aggregate figures hide important differences 
within ability groups. These show a decline in College attendance vis a vis the baseline 
for ability levels two and three and an increase in College attendance for the highest 
ability level 4. In addition there is an increase in the rates of high school graduation 
for the lowest level of ability in response to an increase in the relative price for high 
school graduates. Finally there is a decline in college for the second ability group. All 
this adds up to an increase in the supply of human capital for the lowest and highest 
education groups: the subsidy has in fact led to an increase in inequality.
Similar results have been obtained when we use a production function with a higher 
elasticity of substitution see table 3.6.
3.6 Conclusions
We combine estimation and calibration to obtain an overlapping generations General 
Equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and idiosyncratic uncertainty. Individ­
uals choose education levels, labour supply and consumption within an incomplete
45A d m i t t e d ly ,  t h i s  is  a ls o  d u e  t o  t h e  t i g h t  z e r o  b o r r o w i n g  l i m i t  t h a t  h a s  b e e n  im p o s e d  fo r  a l l  a g e n t s .  
I n  t h i s  s e t u p  p e o p le  w h o  a r e  b o r n  w i t h  z e r o  a s s e t s  a r e  k e p t  o u t  o f  e d u c a t io n .
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Table 3.5: Simulation results. Technology 1: Cobb-Douglas
GROUPS
Benchm ark (T uition  $3105 =  30% o f m ed ian  incom e)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) 
Less than HS HS College
0.34 0.46 0.20
Human Capital Aggregates






Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.94 0.055 0.004 0.56 1.0 0.95
Ability 2 0.36 0.53 0.11 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.23 0.52 0.26 668 1753 2122
Ability 4 (highest) 0.19 0.43 0.38
% with wealth=0 0.082 r 0.0252 Tax lab 0.27
G eneral E quilibrium  (50% S ubsidy)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.34 0.47 0.19 4.54 8.67 5.43
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.92 0.075 0.005 0.53 1.0 0.94
Ability 2 0.36 0.55 0.092 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.24 0.52 0.24 652 1710 2155
Ability 4 (highest) 0.20 0.38 0.42
% with wealth=0 0.082 r 0.02519 Tax lab 0.28
P artia l E quilibrium  (50% Subsidy)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.34 0.42 0.25 4.29 8.01 6.50
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.94 0.050 0.011 0.5575 1.0 0.95
Ability 2 0.36 0.47 0.17 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.23 0.47 0.30 668 1767 2075
Ability 4 (highest) 0.19 0.38 0.43
% with wealth=0 0.086 r 0.0252 Tax lab 0.272
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Table 3.6: Simulation results. Technology 2: E.of.S.=1.54
GROUPS
Benchm ark (T uition  $2929 =  30% o f m ed ian  incom e)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.34 0.50 0.16 4.48 9.71 4.46
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.89 0.10 0.011 0.44 1.0 0.94
Ability 2 0.38 0.56 0.058 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.24 0.55 0.21 563 1816 2310
Ability 4 (highest) 0.19 0.45 0.36
% with wealth=0 0.082 r 0.025 Tax lab .27
G eneral E quilibrium  (50% Subsidy)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.35 0.50 0.15 4.88 9.20 4.61
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.88 0.11 0.011 0.43 1.0 0.93
Ability 2 0.37 0.58 0.048 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.25 0.56 0.19 556 1777 2361
Ability 4 (highest) 0.21 0.39 0.40
% with wealth=0 0.081 r 0.025 Tax lab .2734
Partied E quilibrium  (50% Subsidy)
Edu. Participation (aggr.shares) Human Capital Aggregates
Less than HS HS College Less than HS HS College
0.37 0.44 0.19 4.99 8.40 5.42
Edu. Shares by ability Marg. Products after Tax. and Depr.
Ability 1 (lowest) 0.89 0.095 0.016 0.44 1.0 0.94
Ability 2 0.40 0.51 0.097 Aver. Post-Tax Labour Earn.-1990 US$
Ability 3 0.27 0.49 0.24 589 1807 2257
group 4 (highest) 0.23 0.37 0.40
% with wealth=0 0.084 r 0.025 Tax lab .2750
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markets set-up. We use this model to evaluate alternative educational interventions.
In the current version we experiment with tuition subsidies. It becomes apparent 
that while in partial equilibrium such policies can be very effective in increasing edu­
cation levels and reducing inequality in General Equilibrium the results are much less 
encouraging: the main effect of a subsidy there is to increase the supply of human 
capital as one would expect. However, it is the more able but liquidity constrained 
individuals who take up extra education, while the education levels of the less able can 
actually decrease (they are crowded out). Thus the subsidy acts on the composition 
of those in education.
In many respects this is in line with results found by Heckman, Lochner, and 
Taber (1998a). The inclusion of risky returns on labour earnings and the fact that 
labour supply is endogenous lend additional credibility to the result. The distributional 
changes in this economy under different interventions will be the focus of additional 
analysis. Moreover, future work includes assessing the relevance of liquidity constraints 
in the model economy and the equilibrium effects of artificially removing (insuring 
against) some of the risk components.
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3.7 A ppendix to  chapter 3
3.7.1 PSID  data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics provides information on a variety of dimensions. 
Since the beginning it was decided that those eligible for the 1969 and following waves 
of interviewing would include only persons present in the prior year, including those 
who moved out of the original family and set up their own households46. Until recently, 
there used to be two different releases of PSID data, Release I (also known as Early 
Release) and Release II (also known as Final Release). Early release data were available 
for all years; final release data are available (at time of writing) only between 1968 and 
1993. The variables needed for our study are available in both releases. The difference 
is that Release II data tend to be more polished and contain additional constructed 
variables. We use Release II data for the period 1968-1993 and Release I data for the 
period 1994-200147.
Because of successive improvements in Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI) software, the quality of the Public Release I files improved dramatically in re­
cent waves, allowing the use of these data with confidence. The differentiation between 
Public Release I and Public Release II has recently been dropped altogether.
3.7.2 PSID  sample selection
Unequal probabilities of selection were introduced at the beginning of the PSID (1968) 
when the original Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) sample of poor families was 
combined with a new equal probability national sample of households selected from the 
Survey Research Center 1960 National Sample. Compensatory weights were developed 
in 1968 to account for the different sampling rates used to select the OEO and SRC 
components of the PSID.
46A  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw e e n  o r ig in a l  s a m p l e  in d iv id u a l s ,  i n c lu d in g  t h e i r  o f f s p r in g  i f  b o r n  i n t o  a  r e s p o n d ­
in g  p a n e l  f a m ily  d u r in g  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  s t u d y  ( i .e . ,  b o t h  t h o s e  b o r n  t o  o r  a d o p t e d  b y  a  s a m p l e  
i n d iv id u a l ) ,  a n d  n o n s a m p le  in d iv id u a l s  m u s t  b e  m a d e .  D e ta i l s  a b o u t  t h e  o b s e r v a t i o n s  o n  n o n - s a m p le  
p e r s o n s  a n d  t h e i r  a s s o c ia t e d  w e ig h ts  a n d  r e le v a n c e  a r e  i n c lu d e d  in  t h e  a p p e n d i x .
47W e  a ls o  h a v e  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  a  r e d u c e d  s a m p l e  u s in g  o n ly  R e le a s e  I  d a t a  f o r  1 9 6 8 -1 9 9 3 : 
e s t i m a t e s  o f  t h e  p a r a m e te r s  o f  i n t e r e s t  d o  n o t  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  d i f f e r  f r o m  t h e  fu ll  s a m p l e  e s t i m a te s .
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The probability sample of individuals defined by the original 1968 sample of PSID 
families was then followed in subsequent years. A distinction between original sample 
individuals, including their offspring if born into a responding panel family during 
the course of the study (i.e., both those born to or adopted by a sample individual), 
and nonsample individuals was also made. Only original sample persons and their 
offspring have been followed. These individuals are referred to as sample persons 
and assigned person numbers in a unique range. If other individuals resided with the 
sample individuals, either in original family units or in newly created family units, data 
were collected about them as heads, spouses/long term cohabitors or other family unit 
members, in order to obtain a complete picture of the economic unit represented by 
the family. However, these nonsample individuals were not followed if they left a PSID 
family.
The 1967-2000 Sample. After dropping 10,607 individuals belonging to the 
Latino sample and 2263 individuals belonging to the new immigrant families added in 
1997 and 1999, the joint 1967-2001 sample contains 50,625 individuals. After selecting 
only the observations on household heads we axe left with 19,583 individuals.Dropping 
people younger than 25 or older than 60 leaves us with 16,733 people. Dropping the 
self employment observations leaves 13,740 persons in the sample. We then select 
only the individuals with at least 8 (possibly non continuous) observations, which 
further reduces the people in the sample to 5559. Dropping individuals with unclear 
education records leaves 5,544 people in sample. Disposing of individuals with missing, 
top-coded or zero earnings reduces the sample to 5,112 individuals and dropping those 
with zero, missing or more than 5840 annual work hours brings the sample size to 
5,102 individuals. We eliminate individuals with outlying earning records, defined as 
changes in log-earnings larger than 4 or less than -2, which leaves 4,891 individuals 
in the sample. Finally, dropping people connected with the SEO sample reduces the 
number of individuals to 2,791.
The composition of the sample by year and by education group is reported in the 
following tables.
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Table 3.7: Distribution of observations for the 1967-2000 sample, by year
year N um ber o f O bservations year N um ber o f O bservations
1967 776 1983 1546
1968 842 1984 1582
1969 891 1985 1609
1970 952 1986 1632
1971 1069 1987 1624
1972 1168 1988 1631
1973 1250 1989 1639
1974 1290 1990 1600
1975 1342 1991 1628
1976 1385 1992 1564
1977 1442 1993 1551
1978 1466 1994 1486
1979 1502 1995 1437
1980 1535 1996 1363
1981 1512 1998 1293
1982 1505 2000 1191
Table 3.8: Distribution of observations for 1967-2000 sample, by education 
years o f education N um ber o f Individuals N um ber o f O bservations
less than 12 
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3.7.3 GM M  estim ation of the technology param eters 
The Minimization Problem
After controlling for physical capital, the minimization problem we face in order to 
identify the technology parameters is the following
~  *  (H l ' H2' H3' { P W ) 2
where { P } N is a set of N  parameters of the (possibly non-linear) function $  (•).
If we consider the case of a nested CES-CES function we can write the above
problem as
min {  F (H )  -  { a H\ +  (1 -  A) [B ff| +  (1 — B)  f f | ] H ' }
(A.-B.r.sIeaR4 f t  j )
Of course, depending on the procedure used to obtain F  (H ), the residual term will be 
a different object.
To see this more clearly, consider a log linearisation of the problem above, such 
that we can write
F (H )  «  [ A H l  +  (1 -  A) [BHs2 +  (1 -  B)  J # } 7 exp^
log ( F ( H ) )  =  i  log ( { ^  +  (1 -  A) [BHi  + (1 — B)  } )  +  g
where g is an error term capturing measurement error due to wage mis-reporting and 
errors in the approximation of the aggregate K.
Non linear method of moments (Minimum Distance Estimator)
Consider the original problem where we define the residual of our estimation as
log (F (H)) -  i  log ( { ^  +  (1 -  A) [BHi +  (1 — B)  f f f ] i  } )  =  e
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Of course there will be one such residual for each time period in the sample. We denote 




Two potential problems must be considered when minimizing the sum of such 
residual distances: (i) simultaneity in the determination of residuals and production 
inputs (human capital aggregates). This problem arises if error components (contained 
in the residual as defined above) also determine the employment decisions of agents in 
the economy. In this case we might expect a correlation between control variables and 
residuals which undermines the reliability of estimates of technology parameters48; 
(u) The residuals, as defined above, might be characterized by a certain degree of 
autocorrelation over time which should be accounted for.
If none of the above mentioned problems was present, we could apply a very simple 
minimum sum of squares estimator, using the time vectors {Hu, H^t, H^t , } as regres­
sors. Denoting the transpose of a matrix X  as X ' , we could write the simple non-linear 
minimization problem as
min R' (A ,B ,s ,r )Q ~ 1R (A , B ,s ,r )
{A ,B ,s ,r}
where Cl is some (diagonal) weighting matrix used to account for possible heteroschedas- 
ticity of the residuals over time. In the homoschedastic case D =  a 21 (the identity 
matrix).
If there was a problem of simultaneity in the determination of {Hu, # 2t, Hzt, } and 
Rt the above method would not provide consistent estimates.
One way to control for the effects of simultaneity is to exploit orthogonality con­
48In this case H^t,} would be correlated with the residual dated t.
l * l «  =
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ditions that may hold between the residuals as defined above and some L x T  matrix 
Z  composed of L variables with T  time observations per variable. We suppose that 
the number of variables L is sufficient to identify the parameters of the model, that is 
L > N  and we assume that Z  is correlated with {Hit, Hzt, }• The instruments’ 
matrix is such that E  (R'Z ) =  0 and E {{Hi, H^, H^}' Z ) ^  0.
In general, we might have more IV’s than parameters to estimate. In this case 
we cannot expect to satisfy the empirical counterpart of the population orthogonality 
conditions presented above because we have a system of L > N  equations
R! Z — TYl (Ptf)
in only N  unknowns. It is therefore reasonable to replace the unattainable requirement 
that R'Z =  0 with the requirement that R'Z  be small in some norm. Ignoring any 
multiplicative terms involving the sample size T, a candidate distance we might use as 
an objective function to minimize is
N O R M  =  R'Zfl~l Z'R
Hansen (1982) has shown that under some regularity assumptions, minimizing the 
NORM above produces a consistent estimator of the parameters Pjy, and we can use 
any positive definite matrix fl that is not a function of P/v.49 The question is again 
what kind of weighting matrix fl should be chosen. A natural way to proceed is to set 
ft to the covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions, that is
fl =  C O V  ( p 'z )  =  E { z ' R R ' z }  =  Z'E ( R^R' j^ Z
Unfortunately fl is unknown and this adds to the estimation burden. However, if the 
covariance matrix can be written as fl =  a2 ft we can consider a2 an arbitrary constant,
49The general result is that if is a positive definite matrix and if
plim  R' (Pn ) Z  =  0 
then the minimum distance (GMM) estimator of Pn  is consistent.
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rather than a separate unknown parameter: in fact, since fl is an unknown matrix, 
it can be arbitrarily scaled by some factor c, and if we rescale c r2 by \  the product 
fl =  o 2fl remains the same. An example in which we could ignore c r2 when minimizing 
the objective function is the classical case when E ^RR' j^ — c r 2 / .  This leads to the 
estimator
PN =  argmin B!Z (o 2Z' Z ) 1 Z'R =  argmin R!pzR
where p z  — Z (Z'Z)~l Z' is the standard projection matrix in the Z  — space. This is 
not different from a non-linear two stage least squares estimator, however it is more 
general in the sense that we are not limited to the above choice of fl.
Any positive definite matrix fl that is constant will deliver consistent estimates. 
However, efficiency of such estimates depend on the choice of the weigthing matrix fl. 
Hansen has shown that fl — Z'EZ  where E =  E (RR') is in fact an optimal choice.
When no time correlation is present we can therefore summarize the estimator 
matrix products as follows. The sample equivalent of the theoretical moment condition 
E (R 'Z) =  0 is
T
i f e  =  i ^ e ; 2' =  o
t = l
where z[ =  (zj, z2, . . . ,  z [ ) ,  so that the norm to minimize is
N O R M  =  i  n _1^  ( E ^ J
The sample equivalent of the weighting matrix fl — Z'EZ  is the (L x L) White dis­
persion matrix, which is
_  1 T
i= 1
and therefore we can express the objective function as
f 2
T  (  T  \  —1 T
^ e i z l  ]T Z iz'ef =  & Z (Z 'S Z )  Z'R
N O R M  =
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For consistency of the estimates it is necessary that Z'EZ  is constant when minimizing 
the above NORM. Using Z'EZ =  I  will deliver consistent but inefficient estimates. 
Estimation of any other Z'EZ  requires that some estimate of P/v is already in hand, 
even if P/v is the object of estimation: such estimate of P/v used to construct Z'EZ  
may not be efficient but must be consistent in order to improve the efficiency of the 
main estimation procedure. This still leaves the open question of where to find the 
first round consistent estimator of P/v; one possibility is to obtain an inefficient but 
consistent GMM estimator by using Z'EZ =  I  and then use the resulting estimator 
to construct £  which can be used to re-compute the NORM to minimize.
The GMM covariance matrix
Given the point estimates obtained from the minimization problem outlined before, 
we are interested in obtaining a (asymptotic) covariance matrix. Using a standard 
strategy, we can recover the asymptotic behavior of the estimator.
In general, ignoring the averaging factor the matrix Vt =  Z'EZ  is equal to
T T
£ £  z^ C O V  (ei,ej) 
i = 1 j = 1
where z\ is the i — th row of Z  , and if we denote z lh as the h — th observation of 
instrument I we can rewrite this product as
T  T  
i = l  j = 1
z i  )
T  T
£ £
i = 1 j = 1
(  z} zS z}I J I J
i j i j
z^zli 3
22 3 3
Z^ Z  ^  ^i 3
Zi Z3
4 4  /
)cOV(e i,ej ) =
C O V (eu eA
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Assuming that this double summation divided by converges to a positive definite 
matrix, its estimation relies on the current estimates of the parameters P/v-If residuals 
are uncorrelated over time, the cross terms can be omitted as C O V  (e i,e j) =  0 when 
i ^  j  and we have that
T
Z'EZ =  Ziz\VAR (ei)
i - 1







z}z \  z jz f  





z^ V A R ( e i )  =
VAR(e.i)
The White variance matrix estimator approximates this as
z}z}  z }z f
AA AA
i=l i = 1
ZL Z li i
A  A   ^
AA
For the autocorrelation case, we can either use the Newey-West estimator of Z'EZ or 
we can explicitly control for the presence of autocorrelation in residuals.
Testing
One of the additional benefits of the GMM testing method is that whenever the P/v 
is overidentified (L > N)  the minimand is also a test statistic for the validity of these 
restrictions. Under the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid
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it can be proven that
T  /  T  \  —1 T
N O R M  =  ^ 2  t i zi ( S  Z{Z'& ) S  ®iZi ~ a X2 (L ~ N )
i = l  V t = l  /  i = l
This test does not however give any indication about the validity of all the instrumental
variables, but answers the simpler question: given that a subset of the instrumental 
variables is valid and exactly identifies the coefficients, are the extra instrumental 
variables valid ?
Instruments’ choice
In what follows we present some results obtained by applying the above method to 
the log-linearized version of the production function in which we set the elasticity 
parameters of the CES to zero (that is r =  s =  0).
We find that a GMM procedure applied to the unrestricted CES specification pro­
vides poor, scarcely robust and highly insignificant estimates for all technology pa­
rameters. On the other hand, a restricted (r =  s — 0) CES technology delivers a 
Cobb-Douglas specification of the form F (H ) =  exp-^  which can
be easily log-linearized as
InF (H t) =  A \n H 3t +  (1 -  A) [B\nH 2t +  (1 -  B )ln H 3t) +  f t
and given the small sample dimension (30 observations) this linearization makes the 
GMM procedure more robust and reliable. In fact, in a C-D specification it does not 
matter whether H2 is nested with H\or H%. Such distinction would matter only in a 
CES specification.
In order to explicitly model possible error correlation we assume that
f t  — Oft-1 + £t 
et i.i.d.
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If we then denote A In H$t +  (1 -  A) [B In H%t +  (1 — B) In Hat] as X[fi , we can redefine 
the residuals to be used in computing the empirical moments as
and by doing so we explicitly control for the time correlation of f t .
We initially include a time polynomial of the form t (time, 7 ) =  c +  71 timet +  
72time^ +  73timet in the conditional mean of In F(Ht).  However, after some ini­
tial testing we conclude that only the linear time trend can be robustly estimated in 
most of our model specifications, the other parameters in the time polynomial being 
insignificant and erratic. Therefore we have a final error term specification of the form
et =  In F (Ht) -  X'tj3 -  7 timet -  p [in F (Ht~ 1) -  -  j t im e t- i]  (3.17)
The instruments used to control for the simultaneity of et and the endogenous human 
capital aggregates in Ht are lagged values of Ht itself. We present estimates based on 
empirical moments such as
where H t - i - m-g  =  [H i,t- i-m-g , H2, t - \ -m -g , H3>t- G i v e n  this notation it 
follows that 3 (M  -h i) is the number of moment conditions used in estimation. The 
index g indicates the minimum lag that is employed as an instrument (e.g., when g =  0 
we use a specification with instruments dated between t — 1 and t — M ).
The parameters to estimate in the final specification (3.17) are {/?, p, 7 } where 
/3 =  (A ,B ). Different sets of instruments are alternatively used. We report estimates 
of these parameters under a set of moment restrictions which differ in the:
ct =  InF (Ht) -  p ln F (H t- i )  -  X'tp  +  pX[_xP (3.16)
1 -m-g where m — 1,..., M
g £ { 0 , 1 , 2}
•  choice of Iff;
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• choice of g\
•  choice of the first step weigting matrix, that is either the identity (I) or the 
instrument cross-product (Z' Z)\
To minimize the objective function we use a simplex method algorithm first pro­
posed by Nelder and Meade (1965). This method has the advantage to check whether 
a candidate set of estimates is a real minimizing set by using a quadratic expansion in 
the neighborhood of such set and verifying that the minimum of such quadratic form 
corresponds to the minimum found by the Simplex.
The results of the GMM estimation procedure of the log-linearized C-D technology 
axe reported in the following tables (standard errors in parenthesis). Notice that the 
total number of observations (T) available to compute the moments depends on the 
number and lenght of the lagged instruments and is equal to 30 — 1 — m — g.
The final line of each table reports the objective function value (weighted sum of 
empirical moments): this is a test of overidentifying restrictions and is distributed as 
a ^3(m+i)-at where N  =  4 is the number of parameters to estimate.
Table 3.9 reports results obtained by using: (?) dependent variable measured from 
aggregate wage bills and physical capital augmented to account for residential wealth 
and (ii) a weighting matrix is an identity matrix.
Table 3.10 reports results based on the same dependent variable but with a first 
stage weighting given by the positive definite matrix Z 'Z .
3.7.4 D efinition o f stationary measure 
Stationary measure p*
D e fin it io n  1 Let ( X , F  (X ) , ipj )  be a measure space, where X  =  Q x Q x Z x A  is 
the state space and F (X ) the o-algebra on X .  In order to define a stationary measure 
ipj we need a transition function Q : X  x F (X ) — > [0,1] such that, for F  c  F  (X) ,
i ’j  =  Q (f , i>j)-
In order to construct Q we define the following conditional probability 7  =  7  (7r (•))
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Table 3.9: GMM technology estimates, identity weights
Dep. Var. Based on Wage Bills and Aug. K, First Step Weight Matrix: I
g = 0 g = 1 g = 2
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Dep. Var. Based on
technology estimates, non-identity weights
Wage Bills and Aug. K, First Step Weight Matrix: Z 'Z
g = 0 g = 1 g = 2
M  = 1 M  = 2 M  = 3 M  = 1 M  = 2 M  =  3 AT = 1 M  — 2 M  = 3
A 0.395 0.775 0.468 0.404 0.615 0.548 0.295 0.284 0.299
(0.552) (0.188) (0.105) (0.278) (0.161) (0.139) (0.310) (0.207) (0.141)
B 0.964 -1.188 0.764 -0.029 1.420 0.770 1.042 0.790 0.850
(0.960) (2.106) (0.253; (0.552) (0.300) (0.188) (0.246) (0.123) (0.010)
P 0.951 0.958 0.944 0.972 0.929 0.950 0.934 0.952 0.939
(0.021) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.014) (0.012)
7 0.027 0.055 0.036 0.052 0.023 0.035 0.029 0.035 0.038
(0.034) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004)
T 28 27 26 27 26 25 26 25 24
fu n c . 3.838 2.878 13.765 0.743 8.785 14.729 2.941 6.254 9.262
d.f. 2 5 8 2 5 8 2 5 8
* ( 0 .9 5 ) 5.991 11.070 15.507 5.991 11.070 15.507 5.991 11.070 15.507
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7  [x, y  G F] =  Pr { y  G F  \ x}  =
/  n{zj+1 | Zj} I  { ( 6 , ej+ i (x ) , zj+ i ,a j+ i (x )) G F } chj+i 
Jz
which represents the fraction of agents transiting from x =  (0 ,e , z ,a ) G X  into 
F  C  F {X).  I  (•) is an indicator function.
We can then use 7  (•) to define the stationary measure ip*- as
v>* ( F)  =  Q ( F , r j ) =  /  7 [z,y e F ]  d r .  Or)
«/ X
3.7.5 A nalytical derivation o f the market clearing condition
The budget constraint of a generic agent in chapter 3 can be described as
cj  +  aj + 1 —
=  [1 +  r (1 -  rfc)] (d j  +  qj) +  w e exp£j r i j (  1 -  rne) (1 -  dj) -  (D e -  Te) dj
Such expression can be simplified by using equation (3.8) to express qj, so that we 
obtain
cj  +  a j + 1 — (3.18)
[1 +  r  (1 -  7*)] d j  +  w e exp£j n j ( l  -  rne) (1 -  dj) -  (D e -  T e ) dj
where a\ =  q\, with qj =  0 and <2j+i =  aj+i (x) for j  =  2,..., j . Notice that E  (</i) is 
also described in (3.8).
By integrating this expression using the population distribution p  (x , j ) we obtain
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(3.19)Cj (x) difjj (x) + f  <Lj+i (x ) d'ipj (x ) 
j = \ L J  X  J  X
= (1 + r (1 -  Tfc)) V  Cj /  flj dipj (a) +  
j=l I *
+ Cj /  we exp6j Tlj (x) (1 -  T n e )  (1 -  dj (x)) dlpj (x) + 
j=l ^
i  y J /•
-  /  £>edj (x) d ^ j  (x) + ^  Cj /  Tedj (rr) d'ipj (x)
j_ 1 j_j */x
Using the government budget constraint we can rewrite (3.19) as
c + § c’ [ / ,  Cj (x) dipj (x) +  J  cij+i (x) dipj (x)| =
=  (1 +  r) ^  Cj J _  « j # j  (a) +  X J  Cj  w e expe5 ’ ’ } rij (x) (1 -  dj (x )) dijjj (x) +
L>edj (x) dipj (x)
j=i ^
Let FX denote capital flows. Now use the following relationships
1. j Cj X4 drfj (a) =  K  (r) — F X  (r) , by definition;
2 . F #  =  r  +  S , by profit maximization;
3. F ( K , H ) =  F # If +  J3j=i Cj f x  weexp€j nj (x) (1 — dj (x)) d^j (x) , because 
F  (K , H) is homogeneous of degree 1;
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Using relationship (1) we can write the last equation as
g + E  Cj /  cj  (x ) dipj (x) +  / dj+1 (:r) dipj (x)
j = l  \.J X  J x
(1 +  r) (K  — F X )  +  ^  Cj j  we e x p e j (e ,e , z } rij ( x )  (1 — d j  ( x ) )  d i p j  (x) +
j = i  ^
- V O  [  Dedj (x) d^j (x)
T^i Jx
Then, using relationships (2) and (3) we obtain
(3.20)
o + §  < ■ [ / ,  Cj (*e) d'ipj (*^ 0 J* f~i (^0 dipj (x)j (3.21)
F ( H , K )  +  ( 1 - S ) K  + (1  +  r ) F X -  D edj (x) d'ipj (x)
which, using again relationship (1) can be written as
G +  p ’ \ L  Cj (x) d'ipj (x) +  J  dj+1 (x) dipj (x)j (3.22)
=  F { H , K )  +  Y\ Cj f  dj dipj (a) - 5 K  -  r F X  -  V  Cj f  D edj (x) dipj (x) 
j Ja j Jx
This is exactly the goods market clearing equilibrium condition.
3.7.6 C om putational m ethod
We solve the agent’s problem via backward recursion, starting from the last period 
of life. The optimal consumption and leisure decisions axe found through an Euler 
equation method. Given the non-convexity of the value functions of students we do 
not rely only on local methods to solve for the zeroes of Euler equations: instead, we use 
also a grid method which allows to find all the intervals in which the Euler equations 
change sign. This method splits the state-space into small intervals and computes the 
sign of the Euler residual at the boundaries of such intervals. Whenever a change in
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the sign of the Euler residual takes place place within an interval, a non-linear equation 
solver is used to find the zero of the Euler equation within that interval.
Expectation with respect to labour shocks are computed using Gauss-Hermite in­
tegration.
We store optimal decisions and value functions at grid points but households choices 
axe not restricted to coincide with these points. We do linear interpolation to evaluate 
choices which he between points.
Once the optimal policy have been stored, we run simulations based on age cohorts 
of 10,000 individuals, starting from the youngest and moving further up the age ladder. 
When ah age groups have been simulated we compute the aggregate states and the 
associated prices. We use a sup-norm criterion to check whether the new prices axe 
close enough to the old ones. If they axe close enough in the chosen sup-norm, we 
claim to have converged to an equilibrium, otherwise we start solving the problem all 
over again using a linear combination of old and new prices.
Chapter 4
Education and Crime over the  
Life Cycle
4.1 Introduction
This chapter develops an empirically-based, heterogeneous-agent, equilibrium life-cycle 
model incorporating both education and criminal choices. Its goal is to provide a 
framework in which to analyse the effectiveness in terms of cost to the taxpayer of 
alternative policies which directly or indirectly impact on crime. We apply the model 
to the study of property crime which is more likely to be driven by economic decisions, 
then, for example, homicide or rape.
Crime is a hot issue on the US policy agenda. Despite its significant fall in the 
Nineties its cost to the taxpayer has soared. The prison population has doubled over 
the same period and now stands at over two millions of inmates. The yearly cost of 
keeping a person in jail exceeds 20,000 dollars1. These numbers beg the question of 
whether U.S. policy makers are using a cost-effective mix of policies in the fight against 
crime.
For reasons similar to those highlighted in Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998b),
the analysis of alternative policies to tackle crime benefits from the use of a dynamic
lrThe figure comes from Maguire and Pastore (1995) and is at the lower end of available estimates. 
Section 4.5 reports alternative estimates.
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equilibrium framework2. Dynamics are important as educational and criminal choices 
interact in a life-cycle perspective. Furthermore, in equilibrium any large-scale pro­
gramme is likely to alter personal disposable income both through its impact on market 
prices and through its financing implications. Therefore, in evaluating alternative pro­
grammes it is important to account for their impact on the personal distribution of 
disposable income.
The model has two main sources of heterogeneity. Agents differ in: 1) innate, 
observed ability and 2) initial wealth. Agents self-select themselves into education on 
the basis of these differences and, upon entering the labour market, decide whether to 
engage in criminal activity on a period-by-period basis.
We use PSID, NIPA and CPS data to estimate the parameters of a production 
function with different types of human capital and to approximate a distribution of 
permanent heterogeneity. These estimates are used to pin down some of the model’s 
parameters. We also use PSID data to estimate the relative importance of ability in 
different education groups. The model is calibrated to match education enrolments 
both in the aggregate and by measured ability, aggregate (property) crime rates and 
some features of the wealth distribution.
We compare the implications and effectiveness of two policies: the first, an increase 
in the prison term by 1.2 months, the second, a subsidy towards high school completion 
of roughly 8% of average earnings per year of school. This amount is the same as the 
size of a well-known small scale program - the Quantum Opportunity Program - which 
provided extra support and high school graduation incentives aimed at children from 
a disadvantaged background3. We compare the effect of an unconditional subsidy paid 
to all high school graduates to a means-tested one aimed at students in the lowest 35% 
percentile of the wealth distribution. To control for heterogeneity we also experiment 
with assignment of agents to a treatment and control group.
The increase in the prison term reduces the aggregate crime rate by 4.2% and
2In fact, the case for the use of models allowing for equilibrium effects in policy analysis has 
been recently argued by various authors in different fields. See, among others, Abraham (2001), Lee 
(2001),Lee and Wolpin (2006), Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2004)
3See Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) and Taggart (1995) for a discussion of the program and its 
effects
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marginally expands the stock of inmates and the associated expenditure. As a con­
sequence, the proportional labour tax rate has to increase marginally (from 27% to 
27.03%) to finance the increased cost. The impact of the policy is effectively the same 
both in partial and in general equilibrium.
Financing an unconditional subsidy to high school completion calls for the same 
increase in the labour tax rate despite the fact that, in general equilibrium, the absolute 
cost of the intervention is twice as large as in the case of an increase in the prison 
sentence. The increase in efficiency and revenues makes the tuition policy basically 
self-financing. Furthermore, the tuition subsidy is more than twice as effective in terms 
of crime reduction. The associated fall in the crime rate is a sizeable 9%. The intuition 
behind the result is that, in equilibrium, the subsidy shifts lower ability people, who 
have a higher propensity to committing crime, out of the high school dropouts group. 
At the same time, it increases the proportion of people with relatively higher ability 
in the high school dropouts group. These axe the people whose opportunity cost of 
attending high school goes up more in response to the increase in the relative wage 
of high school dropouts. Since education and skills axe substitutes in their effect on 
crime rates, this reallocation is highly effective. The importance of this composition 
effect is apparent in partial equilibrium. While the policy induces a much larger fall in 
the number of high school dropouts, the ability composition of the pool of high school 
dropouts does not improve at unchanged prices. As a result the crime rate falls by 
only 3%.
The same subsidy paid only to students in the lowest 35% percentile of the wealth 
distribution goes a long way in reducing the crime rate at roughly one third of the cost 
relative to an equivalent unconditional subsidy. The aggregate crime rate falls by 6% 
in general equilibrium while the increase in efficiency implies the policy can be financed 
at a marginally lower labour tax rate relative to the benchmark. The mechanism at 
play and the differences between partial and general equilibrium axe similar to the 
unconditional subsidy experiment.
Conducting the same means tested experiment but randomized over a treatment 
and a control group allows us to compare the predictions of our model to the outcome
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of actual randomized programs such as the Quantum Opportunities Program. The 
average crime rate over the life cycle is between 14 and 15% for the control group 
and half as much for people in the treated group which took up the subsidy. This 
is broadly consistent with the findings by Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) in their 
follow-up study among QOP participants one year after the end of the program. The 
proportion of people reporting being involved with the police at least once is 6% for 
the treated group against 13% among controls.
4.2 R elated  literature
The model is in the tradition of economic models of crime which goes back to Becker’s 
(1968) seminal contributions. There is an extensive body of empirical literature testing 
the main prediction of the theory that both market returns and the expected punish­
ment are significant determinants of criminal choices. The effect of market returns 
upon crime is well established: see for example Grogger (1998) and Freeman (1999) 
who surveys earlier empirical studies. More recent work includes Gould, Weinberg, and 
Mustard (2002), Machin and Meghir (2004) and Raphael and Ludwig (2003). Con­
cerning the effect of the expected punishment, Levitt (1997) and Levitt (1996) finds 
significant elasticity of crime rates respectively to expenditure on police and the length 
of the expected prison term. Finally, the existence of a relationship between crime and 
education is documented by Lochner and Moretti (2004).
Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) study jointly the effect of changes in mar­
ket returns and in the expected punishment within a calibrated, dynamic general 
equilibrium model of crime choice which they use to account for fluctuations in the US 
property crime rate in the past twenty years. Their model is closest to the present one 
and, in fact, we use it as our starting point. They show that the model is remarkably 
effective in accounting for the evolution of the property crime rate in the last twenty- 
five years on the basis of changes in wage inequality, age distribution and expected 
punishment. Their analysis is positive and abstracts from educational choices and im­
perfect substitutability among workers with alternative education levels. Our focus is
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more normative. Furthemore, endogenising investment in education allows us to carry 
out a cost-benefit analysis of a richer set of alternative policies. Cozzi (2004) also 
uses a calibrated equilibrium model to investigate the extent to which differences in 
poverty and labour market opportunities can rationalize the higher crime rates among 
African-American males.
Finally Donohue and Siegelman (2004) assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative 
policies aimed at tackling crime, including social policies. Their cost-benefit analysis, 
though, relies on elasticities from existing empirical studies and is thus necessarily 
static and partial equilibrium.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 
3 discusses the estimation strategy while the calibration is discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 simulates the model and discusses the effect of alternative policies. Section 
6 concludes.
4.3 T he m odel
4.3.1 Environm ent
The model has an overlapping generation structure. Time is discrete.
D em ographics: The economy is populated by a continuum of individuals. At 
each date a new cohort of unit mass starts life. We denote by j  £ J  the age of an 
individual. Individuals are born at age zero, cannot work beyond the compulsory 
retirement age j r and die at age j .  The conditional probability of surviving from age 
j  to j  +  1 is Aj  and the unconditional probability of surviving up to age j  >  0 is 
A — TT-7 - 1  A 4
Preferences: Preferences axe given by
j =0
where Cj denotes consumption at age j .  i s- and dj are indicator functions. The former
4By the law of large numbers, A j  is also the mass of agents of age j  in the population.
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equals one if the individual is in education at age j  while the latter assumes value one 
for an agent engaged in crime at age j .  They axe zero otherwise. The felicity function 
is
c1-CT
u(cj,i],d$) =  u(cj) +  +  Xdcj =  y2^  +  +  x tf .  (4.1)
The parameters ipjiO) captures the (dis)utility of the effort associated with educa­
tion for a student with measured ability 9. The parameter x  captures the (dis) utility 
of engaging in crime other than the opportunity cost stemming from foregone market 
returns. We have chosen this specification since the flexibility it provides turns out 
to be crucial to match enrolment rates by ability and the (local) elasticity of crime to 
expected punishment observed in the data.
Agents do not value their offsprings’ welfare and discount the future at rate (3.
Education: Educational attainment e can take values in E  =  {eo ,e i,e2}.5 To 
achieve education level en an agent has to be in school up to age j n with j n+\ >  j n and 
jo =  0. Hence ed, the number of years of education, takes values in E D  =  { 0 ,1 , . . . ,  J2} • 
We denote by i sj  € {0,1} the choice to study or not at age j  <  J2, with i s- =  1 if the 
individual is in education and zero otherwise. The direct per-period out of pocket cost 
(fee) of studying towards a degree e is f e and the utility of being in education en, ipj(0 ), 
is constant for any j n- \  < j  < j n Students who start a course of study axe assumed 
to be committed to it till its end. Agents who abandon education cannot go back to 
school at a latex date. After completing school, agents enter the labour force. Market 
productivity increases only with the completion of an additional level of education.
C rim e choice: Education and retirement axe incompatible with crime but all
agents in the labour force can choose to engage in criminal activities regaxdless of
their employment status6. We denote by d? G {0,1} the choice to engage or not in
crime at age j  < j r , with dj =  1 if the individual engages in crime and zero otherwise.
Criminal activity amounts to theft. In the current version of the model, only workers
can be robbed, while students and pensioners cannot. For a victim being the target
5These correspond to “less than high school,” “high school” and “at least college.”
6This is the same assumption as in Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004). It is consistent with 
evidence reported in Merlo (2001) that 71% of state prisoners in 1979 were employed prior to their 
conviction.
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of a theft involves losing a fraction a  of post-tax labour income. This is equivalent to 
say that workers face a random, multiplicative shock v with support =  {1 — a, 1} 
to their post-tax labour income. The probability of being the victim of a crime is 
ttv =  P r(v  =  1 — a). For simplicity we assume criminals cannot target their victims 
and each of them obtains a fraction a  of the average post-tax labour income.
An agent engaged in crime in the current period is apprehended and sent to jail 
with probability 7ra. The length of the jail sentence is r  periods, starting from the 
current one. A convicted criminal keeps both her assets and the proceeds from her 
last crime, but she cannot access them while in jail. No optimising choice takes place 
while in jail and utility is exogenously given and equal to u.
Endowments: Agents cannot hold a job while in education. Once they have 
left education and entered the labour market, the supply labour their unit labour 
endowment inelastically. An agent’s labour supply is subject to a multiplicative i.i.d. 
employment shock equal to 0 < / < 1 with probability ttu >  0 and one with probability 
1 — 7ru.7. Therefore the actual labour supply I can take values in L — {1,1}.
The efficiency associated with an agent’s labour supply I is
hj (0, e) =  exp (0 +  Zj ( e ) ) , (4.2)
where 0 6  0  is an agent’s innate level of ability. In each generation, the share of 
individuals with innate ability 0 is 7/(0) with rj (0) =  1.
Production technology: Firms are identical and use human and physical capital 
to produce output according to the production function
Q( H, K)  =  H '~aK a , (4.3)
where H  and K  denote, respectively, the stocks of human and physical capital. The
7This way of modelling unemployment shocks is the same as in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante 
(2003). It allows us to contain the computational burden by using a time interval of a year in our 
calibration while still being able to accommodate a shorter unemployment duration. The latter is 
around one quarter for the US.
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human capital stock H  is the aggregate
H  =  [ctH{ +  0H$  +  (1 -  a  -  p ) H $ .  (4.4)
of the stocks of human capital Hn associated with education level edn. Workers with 
the same level of educational attainement are perfect substitutes. Physical capital 
depreciates at the exogenous rate <5.
M arket arrangem ents: Markets for factors of production and the final good are 
competitive. There axe no state-contingent markets to insure against income risk, but 
workers can self-insure by saving into the risk-free asset. They also face an exogenous 
borrowing limit a' > a, where a' denotes the stock of riskless asset at the beginning of 
the next period. Assets of agents who die before age j  axe distributed to the newborns 
in such a way that the cross-sectional distributions of wealth across deceased and 
newborn agents coincide8.
We denote by w(e) the wage per efficiency unit of labour of a worker with education 
e and by f  the riskless interest rate.
G overnm ent: The government administers a pay-as-you-go pension system, the 
criminal justice system, spends on wasteful public expenditure and transfers and col­
lects taxes. It balances the budget at all times.
In each period, it pays a pension benefit p to each pensioner and bears a total cost 
m  for each convicted criminal. The government also pays a yearly subsidy sube (a) 
to a student with wealth a studying for a degree leading to education level e. Both 
pension benefits and student subsidies are tax-exempt while labour and capital income 
axe taxed at proportional rates ti and tk respectively.
In the model benchmark, once the transfers and the criminal justice systems have 
been financed, any excess tax revenue is spent on non-valued public expenditure G.
Tim ing: The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of each period 
potential students decide whether to enter the labour market in the current period 
and all workers draw their labour supply and decide whether to engage in criminal 
activity or not. At this point criminals may be arrested. At the end of period agents
8The details of the mechanism generating bequests are discussed in Section 4.5.
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receive their labour income or transfers and decide how much to consume and save9.
4.3.2 Recursive representation
The consumers’ optimization problem admits a recursive representation (see 2 for 
proofs). The individual state is fully characterized by age j, the worker’s type associ­
ated with innate ability 9, completed years of education e, beginning-of-period asset 
holdings a, the labour supply realization I and the victimization shock v.
Let Ez denote the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution 
of 2. Let us also denote by r =  (1 — tk)f  the post-tax interest rate equals and by 
yj (6 , e, I) an agent’s flow of consumable resource other than financial income. Let 
the superscripts s, nc, na, a, pr and r index respectively students, non-criminal, non­
apprehended criminal, criminals apprehended in the current period, agents already in 
prison at the beginning of the period and pensioners. Then disposable non-financial 
“income” for agent i is given by
sube (a) — De if i =  s
(1 — ti) (1 — v) w (e) hj ( 6 , e) if i =  nc
(1 — ti) (1 — v) w (e) hj ( 6 , e) +  ay  if i =  na
ay  if i =  a
0 if i — pr
p  if i =  r.
Students and pensioners do not pay taxes on their flow of consumable resources. Agents
engaged in crime in the current period receive their current illegal income ay. If
apprehended they go to jail before receiving their labour income labour. Agents who 
are not in jail in the current period receive their labour income net of taxes but can 
be robbed of a share v of it. The associated dynamic budget identity for individual i
(4.5)
9Apprehended criminals do not supply any labour in the market. Payment of labour income, net 
of any losses due to crime, are paid at the end of each period before optimal consumption levels are 
chosen.
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is
f I a (1 +  r) +  yl — c if i ^  pr 
a =  <
I a (1 +  r) +  yl if i =  pr.
Given the borrowing constraint and the lack of a bequest motive, the individual
maximization problem is also subject to the constraints
a' > a, o!--> 0, do given (4.6)
The value function of a current student satisfies the Bellman equation
Vf (9, e„, a) =  maxu(c) +  i)j{9) +  (d\jVf+1(0, e„, a') (4.7)
if jn < j <  jn+i and
Vf ( 0 , e n,aj) =  maxu(c) +  ^j{0)  +  /3\j max{Vj+i(d, en+i, a;), i^V)“(_i(0, en+i, a', /)}
(4.8)
otherwise. The superscripts s and w index respectively students and workers. A 
student chooses consumption optimally subject to her budget constraint. Furthermore, 
in the year following the completion of its current education course the student has to 
choose optimally whether to study further or enter the labour force before knowing her 
current labour supply realization. Since the highest attainable degree is college, the 
student’s problem is subject to the terminal condition Vj2 (9, e, a) — EiV£  (9, e, a, I ) .
If one denotes by V nc the value function of a worker not engaged in crime and 
by V° the value function of a criminal gross of the cost of crime the problem of a 
labour force participant can be written as
V™ (9, e, a, I) =  max{ Vf ( 9 , e , a , l )  +  x , Vj lc{9, e, a, l ) }  . (4.9)
After observing her labour supply realization the agent chooses whether to engage or 
not in crime. In the former case she is apprehended with probability a  and her value
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function is
Vf (9, e, a, /) =  (! — 7ra) EvV™ (9, e, a, I) +  *aV? (0, e, a, /) .
The lifetime expected utility of a criminal entering jail10 is
V f  (6 , e ,a, l) =  j -  [ « +  ^ Aj + ^ l^ + r  (« .e ,a j+r , l)\ ■ (4.10)
Finally, the value function of an agent who is out of jail in the current period - i.e. 
i =  nc , na - is given by
Vj (9,e,a, l )  =  Ev m axu(c) +  p \jE iVj+i(9 , e,a',l')  . (4-11)
The agent is subject to the random shock v associated with being robbed and is 
uncertain abour her next-period labour supply realization.
4.3.3 Stationary equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we use is that of recursive, stationary, competitive equilibrium 
following Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989). To streamline notation we denote by 
s G S  the vector of state variables (9, e, a, Z) E & x E x A x L  and denote by capital 
letters aggregates of individual quantities denoted by the corresponding small case 
letter. With some abuse of notation, we use integrals even when summing over discrete 
variables.
D efin ition  2 For a given set of government policies {r,p, G, sube (a) , t/, t^} and an 
apprehension probability 7ra, a recursive stationary equilibrium is a collection of value 
functions Vf, individual decision rules { is-,d^} : S  —> {0,1} and : S x —> R,
decision rules { K , H n} for firms, prices { r ,w en}, time-invariant measures : S  —> 
[0,1], a victimization probability 7rv and an average labour income y such that:
10Note that a model period is one year. When the prison term is longer than a year we assume 
that an apprehended criminal receives utility u for the entire year in which she enters jail and the 
remaining fraction of the following year. After leaving jail her labour supply is reduced according to 
the remaining fraction of the year and is subject to the same multiplicative shock as any other worker.
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1. Given {r, wn} , {cj(s, v ), a j(s , v ) , i sj  ( s ) , dCj  (s)} fo r i  ^  pr solve the set of problems 
(4-7)-(4-ll) and V- are the associated value functions. Moreover, a'U (s , v ) =  
(1 +  r) a.
2. Given {r, wen} , K  and Hn satisfy
r +  8 =  Fk  (4.12)
and
w( e n) =  FHn. (4.13)
3. Factor and product markets clear11 or
H n — f  I h j i e ^ d p ^ i d ^ a ^ )  (4.14)
and
Q - 5 K  =  C +  M  +  G +  F.
4- The government budget is balanced
+  G +  P  +  SUB =  tkr K  +  t t [  w(es)lhj (6 , es) dpJfa{s) (4.15)
J j x S
M
5. The victimization rate coincides with the crime rate and satisfies
- 1
7TV =  (  [  d p j  ( s) \  [  dpCj  (s ) . (4.16)
\ J j x S  J  J J x S
6 . The average disposable labor income of employed workers satisfies
y = ( [  dp'ja( s ) \  [  w(e)lhj (6 , es) dp j a(s). (4.17)
\ J j x S  /  J j x S
11 By Walras law, market clearing on the good market and the markets for the three types of labour 
ensures that the capital market clears.
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4.4 E stim ation
The parameters of the model are obtained by a combination of estimation and cali­
bration using data from the US. We estimate components of the wage process and the 
aggregate production function.
4.4.1 Skill price variation, ability and wages
An important characteristic of the model is that the three types of human capital 
represent different inputs to the production function, not necessarily perfectly substi­
tutable and may have relative prices that vary over time in response to changes in 
either supply or demand for skills.
So as to be able to simulate our model, we need to have a distribution of unobserved 
heterogeneity affecting wages and education choices. In the 1972 wave of the PSID 
several IQ measures were elicited for households heads and after some examination one 
of them was deemed to be the most accurate and released. We use the cross-sectional 
distribution of such IQ test scores to approximate the permanent heterogeneity in our 
sample.
In figure (4.1) we report the measured IQ densities for the whole 1972 sample and 




D en sity  of IQ s c o r e s  b a s e d  on  s e le c te d  1972  d a ta N orm lQDensity of IQ scores based  on ALL 1972 data
Figure 4.1: Density of IQ measurement from 1972 PSID wave, for the whole sample 
and a comparable sub-sample.
Permanent characteristics are only one of the determinants of wages and other
4 Education and Crime over the Life Cycle 106
dimensions of heterogeneity must be analysed. We start by specifying an education 
specific wage equation for individual i's (log) wages in period t
In Weit =  Wet +  9e (ageu) +  «eit (4.18)
where wet represents the log of the aggregate price of human capital for education group 
e and where ge (ageu) is the education specific profile of wages. The unobservable 
component ueu is specified to be
Ueit — be(0i) “I- mu (4.19)
where be(9i) is a function of unobserved fixed effects (ability) and mu is measurement 
error, assumed iid. Self-selection implies that fixed effects are correlated with both ed­
ucation decisions and observed wage rates. We use cross-sectional variation to identify 
the gradients of age and ability by estimating the following equation on data from the 
1972 wave of the PSID separately for each education group
lniUej =  cedu +  fieduIQ  +  ot\age -I- oc2age2 +  eei (4.20)
where IQ denotes an individual test score, cedu is a constant and eei =  mu .
If we assume that ge (ageu) be a polynomial in age such that ge (ageu) =  cto +  
a fageu +  <^2a9eit’ ^ follows that the intercepts of the 3 education specific equations, 
cedu, estimate the sum of the age profile component ocq and the education specific 
price we 1972. Some normalization assumption is necessary to disentangle these 2 com­
ponents. The method we use in order to normalize the Oq terms (and therefore the skill 
prices) is described in more detail when we discuss estimation of aggregate technology 
parameters. The quadratic age profiles are used in the numerical simulations12.
In order to identify time variation in skill prices we exploit the panel dimension 
of the PSID data set. Using equation (4.18), we can identify the year-specific (log)
12In estimating age profiles from the 1972 cross-sectional data we ignore cohort effects, which are 
likely to induce a downward sloping profile at older ages. At the moment we do not address this issue.
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changes in wage growth for each education group by looking at individual (log) wage 
changes. We acknowledge that the age composition in each of our education subsamples 
is different. We control for different average age in each education group by estimating 
a first step regression of log real hourly earnings on age and a constant
In weit =  Ke +  A ageeit +  residualeu
The residual can be interpreted as the log real hourly earnings of an agent after con­
trolling for the group age. We then define the first difference of the residuals as
Veit — residualeit — re s id u a l^ -\
and identify the growth rates of wages in different groups by estimating
Vei ,year — dummy{year} + €ei,year (4.21)
for all years between 1968 and 1997. Standard errors are robust and use cluster ad­
justment13.
4.4.2 E stim ating wage equations
For the estimation of wage equations we use cross-sectional data from the 1972 PSID 
wave. We do not use individuals associated with the Census low income sample, the 
Latino sample or the New Immigrant sample and focus instead on the SRC core sample, 
which did not suffer any systematic additions or reductions between 1968 and 2001 
and was originally representative of the US population. We drop people with a zero 
test score because most of them did not take the test seriously enough to be part of 
the sample.
The main earnings’ variable in the PSID refers to the head of the household14 and is
13 No constant is estimated in this equation.
14In the PSID the head of the household is a male whenever there is a cohabiting male/female 
couple. Women are considered heads of household only when living on their own. We do not address 
the related sample issues explicitly, but any gender effects axe likely to be captured in the ability 
estimates.
4 Education and Crime over the Life Cycle 108
described as total labor income of the head15. We use this measure, deflated into 1992 
dollars by the CPI-U for all urban consumers. By selecting only heads of household 
we ignore other potential earners in a family unit and restrict our attention to people 
with relatively strong attachment to the labor force. We include both men and women 
as well as whites and non-whites16.
Information on the highest grade completed is used to allocate individuals to three 
education groups: high school drop-outs (LTHS), high school graduates (HSG) and 
college graduates (CG). In fact, the maximum age in the cross-section turns out to 
be 62. The non constant terms of the age polynomials from the wage equation axe 
presented in table (4.1).
Table 4.1: Results for education specific cross-sectional equations
D epend en t variable: log hourly earnings
















Figure (4.2) plots the age profiles (in logs) implied by the polynomial estimates for 
different education groups under the assumption that the constant terms are zero.
A detailed description of our sample selection for the estimation of log changes in
15This includes the labor part of both farm and business income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commis­
sions, professional practice and others. Labor earnings data are retrospective, as the questions refer 
to previous year’s earnings, which means that 1968 data refer to 1967 earnings.
16There is evidence (see Cozzi (2004)) that property crime is done mostly by males. We do not 
exclude females from our sample in order to keep consistency between our CPS and PSID data sets.









Age earning profiles-various groups
Figure 4.2: Log Age profiles of labour efficiency by education group
HC prices is reported in the Appendix to this chapter: in brief, we select heads of 
household aged 25-65 who are not self-employed and have positive labor income for at 
least 8 (possibly non continuous) years. The estimated log changes of price effects wet 
for different education groups are presented in figure (4.3).
The growth rates of skills prices are of fundamental importance to help identify 
human capital aggregates and the parameters of aggregate technology.
4.4.3 Aggregate production technology
We implement the method described in chapter 3 to measure human capital aggregates 
using CPS data.
However, unlike we did in chapter 3, we proceed to relax the restriction of unit 
elasticity implicit in the Cobb-Douglas specification and we only retain the isoelasticity
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Figure 4.3: Log changes in marginal labor productivity, by education 
assumption. We write the aggregate technology as
Y  =  K aH l~a
H  =  (a tff +  bHp2 +  (1 -  a -  b) Hg)p
The ratio of marginal products of different human capital inputs (M P H C edu) can 
written as
M P H C 3 / M P H C l =  ( l l -a ~ fe) g 3
a H *-x
M P H C 3 / M P H C 2 =
b Hr 1
i  t t P -  1
M P H C 2 / M P H C x =  r
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and terms can be rearranged to obtain expressions involving wage bills, like




which can be log-linearised and used to obtain estimates of p and ratios of share
parameters. At this point the normalisation of skills prices becomes important, as it 
determines the relative sizes of the human capital aggregates Hedu-
Remember from equation (4.20) that the marginal products of human capital types 
in the cross-sectional equation based on the 1972 PSID wave cannot be identified 
separately from the intercept of the (log) age profiles OiQdu of the age polynomial. In 
other words, the amount of log hourly wage that is attributed to log M P H C edu cannot 
be distinguished from the amount attributed to a component of the age polynomial. 
Therefore a normalizing assumption is needed to disentangle these two components of 
wages.
Any normalizing restrictions on the log of the marginal products of each education 
type (M P H C edu) have an effect on the estimates of the share parameters of differ­
ent aggregate human capital types in technology. This can be easily seen by way of 
example. We know that
where =  eWaM i t  w^ere ^  3X6 t i^e rati° °f human capital aggregates obtainedex p (a j) Hi  Hi
under the assumption that both ag and ag are equal to zero (that is when the constant 
term Kedu in the cross-sectional wage equation is fully attributed to the marginal 
product of human capital). Then we can write
log (W B 2 / W B 1) =  log (4.25)
4 Education and Crime over the Life Cycle 112
Notice that the p parameter in equation (4.25) is identified under any rescalings of the 
ratio ^ , because the log transformation captures any rescaling factor in the constant 
term. This means that the estimation of p does not change with alternative normali­
sations of the ctQdu terms. In a similar way, we can decompose the ratios W  B 3 /W  B 1 
and W B 3 /W B 2 and then define a system of linear equations like
log( i )+piog^ M  = x
\ a j  exp (aj)
. f l - a - b \  . exp (ag)
log ------------  J +  p lo g  T-jY : Y\  a J ex p (a i)
( 1  — a — b \  , exp (aj)
l0« — j,—  +plQg ; ° z  v b J exp (qiq)
where (X, Y, Z)  is a vector containing the estimates of the constant terms from the 
log-linearised estimation of equations (4.22 — 4.24).
The above system can provide an estimate of the shares a,b and (1-a-b) as a function 
of the normalization chosen for the otQdu terms. This is linked to the human capital 
aggregates, which also change with the aQdu terms. An easier notation to write the 
linear system above is
S2 -  Si +  p (ag -  a j) =  X (4.26)
8 3 - 8 1 + p  (ag -  a j) =  Y (4.27)
8 3 - 8 2  +  p (ag - a l )  =  Z (4.28)
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with £i =  log (a), 62 =  log (b) and £3 =  log (1 — a —b). The system in matrix form is
'  61 '
r  -1 r  l
1 - 1 0 - p p 0
0 - 1 1 - p 0 p




Ax =  B
and at least a solution to this system exists if and only if rank [A\B ] =  rank [A]. There­
fore we have to check whether the vector (X , Y, Z ) is such that, if we set (a^, a o) 
to some arbitrary (normalising) values, we can solve the system above for a triplet 
(<5i,62,^3) without having any contraddicting solutions: given that the matrix A is 
of rank 2 (easily checked!) this will be true if and only if X  =  Y  — Z  (to check 
this, just subtract the third equation from the second), which means that we have 
a system in 2 equations and 2 unknowns. The restriction on the technology shares 
exp (<5i) +  exp (6 2 ) +  exp (£3) =  1 guarantees that we can find all share parameters. 
Notice that not all the (X, Y, Z)  triplets can guarantee existence of a solution for this 
system.
4.4.4 E stim ation results for production function param eters
We estimate a version of equation (4.25) augmented by a linear time trend for each of 
the 3 wage bill ratios. The time varying regressor log 1S based on the assumption
that the terms cedu in equations (4.20) identify the relative prices in 1972. To control 
for possible endogeneity of the human capital inputs in the production function, we 
adopt an IV approach with lagged regressors (lags from 1 to 4 periods back are included 
in the first step). The results of this specifications, separately estimated, are reported 
in table (4.4.4) with standard errors in parenthesis.
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D epend en t Variable: log o f w age bill ratio
coeff. point estimate S.E.












Table 4.2: Unrestricted, log-linearised wage bills ratios equations.
T esting th e  isoelastic  restrictions
Estimates of p being tested (by wage ratios) F-statistic Prob. >  F-statistic 
P( 2/1) — P( 3/2) 0-03 0.8596
P( 3/2) — P(3/i) 0-42 0.5208
P( 2/ 1) — P(3/i) 0-61 0.4383
P( 2/ 1) =  P(3/i) =  P(3/i) 0-36 0.7019
Table 4.3: Tests for equality of elasticities of substitution among HC inputs
Using a joint estimation approach we are also able to test whether the estimates of 
the p parameters provided by different ratios are statistically different from each other 
(i.e. whether we can reject the isoelastic assumption)17. The results of such tests are 
reported in table (4.4.4).
The tests for equality of the p parameters are unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that the aggregate technology is isoelastic. We therefore estimate a restricted version 
of equations (4.20) in which we restrict the p to be the same for all ratios. The results 
for this specification are reported in table (4.4.4).
Our restricted estimate for p is approximately .45 which corresponds to an elasticity 
of substitution of around 1.8. Using a simple skilled/unskilled classification Katz and 
Murphy estimate the elasticity of substitution in production to be 1.41 with a standard
17U s in g  a  r e l a t i v e ly  s h o r t  t i m e  s e r ie s  d a t a  s e t  im p l ie s  r e l a t i v e ly  l a r g e  s t a n d a r d  e r r o r s  in  o u r  u n r e ­
s t r i c t e d  e s t i m a t i o n ,  w i t h  t h e  n o t i c e a b le  e x c e p t io n  o f  t h e  e d u 3 / e d u 2  r a t i o .
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D epend en t Variable: log o f w age bill ratio
coeff. point estimate S.E.












Table 4.4: Restricted, log-linearised wage bills ratios equations
error of .150. Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998a) report a favorite estimate of the 
elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled equal to 1.441, whereas Johnson 
(1970) has an old estimate equal to 1.50. Notice that our elasticity estimate provides 
a measure of substitutability between 3 different types of workers, rather than two 
simple skill groups.
We also estimate a specification with only lags larger than 1 to instrument for endo­
geneity of human capital aggregates18: this gives a restricted p =.354822 (S.E..1974259), 
which implies a lower elasticity of 1.55, much closer to the skilled/unskilled estimates 
of the previous literature.
The share parameters for the CES production function can be identified by using 
the constants estimated from the wage bill ratio equations above. However, one must 
be careful what normalizing assumptions are made on the values of the a Qdu terms in 
equation (4.25).
After experimenting with different alternatives, we have decided to set the in­
tercept aQduof the log age profiles to values such that the levels of the age pro­
files for different education groups have all the same average over age. If we let 
M edu — exp (a \duj  -f ct2duj 2) /W max, where Wmaxis the maximum working age,
18 T h i s  w o u ld  c o n t r o l  fo r  p o t e n t i a l  e r r o r  c o r r e l a t i o n  u p  t o  l a g  1.
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Values of normalising (qq, Q'q,Q'q) used in benchmark
~.edu= 1 niedu= 2 ~,edu=3a 0 a 0 a 0
________ 0_______ 0.159 -1.164________________________
Table 4.5: Value of intercepts in (log) age profile polynomial 
the normalising assumption we axe imposing is
exp (a£) M 1 =  exp (ag) - f^2 =  exp (qq) M 3 (4.29)
This means that we find the ctQdu such that
c*J -  a 20 =  In (M 2) -  In (M 1) (4.30)
a o — a o =  In ( M3) — In (M 2) (4-31)
which can be solved by setting the value of one of the a.Qdu terms to some arbitrary
value and solving equations (4.30 — 4.31) for the remaining ctQdu terms19. The resulting 
values axe reported in table (4.4.4).
We plug these values from table (4.4.4) in the system (4.26 — 4.28) together with 
the constants estimated in the wage bills equations (X =.5943174,Y =-.2503577,Z=- 
.8446752) reported in table (4.4.4). Notice that X  «  Y  — Z  (easily check that X  — 
Y  +  Z =  5943174 +  .2503577 — .8446752 «  0) and we know that a solution exists. The 
system in levels (not logs) can be written as}
19T h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h i s  s y s t e m  is:
al =  0
oto -  — In  ( A / 2) +  In  ( A / 1) +  Qo
Qo =  -  In  ( M 3) + l n ( M 1) + q J
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Normalised human capital prices by education group - 1972
ao constant HC log price=constant— ao HC price (level) 
Edu 1 0 0.21859 0.21859 1.244321
Edu 2 0.159 0.57754 0.41854 1.51974
Edu 3 -1.164 -0.1005 1.0635 2.89649
Table 4.6: 1972 normalised human capital
^ =  A =  exp [X  -  p (a£ -  a£)]
- — ^— ~ =  B =  exp [Y — p (a£ -  aj)]
“— l " =  c  =  exp [Z -  p (ajj -  a£)]
and solving for a and b we get that a =  =0.24, b =  1+^+A =0.41 and
( 1 - a - b )  =0.35.
Notice that after choosing the agdu terms in the age profile, we obtain the relative 
prices of different human capital in 1972, by using the constant terms cedu estimated 
in (4.20). This allows to identify also a series of human capital aggregates which
are consistent with the technology parameters. For clarity we report in table (4.6)
both the constant terms we have estimated for equations (4.20) and the normalising 
Q.Qdu obtained from equations (4.30 — 4.31). Their difference pins down a normalised 
(log) price for each human capital type in 1972 (the year for which we estimate the 
cross-sectional equation).
Using the price changes estimated in equations (4.21) we can obtain a time series 
of prices and human capital aggregates (efficiency weighted labor supplies) between 
1968 and 1997. These series and their logs are presented in figure (4.4).
The price pattern reported in (4.4) is consistent with a pattern of increasing in­
equality. The time series of human capital stocks give an insight on the importance of 
selection in determining inequality, especially if we contrast them with the aggregate 
labour force and wage bills. Despite a doubling of both the total number and wage bill 
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sample period, suggesting that for this group there has been a reduction in average 
per worker efficiency. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the college graduates, as 
their total number went up by almost four times over the sample period, whereas their 
human capital aggregate increased by roughly 70%. Big shifts in the distribution of 
people of different ability over educational outcomes have probably taken place over 
the sample period.
It is also worth noting that the pattern of HC aggregates is very similar to the 
labor shares’ dynamics presented in figure (3.8) for the Cobb-Douglas case.
4.5 C alibrating th e  benchm ark m odel
Not all the parameters in our model are estimated. The free parameters are chosen 
with the objective to build a numerical counterpart of our model which is able to 
reproduce selected features of the US economy.
Given the nature and timing of the choice faced by people wealth plays a pivotal 
role in determining equilibrium outcomes. The availability of assets and access to 
credit to smooth consumption is a crucial factor in both education and crime deci­
sions. We set time-preference and borrowing limit parameters in order to obtain a 
benchmark with an appropriate wealth/income ratio and a share of asset-poor people 
in line with the observed share for the target year. The distribution of workers over 
education outcomes is equally important, because it determines the relative returns to 
the education investments. However, the aggregate education shares are not sufficient 
by themselves to pin down relative returns because the relative ability of workers is key 
in determining aggregate human capital inputs in the production function. Therefore 
we target not only the aggregate education shares in the target year, but also education 
shares by ability. The additional benefit of this calibration approach is that we are 
able to assess the composition effects of potential policies by looking at selection over 
ability as well as wealth.
Finally, the benchmark equilibrium of our model must be able to reproduce the 
aggregate (property) crime rate for the target. It is also necessary to restrict the
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marginal sensitivity of the aggregate crime rate with respect to the prison sentence to 
a value that is close to estimates from the empirical literature. This allows to measure 
the effects of alternative policies versus the case of a pure stiffening of sentences. We 
achieve this double objective by calibrating a utility cost of crime composed by 2 
elements: a constant purely conditional on committing crime and a quantity which is 
a function of the length of the sentence.
The remainder of this section describes our calibration approach in more detail.
D em ographics. Each period represents one full year. An individual is born at 
age 16 and can choose whether to work or study. If an individual decides to study, 
she commits to be in school for two years until completion of High School. When 18 
a High School graduate decides again whether to work or study for the next 3 years 
in order to become a College worker. In any case, agents can work only until age 65, 
which means that the full working life of a person who starts work at age 16 is 50 
years, whereas it becomes 48 years for High School graduates and only 45 years for 
College graduates (who start working at age 22) . The age range in the model is the 
same as the age range we use in our PSID sample. The maximum possible age in the 
model is 95 and there is an age-related probability to die in each period that we take 
from the US life tables for 1989-1991.
Preferences. Agents have CRRA preferences and we choose the curvature of their 
utility to obtain a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 1.5. The discount factor 0  is 
chosen to produce a wealth income ratio equal to that for US households up t the 99% 
percentile. Wolff (2000) estimates the value of this ratio to be roughly 3.45 in 1983. 
The implied value of the discount factor is 0.967.
U n em ploym ent shocks. Following Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2003) 
we calibrate the required search period for an agent who experiences an unemployment 
shock to match the average duration of unemployment in the US economy. This is 13.5 
weeks, which is roughly 26% of the full-time employed yearly work hours.We therefore 
set the labor supply of (temporarily) unemployed people to 1=0.74. The incidence of 
unemployment ttu (fraction of population experiencing an unemployment spell in a
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given year) is set to 17.5% and the model unemployment rate is 0.175 x 0.26 =  4.55% 
which is the US average for our sample period.20
W ealth  d istribution  o f  th e  youngest. We assume that the wealth distribution 
among the youngest corresponds to the distribution of the accidental bequests in the 
economy. However, no agent is endowed with negative assets, so we censor the bequests’ 
distribution at zero and appropriately modify the average bequest so that the total 
bequitted wealth is held constant.
Borrow ing L im it. The exogenous borrowing limit a is calibrated to match the 
share of workers (all agents excluding students) with zero or negative wealth. Wolff 
(2000) provides an estimate of 15.5% for this share, which implies a borrowing limit 
of about 46% of average post-tax labor earnings.
G overnm ent. We use flat tax rates for both labor and capital income and, 
following Domeij and Heathcote (2003), we set ti =  0.27 and tk — 0.4. For simplicity, 
the pension is assumed to be a constant lump sum for all agents, regardless of their 
education and previous earnings. The replacement rate for the lump-sum is set to 
16.4% of average post-tax labor earnings like in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante
(2003).
D istr ib u tion  o f perm anent characteristic  (ab ility ). We use the distribution 
of IQ test scores from the 1972 wave of the PSID to approximate the distribution of 
permanent characteristics (ability) over the population. For expositional simplicity 
we split the range of ability in 4 equal-size intervals and assign agents to such ability 
bins. The relative share of people in the four bins is different: only 1.7% of the total 
population are in the lowest ability group (bin 1) which contains people in the left tail 
of the distribution plotted in Figure 4.1. Just less than 6.6% of the total population 
is in bin 2, 48% in bin 3 and finally 44% in the highest ability group (bin 4).
D irect C ost o f E ducation. The direct cost of college education is chosen to 
match the value of tuition costs as a proportion of average pre-tax earning. The
20At the moment we do not differentiate employment risk by education, although an interesting 
extension would be to include education specific employment risk.
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Enrolm ent rates by ability  bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 0.75 0.5 0.28 0.12 0.24
Edu 2 0.25 0.43 0.57 0.53 0.54
Edu 3 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.35 0.22
Table 4.7: Education shares among workers, by ability
National Center for Education Statistics provides several measures of tuition costs and 
we use our PSID sample for an estimate of average pre-tax earnings. Over the sample 
period the real college tuition costs have been been steadily growing, increasing from 
less than 5% to over 15% of our selected measure of earnings. We choose to set the 
college tuition costs to be 10% of average post-tax earnings. Given the labor tax rate 
in our model, this is equivalent to a college tuition cost roughly equal to 8% of average 
pre-tax earnings.
For the value of High School direct costs we have set them to be just 1% of average 
post-tax earnings, in order to account for expenses incurred for studying equipment 
and other outgoings. There does not seem to be not much information on such costs.
E ducation  Enrolm ent R ates. Education rates are matched both in the aggre­
gate and by ability groups. The distinction is important because the same aggregate 
shares are consistent with many different distributions of ability over education and, 
therefore, many different relative marginal returns between different types of labor. 
Moreover, the policy experiments are likely to alter the distribution of ability in each 
education group and it is useful that the benchmark can reproduce the distribution 
of ability types over education outcomes. In order to approximate such distribution 
we use the 1972 wave of the PSID which provides data on educational attainment of 
agents as well as their score in an IQ test. We assign people to 4 different ability 
bins, with bin 1 comprising those with the lowest IQ scores and bin 4 those with the 
highest. The education shares for each ability bin and the ensuing aggregate fractions 
are reported in table (4.7).
However, the aggregate education shares based on the 1972 wave of the PSID do 
not represent the true shares of aggregate enrolment in the US economy in our sample
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G rossed-up enrolm ent rates by ab ility  bin
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 0.81 0.56 0.30 0.13 0.25
Edu 2 0.19 0.40 0.58 0.61 0.58
Edu 3 0.00 0.04 0.12 0.26 0.17
Table 4.8: Grossed-up education shares among workers, by ability
period21 which are reported in table (4.8.2). In order to reproduce the aggregate edu­
cation distribution in the economy we gross-up the 1972 rates so that their aggregation 
gives back the aggregate enrolment rates for the US economy in 198022. The values of 
the grossed-up education shares by ability are reported in table (4.8).
We use ability-specific quasi-linear utility terms 'ipj (#) to shift the value of education 
for different ability bins and match the education shares.
A ggregate Crim e R ate and E lastic ity  o f A ggregate Crim e R nte to  th e  
E xp ected  P rison  Sentence. The aggregate property crime rate for the US in 1980 
was 5.6%.23 Furthermore, the evidence linking increased punishment to aggregate 
crime rate indicates that the elasticity of property crime with respect to expected 
punishment ranges from -0.1 to -0.4, see Donohue and Siegelman, 1998. We target 
an elasticity of -0.2, following Levitt (2004) who picks this value to account for the 
increase in incarceration rates over the 1990s.
We jointly choose the utility in jail u and the quasi-linear utility term associated 
to committing crime so that we match the aggregate crime rate and its elasticity to 
expected punishment. The average expenditure per convict in the model is equal to 
m. According to Maguire and Pastore (1995) the average expenditure per convict
21 One reason for this problem is attrition which can unequally affect people with different education 
in the PSID, altering the aggregate education shares. Moreover, our sampling procedure is likely to 
exclude people with low attachment to the labor market.
22We use 1980 for the aggregate enrolment rates because the education shares in that year lie very 
close to  the sample averages for the period 1967-2001. The average fraction of workers with no High 
School degree over the sample period was 0.232. The fraction of High School graduates was 0.575 and 
the College graduate share was 0.193.
23The crime rate is a victimization rate and represents a per capita measure of property crime 
in the US. The data are from the Uniform Crime Report and are taken from the Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics, Bureau of Justice Statistics. An alternative source of data regarding crime 
victimisation is the National Crime Victimisation Survey, based on self-reporting by victims. T his 
study suggests a larger incidence of crime vis-a-vis the UCR data.
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in the US was roughly $ 20,000 in 1992 and went up to $ 26,000 by 1999. These 
per-prisoner-costs are roughly 53% of average pre-tax labour earnings from our PSID 
sample. Donohue and Siegelman (2004) suggests an even higher cost per prisoner of $ 
36,000 for 1993 that would be 90% of the average pre-tax earnings in our PSID sample. 
We choose to set average per prisoner costs to 0.53 of average earnings and set m  to 
match this value.
The value of the parameters calibrated in the benchmark are reported in table 
(4.35) with the exception of the utility quasilinear terms associated with the education 
decisions which axe reported in table (4.8.2). Both tables are in the appendix.
4.6 N um erical sim ulations
This section describes the benchmark economy and presents the results of our policy 
experiments. We start by describing the main features of our benchmark economy in 
some detail. All models results are reported in model units.
4.6.1 The benchmark econom y
E ducation  d istribution . In our benchmark economy both the aggregate and ability- 
specific distribution of people over educational outcomes reproduce the shares in table 
(4.8). At the time of the high school choice wealth seems to matter only for people in 
the two highest ability bins. Given the relatively small differential in wages between 
high school graduates and dropouts (roughly 8% in our benchmark simulation, see 
table 4.10), people in the lowest ability bins are roughly indefferent between high 
school and working. Only for the highest ability group there is a preference for high 
school24 which introduces selection based on wealth. In these bins, agents who opt to 
continue schooling at ages 16 are richer overall than those who opt for work. As shown 
in table 4.9, in ability bin 3 the average wealth of people who progress to high school 
is 11.48 model units compared to just over 1.4 for the people who choose to work (in
24This preference is explained by the fact that ability multiplies market prices in this model, and by 
the fact that many of the high ability people are bound to progress to college.
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this bin high school dropouts account for roughly 30% of the population, see table 
4.8). The difference is even starker in ability group 4, where only 13% of people are 
high school dropouts. In this group the average wealth of students in 9.7 compared to 
a very low 0.31 for the dropouts. Given that we are conditioning on being part of a 
very high ability group, it is clear that selection is working mostly through the initial 
wealth endowment.
Admittedly this result depends on the assumption we are making regarding the 
borrowing limit of agents: we are assuming that people can borrow up to 46% of 
average post-tax labor earnings. Finally, many of the people who decide to go to high 
school in the high ability bins are likely to continue onto college, where tuition costs 
are higher and the length of the period to be funded longer.
In contrast to the high school decision, no large differences in wealth are present 
between people who decide to work at age 18 and people who decide to progress to a 
college education. The benchmark suggests that among college goers selection is based 
mostly on ability and wealth plays a smaller role25.
This results suggest that selection based on wealth takes place at an earlier stage 
in life: education decisions are a sequential process, and by the time of college only for 
a very small fraction of agents the decision will depend upon their wealth.
We also find that there is almost no difference in the average ability of college and 
high school graduates, which we mostly attribute to the fact that the gradient of ability 
in college wages is zero in this model.26
A verage earnings and Incom e by E ducation. The model is able to replicate 
some stylised facts about inequality in earnings and income. Table (4.10) reports post­
tax wage and income, together with average ability and consumption, by criminal and 
education status. In particular, the relative post-tax income by education is in line 
with the long term differences observed between 1967-1996, suggesting that the model
25We also measure what share of potential college goers are borrowing constrained at age 18. The 
only ability bin that contains borrowing constrained potential college goers is the highest, and even 
here only 12% of agents are borrowing constrained. This corresponds to just above 5% of the total of 
potential college goers.
26See table (4.1) in the empirical section for an explanation of the zero gradient of IQ on college 
wages.
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A verage w ealth  o f workers and stu d en ts at ages 16 and 18
age 16 age 18
workers students workers students
average wealth
ability bin 1 8.18 7.77 5.09 4.82
ability bin 2 7.66 9.77 7.20 5.28
ability bin 3 1.43 11.48 9.17 6.44
ability bin 4 0.31 9.69 6.68 7.00
Table 4.9: Average asset holding of young adults - simulated values in model units
Sum m ary sta tistics  for benchm ark econom y: averages
Education
HS dropouts HS Graduates College Graduates
Crime No Crime Crime No Crime Crime No Crime 
Ability 0.948 L023 0 2 7  0 6 0  O H  0 3 7
Wage 1.19 1.72 1.28 1.85 1.37 2.71
Ability by edu 1.011 1.159 1.137
Wage by edu 1.63 1.84 2.70
Income by edu 1.30 2.03 3.07
Table 4.10: Summary statistics: average ability, income and wage. Benchmark
is doing a good job in capturing inequality in both labor and capital income.
Crim e sta tistics  and costs. Empirical evidence suggests that the largest share of 
property crime is committed by young, uneducated people. Lochner (2004) provides 
a large body of evidence documenting a strong correlation between young age, low 
education and crime. In table (4.11) we report some data on education and crime27 
based on the NLSY, provided by Lochner (2004).
27Thefts of at least $ 50 or shoplifting.
Self-reported crim inal participation  rates by education  sta tu s
Source: NLSY (males ages 20-23,1980), table 1, p.825, Lochner (2004)
_________________________ Any income from crime Property crime
years of schooling
Less than 10 years 0.297 (0.035) 0.129 (0.026)
10-11 years 0.337 (0.029) 0.218 (0.026)
12 years 0.244 (0.017) 0.118 (0.013)
more than 12 years 0.174 (0.015) 0.160 (0.015)
Table 4.11: Criminal participation rates by education group. S.E. in parenthesis
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Crime rates by ability and education. Benchmark
Education group
ability bin High School dropouts High School graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) 0.26 0.17 0.024
bin 2 0.19 0.033 0.016
bin 3 0.17 0.009 0.009
bin 4 (highest) 0.11 0.025 0.009
aggregate 0.165 0.019 0.01
Table 4.12: Simulated crime rates by ability and education. Benchmark
On the basis of this evidence it appears that completing 12 years of schooling does 
make a large difference in the propensity to commit crime. If we take the average crime 
rate between ages 20 and 23 produced by our benchmark model for different education 
groups, we have that among high school dropouts the crime rate is 0.35, among high 
school finishers it is 0.07 and among college graduates it is 0.10. It seems that our 
model is slightly overestimating the share of (property) criminals who are high school 
dropouts compared to NLSY data and underestimating the share of criminals with at 
least a high school degree.28 This is due to the nature of the crime decision, which has 
no long term consequences for those apprehended. Introducing some form of stigma, 
like in Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and Rupert (2004) would probably reduce this discrepancy. 
It must be also noted that our measure of crime rate is in fact a victimization rate based 
on the whole population in a certain age group, whereas the NLSY data’s population 
is just the sample population in a given year.
The distribution of crime rates by ability bins and education group in our model 
shows large selection effects for the crime choice. Table (4.12) summarizes such crime 
rates in our benchmark. Given ability, crime rates drop dramatically as the labour 
maxket opportunity cost increases. This effect has been already documented by Machin 
and Meghir (2004).
Increasing opportunity cost seems to work mostly through education, although 
there are sizeable effects in ability, especially in the group of high school finishers.
The aggregate crime rate in the benchmark economy is 5.6%. The aggregate prison
28NLSY data might somehow underestimate the true rates as individual are self-reporting their 
crime activity.
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Crim e rates by ability  and education  - ja il term  13.2 m onths - G .E .)
Education group
ability bin High school dropouts High school graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) -0.03 0 -0.02
bin 2 -0.02 0 0
bin 3 -0.01 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 0 0
aggregate -0.01 0 0
Table 4.13: Changes in crime rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability and education. Jail 
term: 13.2 months, G.E.
expenditure is equal to 0.43, that is 0.3% of aggregate output and 1% of total tax 
revenues.
4.6.2 The effects of increased punishm ent
We have calibrated utility in jail in order to obtain a (local) elasticity of aggregate 
crime rate with respect to expected prison term of roughly -0.2 (see Levitt (2004)). In 
order to assess the effects of increasing the expected prison term in our model, we run 
some experiments in which we increase the prison term.
In the first of such experiments, we increase the expected prison sentence by 0.1 
units of a year, which is equivalent to 1.2 months. This change increases the expected 
sentence for an apprehended criminal from 12.6 months in jail to 13.8 months in jail. 
It is worth pointing out that in our model apprehension corresponds to incarceration. 
However, based on the Sourcebook of Crime Statistics, only 66% percent of cleared 
property crime cases reaching court end up in positive jail sentences. Therefore, ex­
pected sentences of 12.6 and 13.2 months correspond to average dispensed sentences 
of, respectively, 19.1 and 20.9 months.
Increasing the expected jail term to 13.2 months generates, in general equilibrium, 
a drop of the aggregate crime rate to 5.3%. The effect of the higher punishment, as 
summarised in table (4.13), is to reduce the crime rate among high school dropouts, 
especially in lower ability groups.
The increased punishment also generates a change in the ability specific distribution 
of education. Table 4.14 reports the new values. In the lowest ability group the
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Changes in education shares by ability. Jail term: 13.2 months, G.E.
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -0.06 -0.01 0 0 0
Edu 2 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0
Edu 3 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0
Table 4.14: Changes in enrolment rates w.r.t. benchmark, by education and ability. 
Jail term: 13.2 months, G.E.
number of high school dropouts goes down from 81% in the benchmark to 75% in 
the new equilibrium. Also in the second lowest ability group high school dropouts 
decrease from 56% to 55%. We attribute this change to a stronger disincentive to 
use crime as a consumption smoothing device. Since low skill people have a higher 
propensity to engage in crime for given educational attainments, this improves the 
ability composition of the pool of high school dropouts further reducing the crime rate 
for this education group. The aggregate education distribution is roughly unaffected 
given the low number of people in the first two ability bins.
No large effects in other dimensions take place in the new equilibrium. The aggre­
gate prison expenditure goes up to 0.45, and it goes up marginally as a share of total 
tax revenue to 1.1% . Additional costs are paid through increases in the labor tax 
rate which is almost unchanged at 27.03%. The effects of the change in prison term 
length are very similar in partial equilibrium, meaning that no significant price effect 
is induced by this policy change.
We also experiment with an even longer prison term, pushing up the expected 
sentence by a further 1.2 months to 15 months. The aggregate crime rate goes down 
only marginally in this case, to 5.27%. In the second ability bin there is a larger 
drop in high school dropouts’ share, which goes down to 51% of the total. However 
the aggregate prison costs increase to 0.491 or 1.2% of total tax revenues and, as a 
consequence, the labor tax rate increases to 27.09%.
4.6.3 Subsidizing H igh School com pletion
The second experiment we carry out involves subsidizing high school completion. A 
very well known experiment - the Quantum Opportunities Program - was carried
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out on a small scale along similar lines by the Department of Labor and the Ford 
Foundation in two waves: a first one between 1989 and 1993 and a later one between 
1995 and 2001. The program was targeted at adolescents from families receiving public 
assistance. The experiment, appropriately randomized, offered learning support and 
cash incentives, from grade nine through to high school graduation, to students in the 
treatment group. It involved a “salary” starting at $1 and rising to $1.33 per each 
hour of “activity” the student attended up to a ceiling plus a bonus of $100 for each 
100 program hours for completing activities29. An amount equal to the earned stipend 
was also deposited in an accrual account and paid to the enrollee conditionally upon 
completion of her high school degree. The total cost of the program was $3130 per 
student per year, of which $2150 represented the direct payment to the student and 
the remaining amount the cost of the resources (teaching support and equipment) the 
student had access to.
Hahn, Leavitt, and Aaron (1994) report that the program reduced the crime rate 
in the year after the end of the program by roughly 50% (from 13% to 6%) among 
participants relative to the control group. As discussed in Donohue and Siegelman
(2004), there are three main reasons why these numbers must be taken with care. 
First, the data refer to the subjects self-reporting about being in trouble with the 
police. Secondly, the difference in self-reported crime rates between the two groups 
was only significant at 12% according to Donohue and Siegelman’s (2004) calculations. 
Third, the significance decreases further if data from the unsuccessful Milwaukee trial, 
which the analysts dropped from their calculations, were included.
The experiment in this section differs from the Quantum Opportunity Program as 
it is not targeted at students from a disadvantaged background, but consists in giving 
all students attending high school a subsidy equal to 7.6 per cent of average labour 
earnings, which corresponds to the ratio between $ 3130 and average labour earnings 
in the data from 1995, one of the central years in which the program was run. Since 
students are likely to have benefited from the teaching support as well as the transfer,
29The maximum number of program hours was 750 divided between 250 hours of academic sup­
port, 250 hours of cultural and developmental activities and 250 hours of service activities, such as 
community service projects.
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Changes in education  shares by ability. N on  M .T . HS subsidy. P.E.
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.13 -.23 -.15 -.05 -.11
Edu 2 .12 .23 .15 .03 .10
Edu 3 .01 0 0 .02 .01
Table 4.15: Changes in enrolment rates w.r.t. benchmark, by education and ability.
Non means-tested High School subsidy. P.E.
Changes in crim e rates by ab ility  and education . N on  M .T . H S subsidy. P .E .
Education group
ability bin HS dropouts HS graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 .01 -.01
bin 2 .02 .04 -.01
bin 3 .04 .02 0
bin 4 (highest) .01 .01 0
aggregate .03 .02 0
Table 4.16: Changes in crime rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability and education. Non 
means-tested High School subsidy. P.E.
we choose to use the total cost of the program which reflects the actual market value 
of the resources enjoyed by a student.
The partial equilibrium effects of this simple tuition subsidy axe limited in terms of 
crime reduction: the aggregate crime rate goes down to 5.38% This is despite a huge 
shift in the distribution over education conditional on ability. The effects in terms of 
high school completion are extremely large, as reported in table 4.15.
The total number of high school dropouts in the economy drops by more than 40%. 
The increase in total tax revenues due to the job reallocation more than compensate the 
costs of the program. Aggregate prison costs plus the costs of the tuition programme 
are just 1% of total tax revenues. However, as shown in table 4.16, the positive effect 
in terms of crime associated to moving people away from the pool of high school 
dropouts is counterbalanced by a sharp rise in crime rates among the remaining high 
school dropouts. This increase in crime rate among dropouts is largely due to bigger 
inequality among different education groups.
In table 4.17 we report percentage changes (with respect to the benchmark) in
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Differences (%) w .r.t. benchm ark averages.
HS grads vs HS dropouts
N on  M .T . H S subsidy. P.E .
College grads vs HS grads
Ability -6.1% 0.0%
Labor price 0.0% 0.0%
Wage -4.8% 1.2%
Income 54.8% 1.0%
Table 4.17: Change (%) w.r.t. benchmark in average ability, wage, income and labour 
price. Non means-tested HS subsidy. P.E.
between-group differences in average wage, ability, marginal returns30 and post-tax 
income. Given that mostly wealth-poor agents remain in the drop-outs group, there is 
an increase of more than 50% in the income differential between high school graduates 
and dropouts. This additional inequality explains the substantial increase in crime 
rates among dropouts. The increase in crime rates among high school graduates follows 
from the fact that poorer and less able people now represent a larger share of this 
education group.
In partial equilibrium the increase in inequality seems to dampen the effectiveness 
of the HS tuition policy.
In the general equilibrium case things are rather different. The drop in crime rate 
is quite large with respect to the benchmark, as well as the experiments with higher 
jail terms. Table 4.18 reports the crime rates by ability and education for the G.E. 
high school subsidy experiment.
What drives the result is a significant composition effect. As it is clear from Table 
4.19 the proportion of ability 1 people among high school dropouts falls by 8 percentage 
points (against 6 in the prison term experiment) while the proportion of ability 2 people 
increases by 4 percentage points (it falls by 5 percentage points in the prison term case). 
Since the average worker in ability bin 2 has half the propensity to engage in crime 
than the average ability 1 worker, the crime rate falls more than in the case of an 
increase in the prison term. This improvement in the ability mix among high school 
dropouts produces an equilibrium aggregate crime rate of 5.1%, with a drop twice as
30The differences in marginal returns to labor are unchanged by construction in this P.E. experiment.
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C hanges in crim e rates by ability  and education . N on  M .T . H S subsidy. G .E.
Education group
ability bin HS dropouts HS graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 0 -.02
bin 2 -.02 0 0
bin 3 -.01 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 0 0
aggregate -.02 0 0
Table 4.18: Changes in crime rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability and education. Non 
means-tested High School subsidy. G.E.
C hanges in education  shares by ability. N on  M .T . H S subsidy. G .E .
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.08 .04 0 -.02 0
Edu 2 .04 -.04 0 .01 -.01
Edu 3 .04 0 0 .01 .01
Table 4.19: Changes in enrolment rates w.r.t. benchmark, by education and ability. 
Non-means tested High School subsidy. G.E.
large as the ones induced by the increased punishment and by the same tuition subsidy 
in partial equilibrium. Relative both to the prison term experiment and to the partial 
equilibrium case, this favorable composition effect is driven by changes in the relative 
price of skill between high school dropouts and high school graduates. Such relative 
price is basically unchanged in the prison term experiment. However, the labor price 
differences substantially shrink in the case of the tuition subsidy. This increases the 
share of people within ability group 2 who axe high school dropout, because higher 
ability people have a higher opportunity cost of attending high school relative to those 
in ability group 1. Education and skills are substitutes in reducing the crime rate and 
the equilibrium change in market prices shifts towards high school the people with the 
higher propensity to engage in crime.
Finally, in table 4.20, we document a small decrease in labor income inequality and 
a larger decrease in total income inequality that reinforces the drop in disaggregated 
crime rates.
The drop in income inequality is due to the adjustment in prices that was barred 
in partial equilibrium. Inequality in total income between HS graduates and dropouts
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Differences (%) w.r.t. benchmark averages. Non M.T. HS subsidy. G.E.
HS grads vs HS Dropouts College grads vs HS graduates
Average ability 12.2% 31.8%
Labor price -16.7% -1.4%
Average wage -4.8% -1.2%
Average income -5.5% -2.9%
Table 4.20: Change (%) w.r.t. benchmark in average ability, wage, income and labour 
price. Non means-tested High School subsidy. G.E.
is roughly one third smaller in G.E. than it was in partial equilibrium.
In this equilibrium the aggregate prison costs in model units are 0.40, or 0.94% of 
total tax revenues. The high school subsidy program costs roughly 0.5% of total tax 
revenues, which gives a total cost of roughly 1.44% of total tax revenues. However, in 
the new equilibrium total tax revenues axe 0.4% larger than in the benchmark, despite 
the proportional labor tax rate increases by the same amount (to 27.03%) as in the 
case of longer prison term. The increase in efficiency and revenues makes the policy 
effectively self-financing. Yet, for the same change in the tax rate, the effect in terms 
of crime reduction is roughly double as for the increase in prison term.
4.6.4 R estricting the target population
Another step towards designing an experiment comparable to the Quantum Oppor­
tunity Programme is to restrict the target population. The QOP was intended to 
help students from disadvantaged backgrounds: in this sense the population eligible 
for financial support was not the universe of all potential students as in the previous 
experiment. An across-the-board subsidy (i.e. not conditional on available resources) 
corresponds to a giveaway to many inframarginal individuals who would attend high 
school in any case, and its per-dollar effectiveness is likely to be smaller than a targeted 
intervention.
It is interesting to replicate the previous experiment with a restriction on eligibility. 
We do this by making the subsidy available only to agents with an inital assets endow­
ment below the 35th percentile of the initial assets distribution. We do not change the
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C hanges in education  shares by ability. M .T . HS subsidy. P.E .
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate rates
Edu 1 -.06 -.14 -.15 -.04 -.1
Edu 2 .05 .13 .15 .03 .09
Edu 3 .01 0 0 .01 .01
Table 4.21: Changes in enrolment rates w.r.t. benchmark, by education and ability. 
Means-tested High School subsidy. P.E.
C hanges in crim e rates by ab ility  and education . M .T . H S subsidy. P.E .
Education group
ability bin HS dropouts HS graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) .01 .02 -.01
bin 2 -.03 .06 -.01
bin 3 .04 .02 0
bin 4 (highest) .01 .01 0
aggregate .02 .02 0
Table 4.22: Changes in crime rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability and education. Means- 
tested High School subsidy. P.E.
size of the transfer, which is still 7.6 per cent of average labour earnings.
The P.E. result in terms of aggregate crime rate reduction is smaller than for the 
case of the subsidy across the board: the aggregate crime rate goes down to 5.43%. 
This follows from the smaller number of agents switching from the HS dropouts pool 
to the high school finishers group. Table (4.21) reports the changes (with respect to 
the benchmark) in education shares by ability.
The most noticeable difference with respect to the unrestricted subsidy case in 
partial equilibrium is the drop in criminal activity for the high school dropouts within 
ability bin 2 (table 4.22). This curious fact can be rationalised by looking at table
(4.23), reporting the share of eligible people taking up the subsidy by ability group. 
The take-up is increasing in ability (just as enrolment in HS is increasing in ability). 
However, for given wealth, the number of marginal individuals who shift education 
group because of the subsidy is larger in ability bin 2 than in ability 3 or 4; this is 
because there are many inframarginal individuals in bins 3 and 4 who would go to 
high school in any case. This is confirmed by comparing the enrolment rates in this 
experiment with the corresponding partial equilibrium experiment with unrestricted
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Share o f eligib le popu lation  taking-up th e  subsidy, by ability
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate
__________ 0 0.44 0.58 0.75______________ 063____________
Table 4.23: Share of eligible agents taking up subsidy. Means-tested HS subsidy ex­
periment in P.E.
subsidy: among those ability groups with positive take-up shares, only people in abil­
ity group 2 experience a significant change in enrolment. This explains the drop in 
crime rate for that group31. This means-tested policy is having a strong effect on a 
specific group of people (in ability bin 2) whose ability (and wealth) are high enough 
to have positive returns from switching education, and low enough to find such switch 
unattractive without a subsidy. With respect to the non means-tested subsidy, many 
people whose assets are above the means-testing threshold are likely to remain in the 
HS dropout pool (just as they were in the benchark), pulling down the crime rate in 
that group. On the other hand, people who were poorer and more likely to commit 
crime seized the opportunity to become HS graduates thanks to the policy.
The average initial wealth and ability of eligible people who took advantage of 
the programme axe significantly higher than for those who turned down the subsidy. 
Table (4.24) summarises the main differences between those eligible agents who took 
advantage of the programme and those who did not, and compares both to the group 
of people who did not qualify for the programme because of higher wealth. The 
results confirm that only people with much lower wealth and ability did not get any 
advantage from the programme. Moreover, the takers experienced much lower crime 
involvement over their life cycle, although this result can be misleasing insofar we are 
not controlling for self-selection in the programme. Finally, the group of non eligible 
agents is unsurprisingly much richer on average and its average ability lies between the 
ones of the other 2 categories. Not much in terms of crime reduction is lost by reducing 
the scope of the intervention, since the non eligible agents have very low crime rates 
over their life cycle.
31 If there was a positive take-up in ability group 1 we would observe a similar phenomenon. However 
the results show that in ability group 1 there are no marginal individuals whose behaviour changes 
because of the policy.
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Eligible takers vs non-takers/non-eligible. M.T. HS subsidy. P.E.
Eligible Non eligible
Take-up No take-up 
Average initial wealth 2.66 0.39 12.11
Ability 1.157 1.052 1.119
Crime rate over life cycle 0.09 0.21 0.01
Table 4.24: Takers vs non-eligible or non takers. Average wealth endowment at time 
of choice (age 16), average ability and average crime rate over life cycle. Means-tested 
High School subsidy. P.E.
Changes in education shares by ability. M.T. HS subsidy. G.E.
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate
Edu 1 .19 .11 0 -.03 0
Edu 2 -.19 -.10 0 .02 -.01
Edu 3 0 -.01 0 .01 .01
Table 4.25: Changes in enrolment rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability. Means-tested 
High School subsidy. G.E.
This P.E. experiment produces levels of wage and income inequality which are 
comparable to the levels obtained in P.E. within the unrestricted subsidy experiment. 
The aggregate prison expenditure is 0.42 (1%) of total tax revenues, whereas the 
aggregate transfer expenditure is 0.092 (0.02%) of total tax revenues. The labour tax 
rate consistent with budget balance is 26.98%, just below the benchmark level.
When we turn our attention to the G.E. means-tested experiment, things are dif­
ferent. The aggregate crime rate goes down much more than in P.E., to 5.2%. Strong 
composition effects are again present in the G.E. case. The policy is taken up by less 
people than in P.E. (40% vs 63%) and only the two highest bin groups seem to have a 
significantly positive take up share. Nonetheless, crime rates by ability and education 
drop substantially with respect to the benchmark as well as the P.E. counterpart. Ta­
bles (4.25 — 4.28) summarise the results. The mechanisms at work are similar to the 
case of the non means-tested subsidy.
Wage and income inequality are similar to the G.E. results for the across-the-board 
subsidy. The wealth difference between eligible takers and non-takers are smaller than 
in the P.E. case, the ability difference is larger: price effects adjust in such a way
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Changes in crim e rates by ab ility  and education . M .T . H S subsidy. G .E.
Education group
ability bin High School dropouts High School graduates College graduates
bin 1 (lowest) -.02 -.17 -.20
bin 2 -.03 0 -.01
bin 3 -.02 0 0
bin 4 (highest) 0 .01 0
aggregate -.02 0 0
Table 4.26: Changes in crime rates w.r.t. benchmark, by ability and education. Means- 
tested High School subsidy. G.E.
Share o f eligib le popu lation  taking-up th e  subsidy, by ability
Bin 1 Bin 2 Bin 3 Bin 4 Aggregate
__________ 0 0.005 0.175 0.718_____________ 0.397___________
Table 4.27: Share of eligible agents taking up subsidy. Means-tested High School 
subsidy. G.E.
that only high ability people are marginal with respect to the policy. This happens 
because marginal returns to different education types are closer than in P.E. and make 
a difference for high ability people only. Lower inequality reduces the incentive to 
crime for low education and low ability people.
The aggregate prison costs are just below 0.41, or 1% of total tax revenues. The 
cost of the transfer programme is 0.06 which is 0.14% of total tax revenues, and the 
labour tax rate consistent with balanced budget is 26.99%. The G.E. effects of this 
means-tested intervention are more cost effective than an unrestricted transfer policy, 
although not as effective in terms of aggregate crime reduction because the unrestricted
Eligible takers vs  non -tak ers/n on -elig ib le . M .T . H S subsidy. G .E .
Eligible Non eligible
Take-up No take-up
Average initial wealth 2.88 1.20 12.08
Ability 1.24 1.04 1.12
Crime rate over life cycle 0.06 0.17 0.02
Table 4.28: Takers vs non-eligible or non takers. Average wealth endowment at time 
of choice (age 16), average ability and average crime rate over life cycle. Means-tested 
High School subsidy. G.E.
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transfer policy generated an aggregate crime rate of 5.1%. This result is due to the 
fact that in the means-tested case those relatively wealthy individuals in ability bin 1 
and 2 who would have gone to high school in case of subsidy are not receiving any and 
the price differential is not large enough to make them switch. This fact more than 
compensate an even larger decrease in crime disaggregated crime rates.
4.6.5 Introducing a control group: A 5 0 /5 0  random isation
The most interesting piece of information regarding a subsidy experiment is how effec­
tive it is in reducing crime among those who receive it. In order to make a statement 
regarding such change, one should be able to compare the crime rates of two groups 
completely identical in every respect but the subsidy.
In order to obtain such information we have repeated the means-tested HS subsidy 
experiment described above with the simple variant that, among the eligible individ­
uals, only a randomly chosen 50% would receive the subsidy (with the remaining 50% 
not getting anything).
For these experiments we present only result comparing the average crime rates 
(over their life cycle) for eligible people randomised in or out. Here we do not re­
port information on the effects of the policies because they have been documented in 
previous sections. What matters in these experiments is the difference in crime rates 
between treatment and control group. We have run these experiment both in G.E. 
and P.E. and report the results for both in table (4.29).
The subsidy reduces life cycle crime rates by roughly half when we compare people 
who are randomised in and take up the subsidy with people who axe randomised out. 
These numbers are very much in line with crime rates for the treatment and control 
group one year after the end of the Quantum Opportunities Programme experiment 
that we have reported at the beginning of Section 4.6.3. Though caxe must be taken 
due to the different time horizon over which they axe calculated, their similarity is re­
markable. It is worth noting that the average crime rate for people who axe randomised 
out includes observations relative to people who would not take up the programme if 
it was offered to them. These results suggest that a targeted subsidy policy can reduce
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T reatm ent and control group: a com parison. M eans-T ested  H S subsidy
General equilibrium case
Randomised in Randomised out
take-up no take-up 
Crime rate over life cycle 0.07 0.19 0.14
Partial equilibrium case
Randomised in Randomised out
take-up no take-up 
Crime rate over life cycle 0.09 0.21 0.15
Table 4.29: Effectiveness of means-tested tuition subsidy in reducing life cycle crime. 
We compare people randomised in and out of the experiment. Results are provided 
for both G.E. and P.E. experiments.
crime rates in the target population by more than half, with the benefit being spread 
over a long time horizon corresponding to the life cycle of the treated.
4.7  Conclusions
In this chapter we have asked if a policy affecting the education decisions of relatively 
poorer and less able people can be more effective, in terms of costs and results, in 
reducing (property) crime rates than policies based on harsher punishment alone. We 
have developed and estimated a structural overlapping generations, life cycle model 
with optimal consumption, education and crime decisions. Given the complexity of 
the model, we have solved it numerically and have simulated the outcome of two al­
ternative sets of policies - increases in prison sentences and subsidies for high school 
completion. Our findings suggest that subsidizing high school graduation is cost effec­
tive and preferable to policies based on harsher punishment. We have found that the 
effect of a subsidy depend on the size of the intervention, i.e. whether the programme 
is large enough to generate changes in prices, at least locally. Our results indicate that, 
relative to partial equilibrium, price changes induce an improvement in the ability com­
position of the high school dropout pool and lower income inequality across education 
groups. The two effects reinforce each other in reducing the crime rate. We have shown 
that subsidies targeted at poorer students can be nearly as effective in terms of crime 
reduction as unconditional subsidies, at significantly lower cost. Finally, controlling for
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unobserved heterogeneity through a randomisation of the policy intervention, we have 
found that means-tested subsidies towards high school completion reduce the average 
crime rate over the life cycle of a target individual by almost one half. The framework 
can be easily extended to allow for differential employment risk by education and to 
study the effect of other interventions such as wage subsidies, unemployment benefits, 
income tax credits and other redistributive policies. This is ongoing research.
4.8 A ppendix to  chapter 4 
4.8.1 PSID  sam ple selection
Step-b y-step  Sam ple Selection  (data  from  1967 to  2000). After dropping 
10,607 individuals belonging to the Latino sample and 2263 individuals belonging 
to the new immigrant families added in 1997 and 1999, the joint 1967-2001 sample 
contains 50,625 individuals. After selecting only the observations on household heads 
we are left with 19,583 individuals.Dropping people younger than 25 or older than 65 
leaves us with 18,186 people. Dropping the self employment observations leaves 14,866 
persons in the sample. We then select only the individuals with at least 8 (possibly 
non continuous) observations, which further reduces the people in the sample to 6228. 
Dropping individuals with inconsistent education records leaves 6213 people in sample. 
Dropping individuals with missing, top-coded or zero earnings reduces the sample to 
5671 individuals and dropping those with zero, missing or more than 5840 annual 
work hours brings the sample size to 5,660 individuals. We eliminate individuals with 
outlying earning records, defined as changes in log-earnings larger than 4 or less than 
-2, which leaves 5,477 individuals in the sample. Finally, dropping people connected 
with the SEO sample reduces the number of individuals to 3,085, with a total number 
of observations of 50,720.
The composition of the sample by year and by education group is reported in the 
following tables.
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year N um ber o f O bservations year N um ber o f O bservations
1967 933 1983 1,775
1968 1,015 1984 1,802
1969 1,109 1985 1,808
1970 1,181 1986 1,829
1971 1,294 1987 1,837
1972 1,395 1988 1,840
1973 1,508 1989 1,838
1974 1,543 1990 1,809
1975 1,601 1991 1,780
1976 1,635 1992 1,697
1977 1,685 1993 1,698
1978 1,705 1994 1,638
1979 1,737 1995 1,588
1980 1,755 1996 1,510
1981 1,734 1998 1,425
1982 1,718 2000 1,298
Table 4.30: Number of individual observations, by year
Years o f E ducation N u m ber o f  Individuals N um ber o f O bservations
Sample from 1967 to 2000
less than 12 430 6,546
12 to 15 1,792 29,229
16 or more 863 14,945
Sample from 1967 to 1996
less than 12 430 6,380
12 to 15 1792 27,583
16 or more 863 14,034
Table 4.31: Distribution of individuals and total observations by years of education.
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Descriptive Statistics: Demographic Characteristics
1967 1980 1993
age 38.04 38.93 44.29
average hourly wage-LTHS 11.82 12.69 11.02
average hourly wage-HSG 14.53 15.33 15.63
average hourly wage-CG 20.54 19.34 25.02
average ln(hourly wage)-LTHS 2.36 2.42 2.24
average ln(hourly wage)-HSG 2.59 2.59 2.60
average ln(hourly wage)-CG 2.90 2.84 3.04
median hourly wage-LTHS 10.59 11.61 10.31
median hourly wage-HSG 14.09 13.96 13.61
median hourly wage-CG 19.24 17.45 21.46
average hours worked-LTHS 2246 2093 2121
average hours worked-HSG 2268 2125 2155
average hours worked-CG 2234 2158 2196
Table 4.32: PSID Sample Descriptive Statistics: Earnings are annual earnings and 
hours are annual hours worked. Wages are hourly wages computed as annual earnings 
divided by annual hours worked. Both wages and earnings are expressed in 1992 
dollars.
4.8.2 CPS data
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 50,000 house­
holds conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This 
monthly survey of households is conducted for BLS by the Bureau of the Census 
through a scientifically selected sample designed to represent the civilian noninsti- 
tutional population. Respondents are interviewed to obtain information about the 
employment status of each member of the household 15 years of age and older. Each 
month about 50,000 occupied units are eligible for interview. Some 3,200 of these 
households are contacted but interviews are not obtained because the occupants are 
not at home after repeated calls or are unavailable for other reasons. This represents 
a non-interview rate for the survey that ranges between 6 and 7 percent. In addition 
to the 50,000 occupied units, there are 9,000 sample units in an average month which 
are visited but found to be vacant or otherwise not eligible for enumeration. Part of 
the sample is changed each month. The rotation plan, as explained later, provides for 
three-fourths of the sample to be common from one month to the next, and one-half 
to be common with the same month a year earlier. The CPS has been used to collect
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annual income data since 1948, when only two supplementary questions were asked 
in April: ’’How much did ... earn in wages and salaries in 1947 ...” and ’’how much 
income from all sources did ... receive in 1947”. Over the years, the number of income 
questions has expanded, questions on work experience and other characteristics have 
been added, and the month of interview relating to previous year income and earnings 
has moved to March. This yearly survey goes under the name of March CPS Supple­
ment.32 Age classification is based on the age of the person at his/her last birthday. 
The adult universe (i.e., population of marriageable age) is comprised of persons 15 
years old and over for March supplement data and for CPS labor force data. Each 
household and person has a weight that should be used in producing population-level 
statistics. The weight reflects the probability sampling process and estimation proce­
dures designed to account for nonresponse and undercoverage. Unweighted counts can 
be very misleading and should not be used in demographic or labor force analysis.
Sample selection. We use the March CPS yearly files and additional files from 
1968 to 2001. We use the CPI for all urban consumer (with base year 1992) to deflate 
the CPS earning data and drop all observations that have missing or zero earnings. 
Since the earning data are top-coded for confidentiality issues until 1995, we have 
extrapolated the average of the top-coded values by using a tail approximations based 
on a Pareto distribution.33 For the period 1996-2000 BLS provides the averages of 
unreported values for different age/sex/empl. groups. Therefore the overall mean of 
the distribution is easy to recover and we do not use any tail adjustment.
The averages of earnings, both censored and tail-adjusted, are reported in table 
(4.8.2), categorized by education group and year.
32Today, information is gathered on more than 50 different sources of income, including noncash 
income sources such as food stamps, school lunch program, employer-provided pension plan and per­
sonal health insurance. Comprehensive work experience information is given on the employment status, 
occupation, and industry of persons 15 years old and over.
33This procedure is based on a general approach to inference about the tail of a distribution originally 
developed by Hill (1975). This approach has been proposed as an effective way to approximate the 
mean of top-coded CPS earning data by West (1985); Polivka (2000) provides evidence that this 
method closely approximates the average of the top-coded tails by validating the fitted data through 
undisclosed and confidential non top-coded data available only at the BLS.
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Shares (%) of workers by years of schooling in each sample year
Years of schooling Years of schooling
year <12 12-15 > 15 year <12 12-15 >15
1968 41.4 47.5 11.1 1985 20.0 60.0 20.0
1969 40.0 48.7 11.3 1986 19.0 60.0 21.0
1970 38.4 50.1 11.5 1987 19.0 60.0 21.0
1971 36.7 51.1 12.2 1988 18.7 60.0 21.4
1972 35.3 51.9 12.8 1989 18.2 59.8 22.0
1973 33.6 53.1 13.3 1990 17.5 60.1 22.4
1974 32.8 53.4 13.8 1991 16.8 60.6 22.6
1975 31.3 54.1 14.6 1992 15.7 61.7 22.6
1976 29.2 55.2 15.6 1993 14.8 61.7 23.4
1977 28.8 55.2 16.0 1994 14.7 61.8 23.5
1978 28.1 55.8 16.1 1995 14.6 61.1 24.3
1979 26.3 57.0 16.7 1996 14.8 60.5 24.7
1980 25.1 57.6 17.3 1997 14.7 60.7 24.6
1981 23.8 58.6 17.6 1998 14.6 60.2 25.2
1982 22.8 58.8 18.4 1999 14.4 59.8 25.8
1983 21.0 59.3 19.7 2000 14.1 59.8 26.1
1984 20.3 59.6 20.1 2001 13.8 59.6 26.6
Table 4.33: Percentage of people without High School degree (less than 12 years of 
schooling), with High School degree (12-15 years of schooling) and with College degree 
(at least 16 years of completed schooling), for the years 1968-2001. Based on CPS 
March Supplement data. The sample consists of workers only.
Average Earnings (yearly, in $ )
year censored data adjusted data
<12 12-15 >15 <12 12-15 >15
1968 14336 20609 35324 14384 20688 35725
1969 14794 21180 35432 14794 21261 35780
1970 14903 21610 37036 14924 21702 37540
1971 14690 21417 36364 14839 21556 36863
1972 14841 21157 36340 14920 21242 37115
1973 15383 22249 37538 15541 22469 38507
1974 15020 22232 37057 15118 22435 38110
1975 14208 21199 34357 14335 21405 35595
1976 13333 20468 34367 13400 20689 35949
1977 13675 20584 34544 13796 20863 36467
1978 13396 20979 34810 13484 21272 37267
1979 13395 21121 34499 13613 21409 37503
1980 13513 20678 33632 13692 21040 37283
1981 12600 19625 32169 12701 20077 36040
1982 12213 19223 32311 12337 19410 34289
1983 11699 18746 32621 11730 19000 35209
1984 11796 18928 33191 11906 19178 35585
Average Earnings (yearly, in $ )
year censored data adjusted data
<12 12-15 >15 <12 12-15 >15
1985 11676 19319 34656 11762 19463 36276
1986 11626 19682 35301 11779 19834 37290
1987 11820 20139 36598 12002 20322 39057
1988 11991 20364 36049 12229 20668 38349
1989 11755 20288 36084 12152 20689 38472
1990 11265 20334 36405 11369 20811 39571
1991 11127 19733 35296 11230 20084 38467
1992 10661 19381 35210 10777 19710 38507
1993 10446 19422 35363 10597 19784 39089
1994 9955 19167 35610 10117 19617 40228
1995 10227 19439 35991 10468 19913 41664
1996 10579 20306 39643 10579 20306 39643
1997 10790 20586 40073 10790 20586 40073
1998 11287 20809 41019 11287 20809 41019
1999 10984 21406 42794 10984 21406 42794
2000 10784 21626 42148 10784 21626 42148
2001 11330 22346 45147 11330 22346 45147
Table 4.34: Average earnings by education group, all years. Earnings are in 1992 dollars. Censored averages are based on 
unadjusted, top-coded data. Adjusted averages are based on data with Pareto-tail adjustment. From 1996 onwards censored and 
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Calibrated Parameter Values for Benchmark 
Parameter Value Moment to Match
j 79 Maximum lifespan after labor market entry
jr 50 Maximum years of working life
- Survival rates
P 0.967 Wealth-Income ratio excluding top 1%
I 0.74 Average duration of unemployment
Q .175 Unemployment incidence
Subhigh school .019 Direct tuition cost of High School
Subunivers{ty  .19 Direct tuition cost of College
a -.865 Fraction of households with net worth < 0
a .35 Capital share in total output
8 .065 Depreciation rate
P .307 Pension replacement rate
U .27 Labor income tax
tK .40 Capital income tax
X -.32 Aggregate property crime rate
u -.80 Elasticity of crime rate w.r.t. expected prison term
Table 4.35: Value of Parameters Calibrated in Benchmark
Quasi-linear utility terms associated to education
Education group
Ability Bin High School College
Bin 1 (h27 -5.80
Bin 2 0.39 -4.32
Bin 3 0.49 -2.55
Bin 4 0.89 -0.64
Table 4.36: Quasi-linear utility terms associated to being in education for High-School 
and College. The terms differ by ability bin because the enrolment rates that are 
matched are different in each bin.
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4.8.3 N um erical im plem entation
The procedure adopted to implement the numerical simulations is very similar to the 
one described in section 3.7.6. However, the inclusion of an additional binary decision 
makes the execution much slower.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
This thesis focussed on the evaluation of policy interventions adopting a structural 
approach. Chapter 2 has dealt with issues stemming from the inclusion of binary 
decisions within life-cycle models and has provided a set of results that are useful to 
understand the characteristics of such models and to implement their numerical coun­
terparts. Chapter 3 has looked at how subsidization of College education interacts with 
heterogeneity, addressing issues of selection and wage inequality in equilibrium. Chap­
ter 4 has provided an example of structural policy analysis comparing the effectiveness 
of alternative interventions targeting a reduction in crime rates.
The analysis in chapters 3 and 4 has relied on the measurement of fundamental 
model parameters through direct estimation or model calibration. Aggregate moments 
were mostly calibrated whereas individual parameters were estimated. Estimation 
equations were specified in accordance to the models’ structure. Different approaches 
to the estimation of wage dynamics and production technologies have been presented 
in different chapters.
Through counterfactual policy analysis the chapters of this thesis have provided 
evidence supporting the view that long-term, equilibrium policy outcomes may drasti­
cally differ from their short-term counterparts. The comparison of partial and general 
equilibrium effects showed that price responses, even of relatively small size, can trig­
ger large changes in selection into (or out of) education and crime. In chapter 3 it was 
shown that College subsidization could actually lead to increased wage inequality when
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all equilibrium effects are accounted for and that major crowding out effects can take 
place in equilibrium. Chapter 4, similarly, has documented the importance of earnings 
and wealth inequality in shaping criminal behaviour and showed that policies which 
are able to induce reductions in equilibrium wage inequality turn out to be extremely 
effective in reducing crime participation. In all applications equilibrium effects have 
proved to be non trivial, both in quality and quantity.
These results have highlighted the significance of explicitly modelling different 
sources of heterogeneity in the evaluation of policy interventions: the distributional ef­
fects of policies appear to be remarkably strong and able to shape aggregate outcomes. 
Some extensions could make these models more interesting and are planned as future 
research. First, comparing measures of welfare would identify the winners and losers 
of different interventions. This would help understand whether a specific intervention 
is implementable from a political economic perspective. Second, the computation of 
transitional dynamics could shed some light on the effects of a policy intervention while 
agents adjust to the new steady state. This would complement the welfare analysis, by 
indicating how painful a transition really is. The future research agenda should also 
include the study of alternative methods to parameterise large heterogeneous agents 
models in a consistent manner. Better procedures to reconcile the agent-based, behav­
ioural dimension with the aggregate dimension would be an enormous step forward.
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